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Abstract
The study has focussed on four issues:
First, the study has stressed the idea that patterns of 
income distribution and poverty are the outcome of a complex 
interaction of many social, economic, and political factors 
operating in a manner peculiar to each individual economy. 
It is such factors which differentiate the experience of 
different countries with regard to growth, income inequality 
and poverty. Accordingly, it was decided to pursue a more 
eclectic approach to the understanding of such factors in 
Algeria.
Second, a review of the Algerian economy during the colonial 
era shows how the economy was serving its metropolitan 
counterpart in general and the settlers in particular. While 
the settlers were enjoying a high standard of living, the 
Algerians were experiencing impoverishment.
Third, a critical analysis of the Algerian development 
strategy, which was implemented during the post independence 
era, showed that the economy remained beset by a number of 
problems, bottlenecks and performance failures, which have 
not permitted the generation of self-sustainable growth of 
output and employment. Consequently, the pattern of income 
distribution and poverty has been significantly affected. 
The improvement in the overall income distribution and 
alleviation of poverty, identified during 1967/68 - 1979/80 
(the seventies) was ephemeral. During the Eighties, it seems
xv
that the trend has been in the opposite direction. The 
economic variables which accounted for the improvement in 
the seventies were, in fact, the same variables which 
accounted for the deterioration in the Eighties, now opera­
ting in reverse. In this respect, the primary conclusion is 
that such a reversal was to be expected. The improvement had 
been based on a temporary advantage (the oil boom), and on 
an ill-founded economic policy (job-sharing) . The short-term 
improvement followed by a reversal was directly due to the 
type and nature of the development strategy in general and 
of the distributional policy in particular. As a matter of 
fact, the prevalence of unequal' distribution of assets 
(specifically land), the continuous rise in unemployment, 
the deterioration of the wage rate, and the rising cost of 
living lead us to a pessimistic forecast about the trends of 
poverty and income inequality in the immediate future.
Fourth, the policy implication is that attainment of a 
sustainable improvement in income distribution and reduction 
of poverty requires more drastic reform of the mechanism of 
resource allocation and resource use. It would also require 
corrections of the observed distortions, the increase and 
expansion of production units on an autonomous basis, in 
order to create the conditions favourable to vigorous 
growth, as well as a sustainable improvement in the distri­
bution of income and in the alleviation of poverty. For such 
an aim, issues of income distribution and alleviation of 
poverty will have to become integral parts of the 
development strategy.
xvi
Int roduct ion
Over the last two decades, the need to improve the distribu­
tion of income and alleviate poverty while fostering rapid 
economic growth has been emphasised in the development 
literature. As a result the analysis of the determinants of 
the pattern of income distribution and poverty has been 
brought to the forefront. By now, there is a growing 
consensus that the disparities in the distribution of 
economic assets and political power, which result from 
complex interaction between economic as well as socio­
political forces, are the main factors determining such a 
pattern in a particular society.
It has to be noted that the understanding of how income 
comes to be distributed is an exceedingly complex matter. It 
is subject to various limitations which stem from the fact 
that the distribution of income is the end result of the 
workings of the entire socio-economic and political system. 
This explains partly why we lack a comprehensive theory 
explaining how income is distributed among persons or 
households. Most theories of income distribution have, in 
the past, taken a partial view, focussing on one or more 
factors which govern the distribution of income in a 
particular society. The recent econometric analyses have 
tended to be more comprehensive as they have attempted to 
incorporate the impact of development strategies and 
policies on the incidence of poverty and on the relative
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shares of various groups. But because of the difficulty in 
quantifying socio-political relationships, it is often 
advanced that some variables are either non-existent or at 
best constant; (i.e. included in the "other things remaining 
constant" - but other things never are the same, or anything 
like the same). In fact, in a developing society, particu­
larly when the government has adopted planning as the tool 
of policy formulation and implementation, it aims at 
reforming attitudes and motivations; therefore assuming that 
political and social variables are constant casts doubt on 
the findings arrived at by such econometric analyses. 
Besides', it has' been commonly experienced in many developing 
countries that attempts to change the existing income 
distribution or property relations have encountered severe 
opposition from the vested interests. Neither privileged 
groups nor individuals give up or concede their privileges 
to other groups or other individuals easily, let alone 
willingly. In such circumstances not including such factors 
in one’s analysis makes the results of such analysis rather 
weak and somewhat meaningless for practical policy making. 
One may also cast doubts even on the accuracy of the 
quantifiable variables and their impact on income distribu­
tion and the incidence of poverty because the data on which 
such econometric models are constructed, are often very 
shaky.
It is not being suggested that econometric analyses are not 
much use. In many ways they are; they provide the resear­
chers some insights into various quantifiable relationships 
as well as the gaps in our knowledge about a country. But at
2
the same time one has to be aware of the limitations of such 
econometric exercises for practical policy making. A socio­
economic analysis probably gives us much more insight than 
an econometric exercise which does not (or cannot) include 
socio-economic relationships. In the present thesis it has 
been- decided consciously to take a socio-economic approach 
because, leaving out socio-economic variables and relation­
ships is not particularly justifiable in such an analysis. 
But it is also true that Algeria does not possess the range 
of data required for a full-blown econometric model of the 
type that are available for India or Korea.
An intensive search into the causes of inequality is the 
crux of this study, because it enables us to determine the 
obstacles to the "trickle down" effect of growth or to a 
sustainable improvement in the distribution of income and 
alleviation of poverty. This would help us to examine the 
nature of the policies related to income distribution and 
poverty and to explore their likely effects. It remains to 
be seen whether such policies have had lasting effects, or 
only short-lived ones attributable to special conditions. 
Such an examination allows us also to test the hypothesis 
that the policy of 'sharing jobs' implicit in Algerian 
policies, which was associated with the oil boom period, 
represented a type of a once and for all income transfer, 
generating only a temporary improvement in the distribution 
of income and in the alleviation of poverty. The recent 
status of the Algerian economy, as indicated by a number of 
factors, shows that the trend in income distribution and
3
poverty, which was noticed during the seventies, has been 
reversed during the 1980's, and this is more likely to 
continue in the immediate future despite the rhetoric to the 
contrary to be found in its first and second five year 
plans. Therefore such an examination would not only reveal 
how the Algerian development strategy has exerted its 
effects on the pattern of income distribution and poverty, 
but also determine the main forces shaping such a pattern in 
its long term trend.
Essentially, this study will further four distinct tasks:
(a) to identify trends in income distribution and in 
poverty in the overall economy, in urban, and in rural areas 
during 1967/68 -1979/80 period, (henceforth the seventies).
(b) to explore the main factors which have apparently been 
responsible for the changes in income distribution and 
poverty during the 1970s.
(c) to indicate the likely trend in the distribution of 
income and poverty during the 1980s and in the immediate 
future.
(d) to stress the need to incorporate the issues of income 
distribution and the alleviation of poverty specifically 
into development planning.
Any analysis of this nature requires a framework in which 
the above tasks can be performed with analytical rigour. One 
of the best ways of creating such a framework is to review 
the existing literature on income distribution and poverty.
Such a framework provides a basis of selecting the main 
determinants of income distribution and poverty. -But such 
determinants may not necessarily behave in the same fashion 
in all societies. Therefore it may be useful to examine the 
structure of the Algerian economy and to see how these 
determinants operate (or are likely to operate) in the 
Algerian situation. This will form the second main aspect of 
this study.
The third aspect of the study traces changes in the 
distribution of income, as to provide a basis for analysing 
the impact of growth on income distribution and its main 
determinants. It examines the intra-sectoral and inter­
sectoral effects which contribute to the overall income 
inequality - employing measures of income inequality that 
can be decomposed - and which provide a deeper understanding 
of the underlying characteristics of inequality. This would 
highlight how policy measures affected the distribution of 
•income during the 1967/68 - 1979/80 period.1
The fourth aspect of the study aims at examining the trends 
of absolute poverty and its extent during 1967/68 - 197 9/80, 
both in urban and in rural areas, and how inequality changes 
have affected various income groups. This leads us to the 
fifth aspect of this study which examines the main 
determinants of the pattern of income distribution and 
poverty during the 1967/68 - 1979/80 period, during the 
1980s, and in the years to come. This means that such an 
examination would allow us not only to indicate some of the
5
main forces which have shaped that pattern during the 
1967/68 - 1979/80 period but also to examine how these 
forces have determined the trends in that pattern during the 
1980s, and how will they affect it in the near future. The 
final and the concluding section suggests some policy 
measures as well as some changes in the pattern of 
development in order to achieve more lasting improvements in 
the distribution of income and reduction in the incidence of 
poverty.
It has to be noted that any analysis that attempts to 
document and explain income inequality and poverty will 
inevitably suffer from problems of oversimplification and of 
methodological nature.2 However, it is hoped that this study 
will make some contribution to the understanding of the 
patterns of income distribution and poverty in developing 
countries in general and in Algeria in particular.
6
Notes.
1. It is only through the examination of changes in the 
distribution of income over the years that one can see 
how changes in various policy measures affected the 
patterns of income distribution and poverty.
2. Any analysis for a developing country is also plagued by
unavailability and/or inaccuracy of relevant information 
and data.
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CHAPTER I
Development, income distribution and poverty.
Economic development has attracted a considerable interest 
since the end of World War II. Early in that period, 
economic development was expressed almost exclusively in 
terms of increases in GNP; and growth was seen as a 
sufficient goal of development policy. Accordingly, it was 
thought that rapid gains from the overall growth in per 
capita average income would, automatically, narrow income 
differentials and bring benefits to the masses. This has not 
happened: the poor do not seem to have gained significantly 
from the economic development of recent decades.1 It was 
emphasised that "Contrary to earlier expectations, the 
experience of the past two decades has shown that rapid 
growth of aggregate output does not by itself reduce poverty 
and inequality..."2 Although growth did take place, the 
distressingly persistent problem of poverty remained wide­
spread.3 This, therefore, casts doubts on the hypothesis 
that poverty can be taken care of after growth is achieved,4 
and refutes the idea of "grow now and redistribute later", 
leading to a growing scepticism about whether "later" would 
ever come.5
Moreover, as the ILO points out "it is no longer acceptable 
in human terms, or responsible in political terms, to wait 
several generations for the benefits of development to
trickle down until they finally reach the. poorest groups."6 
Some other scholars also agree that "Distribution cannot be 
left as a fortuitous by-product of growth, but must be made 
a conscious and explicit element of policy."7 In fact, the 
growing awareness of the problems of poverty and income 
inequality has led to a surge of interest in the 
relationship between development and income distribution. 
This has attracted a tremendous amount of empirical analysis 
and research both by development economists an d 
international development institutions.
This requires certainly an understanding of the nature of 
the force's which determine the pattern of income 
distribution and the incidence of poverty in an economy. 
Admittedly, the attempt to understand how income is 
distributed, or what causes poverty goes back to the 
classical economists, if not earlier, but so far a 
comprehensive theory has not yet been developed. Most 
attempts have tended to be a partial analysis as a brief 
review presented here suggests. Nevertheless, such a review 
may give us some insights into the understanding of the 
problems of income distribution and poverty and may enable 
us to draw some conclusions about the main determinants of 
inequality and poverty in Algeria.
1.1- The Distribution of Income.
In the literature, the distribution of income has been dealt 
with by two main approaches - the functional distribution
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which analyses the distribution of income among the factors 
of production namely land, labour and capital, and the 
personal distribution (known also as the size distribution) 
which examines the distribution of income among individuals, 
families or households.
1.1.1- The Functional Distribution of Income.
The classical economic theory analysed the phenomenon of 
income distribution through the functional approach which 
centered its analysis on the relative shares that the owners 
of different factors of production receive out of the total 
income. Thus., the concern was primarily with the distribu­
tion among factors of production, in the form of rent, 
profit, and wages attributed respectively to the three main 
classes of the community, namely landlords, who owned titles 
of property in land, capitalists who owned property in 
capital, and labourers, who provided labour power. In his 
Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith wrote that "the whole annual 
produce,... naturally divides itself into three parts, and 
constitutes a revenue to three orders of people, to those 
who live by rent, to those who live by wages and to those
who live by profit. These are three great, original and
constituent orders of civilised society."8
In this perception, the division of what was produced among 
the factors of production attributed to the prevailing
social classes, determined the functional distribution of
income. Ricardo saw the laws which regulate this distri­
bution as the principal problem in political economy. In a
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letter to Malthus he wrote, "Political economy, you think is 
an inquiry into the nature and causes of wealth; I think it 
would rather be called an inquiry into the laws which 
determine the distribution of the produce of industry among 
the classes which concur in its formation."9
Adam Smith discussed the trend of the labour share, to show 
how wages gravitated around subsistence. According to him 
wages first rose and then fall back to subsistence as 
population catches up with capital accumulation; other 
shares were less satisfactorily explained. He advanced that 
the rate of profits would fall10 due to the exhaustion of 
investment opportunities, overlooking the fact "that conti­
nuing new inventions will greatly delay the fall of the 
profit rate to its minimum and perhaps continue to do so 
permanently."11 This was observed by many economists such as 
Kuznets who noticed that, in this century, growth of 
technology has been enough to keep the real rate growing at 
something like an exponential rate.12 Moreover, Smith did 
not give a coherent statement about rent; he appeared not to 
be sure about it. At one time, he argued that progress will 
cause rents to rise both in nominal and in real terms; and 
at another time, he suggested that rent tended to decline 
with progress. Moreover, at one point, he suggests that the 
highest rates of profit will eat up all rent. In this 
respect, it seems that Smith did not have a clear idea about 
the trends of relative shares. In fact, as pointed out by 
Ricardo, "Smith advanced very little satisfactory informa­
tion concerning the natural course of rent, profit and
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wages.1,13
Ricardo, meanwhile, presented a- clearer idea about the 
trends of relative shares. He saw wages tied up to 
subsistence, rent increasing14 - mainly due to diminishing 
returns and the pressure of population on land, and profits 
falling. He argued that with the pressure of population, 
poorer soils are brought under cultivation, resulting in a 
decline in the marginal yield of land. Consequently, rent 
tended to rise, wages gradually absorbed an increasing 
portion of the remainder, and profit correspondingly 
declined. The continuation of such a process reduced capital 
accumulation to nil, more workers could not be supported and 
the "stationary state" is reached. At this stage, the share 
of the rentiers is relatively high, while average labour 
income still remains near subsistence and, consequently 
income will be unequally distributed. However, Ricardo's 
basic theory on distribution is that a rise of wages - due to 
the rise of corn - would invariably lower profits.15 
Accordingly, the only persistent forces working to lower 
profits is diminishing returns in agriculture and population 
growth. This by no means suggests that the forces regulating 
the trend of rent are the same as those regulating the trend 
in profits. In this respect, Ricardo pointed out that "the 
laws which regulate the progress of rent are widely 
different from those which regulate the progress of profits, 
and seldom operate in the same direction."16 Thus, the three 
shares are determined by different principles. Rent is the 
surplus over marginal yield, wages are determined by the
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standard of living of the labouring people and profits 
absorb the residual.17 It seems that Ricardo underestimated 
the effects of technological progress which could lower 
wage-good costs and thereby increase profits. In fact, many 
economists18 have rejected the Ricardian view, mainly the 
one of the inverse movement of wages and profits, on dynamic 
grounds, reflected through the role of technical progress in 
both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors.
On the other hand, Mill supported Ricardo's conclusion that 
"the rate of profits depends on wages, rising as wages fall, 
and falling as wages rise."19 However, while the theoretical 
foundation of Mill's analysis of distribution is still the 
same as of Ricardo, noticing that rent rises, wages, and 
profits move inversely; Mill introduced the effects of social 
and institutional factors. He considered the laws of proper­
ty, and inheritance, systems of land tenure and customary 
practices as affecting rents, and wages, and the distri­
bution of ownership. He showed that the absence of competi­
tion was a main factor contributing to inequality of remune­
ration and stressed the consequences of the inheritance of 
wealth on the unequal distribution of income. He advocated 
the system of peasant proprietorship, which may gradually 
move the society toward less income inequality. But for Mill 
the distribution of income concerns only the 'advanced 
countries.'; he stressed that, "it is only in the backward 
countries of the world that increased production is still an 
important object; in those most advanced countries, what is 
economically needed is a better distribution".20 This is, to
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some extent, the idea that less developed countries (LDCs) 
do not have to worry about distribution until there is 
something to redistribute, which will be discussed below.
All in all, the Classical economists envisaged the pre­
existent division of society into classes and formulated 
principles in accordance with which national income is 
divided among them; each class is aimed to secure a larger 
share of the income. It was this idea which gave Karl Marx 
the basis for the development of the concept of class 
conflict. But the Classical economists did not discuss how 
income should be distributed. In this respect, according to 
Sidgwick, "Adam Smith and his immediate successors conceived 
[political economy] as the maximisation of the national 
production of wealth, and hardly appear to have entertained 
the notion of aiming at the best possible distribution."21 
However, it may be concluded that the reward to different 
factors of production, portraying the source of income, 
would give us insights into the determinants of income 
distribution in a particular society. Further elaboration on 
this point will be seen below.
In Marxists' thinking, the distribution of income is syste­
matically organized around the distribution of property. In 
capitalism, from Marx' point of view, labour power itself 
becomes a commodity; and ownership of the means of produc­
tion becomes concentrated in the hands of a class that is 
able to appropriate a parr of the output produced by labour 
in the form of surplus value, which is converted into
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capital for the purpose of producing more surplus value. 
This process of capital accumulation, in Marxists1 terms, 
increases the size of the proletariat through the global 
expansion of the capitalist mode of production and by 
breaking up non capitalist mode of production - traditional 
handicrafts and so on; it keeps wages at their subsistence 
level by virtue of the existence of the 'reserve army1 of 
labour, and increases the immiserization of the prole­
tariat.22
In this respect, from the stand point of Marxist theory, the 
existence of labour power as a commodity is associated with 
a distinctive social relation, the capital-labour relation. 
It is within the social relations of production that classes 
are defined, on the basis of relationship to the means of 
production (owners of means of production versus hired
labour) . It is on this foundation that Marxist theory was 
based, explaining the division of the national product 
between labour, and capital, representing the two different 
classes in the society. With these two different classes, 
Marxists emphasized the impact of property ownership on the 
concentration of wealth and income, and stressed the unavoi­
dable consequences, in terms of deprivations and income
inequalities in the context of capitalist development. In 
other words, in a model of capitalist accumulation, wages 
are prevented from rising permanently above a socially 
determined level by the existence of a "reserve army"23 of
labour, replenished by workers who are displaced from handi­
crafts and/or by the labour saving innovations of the capi­
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talists, resulting in a falling share of wages in total 
output, and consequently increasing the concentration of 
wealth and income.24
From this point of view, the distribution of income is 
determined within the framework of the theory of surplus 
value or theory of exploitation. In fact, while emphasising 
the income determination process between classes and only 
casually discussing the income determination process within 
classes, the Marxists believe that it is the between-classes 
income differentials which are the main determinant of 
income inequality in a capitalist society.25
Marxists, however trace the dynamics of capitalist society 
in general and income inequality in particular to this 
unequal control over the productive apparatus according to 
which a substantial degree of inequality is inevitable. Here 
Palma26 follows Cardoso and Warren in deriding those who 
hope that capitalism could ever produce a just distribution 
of income, wealth and power. This stems from the idea that 
class - defined as positions within the social relations of 
production - plays a central role in generating income 
inequality in capitalist societies. In other words, it does 
demonstrate that class has a systematic and pervasive impact 
on income inequality. In this respect, as it has been 
pointed out, to ignore social relations of production in the 
distribution of income, is thus to ignore one of the 
fundamental dimensions of social inequality in capitalist 
society.27
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In the absence of different classes, in so far as there is 
no private ownership of the means of production, there can 
be no meaningful distinction between income from property 
and income from labour power.28 Accordingly, the inequa­
lities that may emerge, would be entirely explicable in 
terms of the differential .remuneration of mental as opposed 
to manual labour, which, as Marx and Lenin were careful to 
note, was to be regarded as regrettably inevitable in the 
initial phase of a socialist development. In this respect, 
it has to be noted that such a principle for differentiation 
has hardly been seen in the real world, where political 
status is another element for differentiation. For instance, 
a member of the Communist Party in socialist societies 
enjoys high status and fringe benefits which are usually not 
taken into account in the size distribution of income.29 In 
Poland, for instance, "Extremely high incomes are found in 
households whose members are closely linked to the political 
power centre or are representatives of the so-called 
'private initiative’,... The first group comprises the house­
holds of those who work in national defense, police and 
secret service, or the political and party apparatus."30 As 
a matter of fact, in most societies, even when the means of 
production are said to be publicly owned, advantages and 
privilege are not equitably shared with the populace at 
large but are enjoyed by a handful of decision-makers, 
whether they are capitalists or party executives. In a word, 
inequalities in both the sphere of ownership and the sphere 
of decision-making lead to inequalities in•the distribution
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of income.
However, we can infer from the Marxists1 theory that the 
sources of inequalities are identified as being in the 
sphere of ownership. The private control over the means of 
production is one of the main forces generating "some appa­
rently built-in tendencies for the rich to sustain their 
riches and the poor their poverty which one would expect to 
help in explaining the persistent continuation of the large 
inequalities in income and wealth1'31 which have apparently 
been seen in many countries. In turn, change in the struc­
ture of ownership of the means of production was treated as 
a prerequisite for the elimination of all other inequalities 
in social life.
In the view of the Marginalist School on the other hand, all 
factors were assumed to be paid according to the value of 
their marginal product. This ties in neatly with the margi­
nal productivity theory of distribution, laid down under 
certain conditions, with the assumption of a constant return 
to scale and/or perfect competition in factor and commodity 
markets. The main- idea is that the productive factor is paid 
at a rate equalling its marginal value product, which elimi­
nates the need to attribute residual income to any one 
factor, as the Ricardian system did - it assigns to 
'profits', as shown above, the residual in total output value 
after rent which was determined by the differential fertili­
ty of land, and wages determined by subsistence were deduc­
ted. It follows, according to the Marginalist School that 
the sum of payments, i.e. the prices paid for the factors of
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possessed by an individual, determine his income. In this 
respect, factor shares are governed by the changes in the 
relative factor quantities, elasticity of substitution 
between factors, changes in the demand for products, and the 
character of the technical change. It is the specific form 
of the marginal productivity theory that is embodied the 
Neoclassical conception of different categories of income as 
returns to different factors reflecting relative factor 
scarcities and technical conditions of production.
In this model, however, relative factor shares change with 
both technical changes affecting marginal productivities and 
changes in the relative amounts of factors employed. 
Consequently these have raised certain problems mainly: (a)
the question of the measurability of capital in the context 
of the Neoclassical production function. In other words the 
main argument put forward is that it is not possible to 
measure adequately aggregate capital, because the value of 
capital is dependent on the rate of interest that is used to 
discount future profits, and interest rate itself is equal 
to the marginal product of capital. It is circular reasoning 
rendering the measurement of capital a questionable issue. 
Moreover, capital as such is produced by labour; it is a 
whole debate in the Neoclassical economic theory.32 And (b) 
how the choice of techniques of production and technical 
progress affect growth and income distribution over time.33 
Furthermore, one has to question the assumptions of the 
Neoclassical approach, mainly with regards to the particula­
rities of LDCs. Among its characteristics are a general
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•distribution of knowledge and opportunities, and absence of 
impediments to factor mobility, which thereby occur within a 
perfectly competitive structure. Most of these, if not all, 
assumptions are not valid with regards to the specific 
socio-economic institutional structure of less developed 
countries. In other words, it has been mainly concerned with 
abstract economies, which resemble the developed countries 
more than the developing countries. In developing countries, 
knowledge of opportunities is poorly distributed, factor 
mobility is impaired, exchange systems are rudimentary and 
non competitive, preferences are volatile,34 and the struc­
ture itself is undergoing rapid change. The above factors 
inhibit the use of the generalities of an ideal model. So, 
there is little significance to the Neo-classical functional 
distribution of returns in explaining how income is distri­
buted in less developed countries. A satisfactory explana­
tion, meanwhile, has to incorporate the specific socio­
economic institutional structure of LDCs.
All in all, the literature on the functional distribution of 
income allows us to have some ideas about the factors affec­
ting factor shares between different classes. Such factors 
are ownership of land and capital, population growth and 
technological progress. Meanwhile, the income of different 
classes may originate from different sources - from the 
reward of different factors of production (land, labour and 
capital) which yield income shares overlapping the threefold 
scheme of rent, wages and profits as seen by the classical 
economists or the twofold scheme of wages and profits as in
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the Marxist definition. This may make the trend in factor 
shares different from the trend in class incomes, which 
leads to the analysis of the variability within source of 
income among income receivers. In fact, the assumption of 
homogeneity within source group, as assumed by the classical 
economists, is untenable.35 After all the overall income 
inequality is the sum of "within" and "between" inequa­
lities. Moreover, within-country decomposition analyses of 
income inequality in many developing countries36 have shown 
that "within" factor inequalities are far more important in 
accounting for inequality than "between" factor inequa­
lities. However, what.can be inferred from the above section 
is that although the Classical Economists lack a disaggre­
gation of different classes’ income by source, they still 
give us some insights into the determinants of the 
distribution of income, as advanced, for instance, by the 
Marxists: the higher the share of capital income, the more 
likely is the unequal distribution of income.
1.1.2- The size distribution of income.
As a matter of fact, the income of an individual or a 
household may be derived from different sources, not neces­
sarily from one source only, as assumed by the Classical 
Economists. Such an income may be the sum of the-»reward from 
different factors of production (as seen above, land, labour 
and capital) and from transfers, public and/or private. This 
shows also how the functional distribution of income is 
linked to the size distribution of income. Accordingly, in
21
recent years the controversy has focussed on what determines 
the personal income distribution (known also as the size 
distribution of income), emphasising the trend in income of 
individuals or households by source of income. It focuses on 
how such an income is constituted, where it has been earned 
and from which*occupation.
In economic literature, the field of the size distribution 
of income is less developed than the field of functional 
income distribution. In this respect, many economists have 
noticed the lack of a satisfactory theory of personal income 
distribution. Blinder/ for instance, closed his book with 
the comment that "the theory of size distribution is indeed 
still in its infancy."37 And in the same line of thought, 
Atkinson pointed out that "...far too little is known about 
this central subject."38 Nevertheless, over the past century 
different theories have been developed in the attempt to 
portray what determines the size distribution of income. An 
extensive survey of such theories has been presented by 
Sahota,39 ranging from early theories such as the 'Ability 
Theory' - the 'stochastic theory' - through to the theories 
of 'educational inequalities' and of 'distributive justice.' 
But none of these theories, as emphasised by Sahota, can be 
called a general theory, "most of them are piecemeal and 
partial despite claims of generality."40 For it signifies 
that personal distribution of income defies and goes beyond 
simple explanation, as income is the end result of the 
interaction of a complex of socio-economic and political 
factors. That is, most if not all socio-economic and politi­
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cal factors impinge in one way or another on the size 
distribution of income. In this respect, Sahota concluded 
that future development of a more satisfactory theory of 
personal income distribution should incorporate various 
forces determining the distribution. "These include the non- 
genetic components of abilities, education (including pre­
school, school, post-school, and informal education), other 
forms of human investment (health, fertility,, marital selec­
tion, job search, migration, earnings, work, saving, accumu­
lation, and so on"41 including ownership of assets (land and 
capital) .42
The question now being asked is whether the distribution of 
income in a society has become more or less equal. In view 
of this, there has been an attempt at developing tools of 
measurement, particularly for comparability and for gauging 
the trend in income distribution and poverty. Such tools of 
measurement have their own drawbacks and ambiguities, and 
are reviewed in Appendix 1. Development economists have some 
times directed their attention, also at the characteristic 
features of income distribution together with the forces 
that create or influence them, the possible impact of diffe­
rent distributive structures on economic development, and 
the policy issues of redistribution. In this respect, consi­
derable empirical insights have been attained by statis­
tical and econometric analyses; one of the earliest examples 
of such analyses is by Kuznets, who examined the relation­
ship between personal income distribution and different 
stages of economic growth. So what evidence is there of the
23
pattern of income distribution that accompanies economic 
growth in a developing economy?
1.2- Economic Growth and. Income Distribution.
The analysis of the pattern of income distribution that 
accompanies economic growth in a developing economy was 
pioneered by Kuznets who was interested in exploring the 
trends in the size distribution of income that emerges in 
the process of economic development. On the basis of a 
cross-section study of some developed and developing 
countries Kuznets43 concluded that relative income inequa­
lity44 rises during the early stages of development, reaches 
a peak and then declines in later stages. This phenomenon 
came to be known as the "Inverted-U hypothesis" because of 
the graphic representation of this trend.
In analysing the factors determining the secular level and 
trends of income inequalities, Kuznets distinguishes between 
two groups of factors which pull inequalities in different 
directions. Among these factors, at least two factors point 
to an accentuation of the inequality of incomes before tax. 
The first factor was the concentration of savings in the 
higher income groups. He points out that "only the upper 
income groups save; the total savings of groups below the 
top decile are fairly close to zero."45 This leads to 
increasing concentration of assets, and that of income 
(mainly when they yield an income). The second factor lies 
in the structure of employment and migration, a shift away
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from agriculture, a marked feature of economic growth - a 
process usually referred to as industrialisation and urbani­
sation.” Such a shift, Kuznets believes, is likely to be 
accompanied by an increase in inequality. This is for two 
reasons: incomes per head in the non-agricultural sector are 
higher and grow faster than in the non-agricultural sector, 
and the inequality of incomes in the non-agricultural sector 
is greater than in the agricultural sector and may grow 
faster. He concludes that "the increasing weight of urban 
population means an increasing share for the more unequal of 
the two component distributions... and if this is so, inequa­
lity in the total income distribution should increase.”46
Furthermore, he showed, with different numerical values, 
that even if the difference in income per head is constant 
and if the income distributions are the same in the two 
sectors, a mere shift of the population from agricultural 
sector to non-agricultural sector will, in general, first 
widen the range of income distribution and then diminish it. 
That is, when the proportion of the population in agricul­
tural sector diminishes, the differences in incomes first 
widens and then diminishes following the rise in the income 
share of the lower income groups within the non-agricultural 
sector. Meanwhile, along this process, Kuznets identified a 
number of factors limiting the tendency for inequality to 
increase. One group of such factors was said to be legis­
lative interference and 'political1 decisions."47
In fact, Kuznets was not only aware of the fact that there 
are many important factors determining the distribution of
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income, but he was also aware of the limitations in deter­
mining such factors. He pointed out that "the long swing in 
income inequality must be viewed as part of a wider process 
of economic growth, and interrelated with similar movements 
in other elements."48 (He did not go into the nature of 
these elements). Furthermore, he added that "without better 
knowledge of the trends in secular income structure and of 
the factors that determine them, our understanding of the 
whole process of economic growth is limited."4  ^Among the 
constraints that inhibit such an understanding, Kuznets 
stressed that "the field is distinguished by looseness of 
concepts, [and] extreme scarcity of relevant data..."50 It is 
partly this that made Kuznets appropriately tentative in 
describing his findings.
Subsequently, several cross-sectional studies have supported 
Kuznets’s findings. Adelman and Morris51 found that the 
income shares of the poorest groups showed a marked decline 
in the early stages of development, confirming Kuznets' 
hypothesis. Chenery and Syrquin,52 and others have also 
added support to the inverted-U hypothesis. Paukert,53 in 
considering the shares of different socio-economic classes 
of 56 countries, not only confirmed Kuznets'hypothesis but 
was able to identify the per capita income levels at which 
inequality was most marked. His study revealed that income 
distribution begins to become noticeably more unequal at a 
relatively early stage of economic growth. Paukert found 
that in countries with per capita incomes of less than $100, 
the average Gini coefficient was 0.42, while in those with
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$101 - 200, the Gini coefficient was 0.46, while in those 
with $201 - 300, the Gini coefficient was 0.50, then the 
Gini coefficient begins to decline to 0.49 in countries in 
the bracket of 301 - 500, to 0.44 in countries in the range 
of $501 - 1000, to 0.40 in countries 1001 - 2000, and to 0.36 
in countries with over $2001.
It is in respect of this general trend he claimed that his 
study supports Kuznets's hypothesis, even though he recogni­
sed that at each level of income, as the data of his study 
show, there are some countries whose income distribution in 
sharp contrast with the prevailing Inverted-U hypothesis. 
But this resulted from the fact that he was dealing with 
averages- among groups of countries and not with the infor­
mation on individual countries themselves, as significant 
variation in relative inequality was noticed within groups 
of countries. This is to say that within each income group 
there was a sharp variation in the Gini coefficient. He did 
not examine which factors contribute to the differences in 
income inequality and its changes in the course of economic 
development. In this respect, it seems that he placed a 
heavy emphasis on per capita income itself; and it appears 
to suggest that governments wishing to develop their econo­
mies had to accept the inevitability. Official policies may 
be important in influencing the trend of income distribu­
tion, as Kuznets himself acknowledged. To base one's judge­
ment on per capita income alone may not be justified.
Ahluwalia,54 in a cross-country analysis based on a sample
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of 60 countries, comprising 40 developing countries, 14 deve­
loped countries and 6 socialist countries, showed that as 
per capita GNP rises, the income share of the poor - the 
lowest 40%,55 first falls, reaches a minimum and then rises. 
He estimated the per capita income - the turning point - at 
which the share begins to rise. Such a per capita was found 
to be $468 if the entire sample is used and $371 if only the 
developing countries are considered. The trend of the income 
share of the lowest 40% moves from 17% at a level of $100, 
to 11% at the turning point, and rises to about 15% at the 
level of $2000. It is to this trend that Ahluwalia was led 
to believe these results confirmed the Inverted-U hypo­
thesis.56 As to what affected the degree of inequality in 
the process of development, he suggests three different 
variables. The first is the shift of population from the 
traditional agricultural sector to the modern sector, (i.e. 
the migration factor, as Kuznets did). The second variable, 
Ahluwalia advances, is improvements in the quality of human 
resources, which operate to decrease income inequality.57 
The third variable, he suggests is the demographic factor - 
the population growth which has an important effect on 
income inequality by prolonging the phenomenon of surplus 
labour.58
Meanwhile, when he regressed the rate of growth, regardless 
of the level of per capita income of the country - as the 
dependent variable, against income inequality - the indepen­
dent variable, he reached a different conclusion, different 
from regressing level of per capita income and income
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inequality. The results show no systematic relationship 
between higher inequality and a faster rate of growth. He 
did not reconcile the two different findings. All he 
suggests, is to promote the highest rate of growth to pass 
the traditional period of severe inequality as quickly as 
possible. He explains that "higher growth rates accelerate 
this transition without necessarily generating greater 
inequality than can be expected, given the structural 
characteristics of the economy at each level of develop­
ment."59 It seems that Ahluwalia fails to recognise the 
effect of other structural factors affectirfg income inequa­
lity, such as the distribution of assets (land and capital), 
which is one of the main reasons why at a comparative level 
of development, the distribution of income in socialist 
countries is more equally distributed than in other 
countries.60 Furthermore, some empirical studies have shown 
the extent of the property income in shaping the distribu­
tion of income. McLure,61 for instance, has shown that in 
Panama property income is sufficiently large and suffi­
ciently inequitably distributed to explain a large part of 
overall income distribution.62
In fact, a country-by-country examination reveals the wide 
variety of experience found among developing countries. In 
this respect, Fields, 63 using time series data for 20 
countries, found that inequality had worsened in seven 
countries, improved in 5, and remained unchanged in the 
remaining eight countries. These findings suggest that 
alternative development strategies may really have differing
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impacts on the income of different groups, not systema­
tically displaying the Kuznets U-pattern. As far as 
Ahluwalia's study is concerned, Anand and Kanbur have shown 
that "the index used by Ahluwalia, the income share of the 
lowest 4 0%, does not generate an explicit functional form 
for the inequality-development relationship under inter­
sectional shifts theory."64 Furthermore, they have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the data base employed by Ahluwalia.65
Different trends, however, are expected because the complex 
processes influencing income distribution affect different 
strata of the population in different ways; and because the 
forces inducing changes in income distribution may interact 
quite differently in countries having different policies and 
characteristics.66 Accordingly, such policies and charac­
teristics may render the pattern of income distribution 
deviating from the observed curve. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that if one looks at empirical evidence concer­
ning the relationship between economic growth and income 
distribution, evidence of which is available for about 80 
countries, we observe different patterns. Along this line, 
Cline, in his survey of literature on distribution and deve­
lopment, stated that:
"it seems more reasonable to postulate that particular 
policies combined with the inherited social structure 
make it more highly unequal in some less developed 
countries, while alternative policies and structure 
make it more even in others, but there is no 
inexorable theoretical basis - justifying a worsening of 
the distribution in the course of development."67
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All in all, the conventional practice of testing growth 
distribution hypotheses such as the Kuznets hypothesis, by 
using cross country data (which have their pitfalls) suffers 
from serious problems of data comparability, and bypasses 
country-specific characteristics. It entails fairly arbi­
trary assumptions concerning the question of the growth 
paths of the individual countries, and provides no guarantee 
that the patterns of growth distribution association found 
in the cross country sample, will be of the same nature as 
those that characterize intra-country data. That is to say, 
its application to any particular country is rather limited; 
and it is much tod aggregative to help formulate policy for 
any specific country. The use of cross-country data for the 
analysis of what are essentially dynamic processes raises a 
number of familiar problems. Ideally, such processes should 
be examined in an explicitly historical context for each 
particular country. Studies, focussing on specific 
experience, support the diversity hypothesis concerning the 
relationship between growth and inequality.
Certainly, countries having the same level of income but 
different characteristics have experienced different types 
of income distribution, e.g. China and India, Brazil and 
Taiwan, Japan and USA. Moreover, some individual countries 
have been able to establish the preconditions for a more 
egalitarian distribution of income; stimulating growth in 
such a policy environment may well avoid the Inverted-U 
hypothesis; the experience of a number of countries such as 
Yugoslavia, Taiwan and South Korea68 are cases in point.
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1.3- Poverty and its causes.
In spite of the preoccupation of the classical economists 
like Adam Smith and Ricardo with subsistence wage and 
relative shares of population groups; poverty and its causes 
did not get any prominence. It was Malthus who explicitly 
undertook to explain the causes of poverty, although he did 
not give any rigorous definition of poverty. To him rapidly 
rising population was the main cause of poverty and not the 
political system or distribution of income which the 
'utopian' socialists had claimed. According to Malthus popu­
lation, when unchecked, increased in a geometrical ratio, 
while subsistence increased only in an arithmetical ratio. 
This meant that over a certain period of time, food requi­
rement would exceed food supply giving rise to 'positive' 
checks (i.e. starvation, disease and famines) . He also 
argued that wherever human beings obtained more than mere 
subsistence, their numbers go up. Ultimately positive checks 
restored a new equilibrium. It follows therefore that there 
is no point in trying to improve the conditions of the lower 
income groups by measures such as poor relief, for it will 
only end up in more people being poor.69 Even technology
provided only a temporary respite.
Malthus'views received heavy refutation from many writers 
both of the classical as well as Marxian; Senior, for
instance, in a letter to Malthus, pointed out that "in.the 
absence of disturbing causes, food has a tendency to
increase faster than population because, in fact, it has
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generally done so..."70 Moreover, Mill emphasised that "it is 
ah error to maintain that population, in any improving 
community, tends to increase faster than, or even as fast 
as, subsistence."71 Such a proposition "was agreed to be 
perfectly consistent with the regular fact of food increa­
sing faster than population."72 Clearly, the experience of 
Europe in the 19th century went against Malthusian hypothe­
sis, but the spectre of famine continued in the colonies of 
European countries and Malthusian ideas continued to have 
some influence in those countries.
To Marx and Engels, who were very critical of Malthus, 
poverty like inequality was the consequences of a certain 
type of social relationship of production, in which the 
means of production concentrated in the hands of the capita­
list class. Over the long-run the uncoordinated nature of 
capitalism led to overproduction and crisis which in its own 
turn led to deprivation and immiserisation of the proleta­
riat, which are the unavoidable consequences of capitalist 
development.73 "As long as capitalism remains capitalism, 
surplus capital will never be used for the purpose of 
raising the standard of living of the masses, for this would 
mean a decrease in profits for the capitalists."74 Poverty 
is therefore endemic in capitalist societies - it is part 
and parcel of the working of the system. Capitalism has an 
inherent tendency to create poverty as part of the process 
of generating wealth.
In fact, Marx's prophecy about increasing immiserisation has 
not come out to be true due to the increase in the power of
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not come out to be true due to the increase in the power of 
the trade unionism which strengthened the bargaining power 
of the workers to press for a higher share of the growing 
national product, the rise of the welfare state, and the 
growth of the public sector and the policies of social 
justice.75 The provision of social services: especially
health, education, transport and drinking water, has contri­
buted to the improvement in the well-being of the poorer 
strata of the population. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the 
evidence shows that in most (but not all) countries, regard­
less of their economic system, "absolute incomes for the 
poorest groups have improved, and consequently absolute 
poverty76 has diminished with economic growth."77
With the emergence of the Marginalist School, the focus of 
attention moved away from the questions of income inequality 
and poverty, particularly in economic thinking. It was 
related to the way economics was developed; a lot of effort 
was devoted to research on economic theory. There was some 
steady trend from 'static analysis in 1870 to a much more 
'dynamic analysis at the end of the period, (1870 - 1929). A 
very great deal of the controversy of the period, in all 
branches, centred around this difficult process of clarri- 
fying the significance of 'static' and 'dynamic' analysis, 
and the transition from the one to the other.78 However, 
troubled with poverty in Europe, sociologists such as 
Rowntree gave considerable attention to the measurement and 
analysis of poverty early in the 20th century. Some of these 
attempts will be discussed later in chapter 4.
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Given the immensity of the problem of poverty in developing 
countries after the Second World War and more after the 
1960s, major efforts have been made to analyse the causes of 
poverty. There has been a growing consensus that since 
assets are a major source of income, its unequal ownership 
and limited access (such as the prevalence of landlessness), 
remains a major factor causing poverty and inequality. In 
absence of assets, employment remains the only meaningful 
sense of earning income and eliminating or reducing poverty. 
It is emphasised that "insufficient and unequal access to 
employment rank high among the major causes of poverty and 
inequality."79
This, meanwhile, by no means excludes the importance of 
other factors because, as pointed out "the problems of 
poverty are deeply rooted in the institutional framework 
particularly in the distribution of income and political 
power within the system."80 Along this line, Adelman and 
Morris emphasised that, "in underdeveloped countries, it is 
to be expected that a variety of historical, social and 
political influences that are difficult to measure will 
interact with classical economic considerations in determi­
ning the distribution of personal income."81 Hence, it is 
worth stressing that poverty and inequality are the result 
of a complex interaction of socio-economic and political 
factors or forces deeply rooted in the structure of a parti­
cular society, and it is very difficult to disentangle these 
causes from one another or indicate their relative impor­
tance.82 It is precisely these factors that are of interest
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from the analytical as well as the policy-making point of 
view. In this respect, in the realm of policy implications 
of the income distribution, poverty and development rela­
tionships, some development economists have used the econo­
metric analysis not only to find out the factors shaping the 
pattern of income distribution that accompanies economic 
growth but to incorporate the impact of development strate­
gies and policies on the incidence of poverty and on the 
relative shares of various groups. Such studies have added 
support to the view that the interaction of the concentra­
tion of asset ownership, the prevalence of landlessness,83 
and near-landlessness,84 and the lack of employment opportu­
nities constitute the main factors determining the genera­
tion and the persistence of poverty and inequality in a 
particular economy. Reviewing some of such studies may give 
us an insight into the factors and policy options which may 
reduce income inequality and alleviate poverty in the course 
of economic development.
1.4- Simulating income distribution and poverty.
One of the recent simulation models that is worth reviewing 
is the Adelman-Robinson Model based on Korea - the country 
often considered among the LDCs which has succeeded in 
undergoing a rapid growth with equity. The model was 
designed to provide a laboratory for investigating the 
potential impact of standard economic policy instruments and 
programmes intended to improve the relative and absolute 
incomes of the poor, and tracing out both the direct and the
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indirect influences on the distribution of income.85 The 
main results they reached are that a steady reduction of 
deprivation may be the hardest to achieve, and that "most 
anti-poverty policies eventually help the rich and middle 
income groups more than they help the poor... This trickle-up 
effect was evident in a great many different policy experi­
ments and is difficult to avoid."86 Other policies that have 
a significant influence on poverty are those encouraging 
rural-urban migration. This has been the case because in a 
rapidly growing economy like the one of Korea where the 
urban labour force can absorb the new migrants without a 
significant fall in wages, which leads to the eradication of 
the surplus labour - a main necessary condition for the 
sustainable improvement in the distribution of income and 
for the alleviation of poverty. But these results were 
conditional on the availability of other factors and condi­
tions. They emphasised that "These results cannot be genera­
lised to nations that do not start out with both a reasona­
bly equitable pattern of land-ownership and tenure and a 
relatively well-educated and skilled population."87 As far 
as sectoral and regional development are concerned, they 
advanced that a concerted rural development strategy is very 
effective in alleviating poverty and improving the distri­
bution. In this respect, they stressed the effective role of 
land redistribution in affecting the distribution of income 
and poverty, showing that with land reform, there are 30% 
less households living in poverty than in the package 
without land reform.88 Concerning urban areas, it was found
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that a certain programme of public works, export promotion 
in labour intensive industries, and the adoption of more 
labour-intensive techniques is effective in reducing poverty 
and improving the distribution of income. Meanwhile, such an 
outcome can be brought about, only when a sufficient number 
of different interventions are applied simultaneously, so 
that there is, in effect, a change in development strategy; 
stressing that structural change is required to affect 
inequality, and that equity objectives must shape the choice 
of basic development strategy if they are to be met.89
All in all, they concluded that "In our summary, our study 
reinforces the view that the distribution of income is 
firmly rooted in the structure of the economy, and that its 
path over time depends on the fundamental development 
strategy chosen by the society."90 This really emphasises 
the principal idea that the improvement in the distribution 
of income and the alleviation of poverty are relegated to a 
complex interaction of the socio-economic and political 
forces operating within the chosen development strategy.
Another interesting simulation model which is useful to 
present its main conclusions, is the one on India, developed 
by Sinha and others. It was set up not only to explore the 
interrelations between poverty, income distribution and 
employment, but also to simulate the implications for the 
distribution of incomes and the attainment of basic needs of 
various possible strategies of development and policies. 
These include: "income transfers from rich to poor; growth
strategies based on alternative groups of sectors, such as
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light or heavy industry, hypothetical policies of growth 
with redistribution, and a land redistribution."91 In 
discussing the redistribution of income transfers between 
classes and its effects on income and employment, they first 
noticed the general limited sensitivity of employment to 
income redistribution, and showed as well that an income 
transfer from the rich to the poor is largely reversed 
almost immediately by the system itself. They found that ,it 
is the redistribution of income from the rich to. the middle 
income groups which has most favourable effects on income 
and employment.92
More important, they assessed the effects on employment and 
income distribution of various growth strategies based on 
alternative groups of sectors, in agriculture, in industry 
and in services, and land redistribution, aiming to deter­
mine the policies that will have greater impact on output, 
employment and income distribution. They emphasised that the 
redistribution of existing assets, including land, or the 
creation of new assets vested specially in these groups, or 
a restructuring of factor rewards, that any redistribution 
policy must focus if it is to be successful. As a conse­
quence, they come to point out that "An alternative, and 
more fundamental, form of redistribution would be the redis­
tribution of assets, to change the income shares, accruing 
from production to the various classes."93 Particularly, it 
was found that a radical redistribution of land improves 
both the absolute income level and income shares of the 
rural poor. But the likely effects of land redistribution on
39
output and employment, as they acknowledged, cannot be 
ascertained, mainly because "a land redistribution might 
alter the social and economic organisation of the villages 
so drastically that it becomes difficult to be at all 
certain about likely output and employment effects."94 They 
also found that in the present socio-political context of 
India, the implementation of a radical land distribution was 
rather implausible. Under these circumstances, employment 
creation or reduction of poverty had to be seen in the 
context of existing pattern of assets (i.e. land etc) owner­
ship. With the limitation in view, one could mainly think of 
a development strategy which helped employment creation. 
Among various simulated strategies, the capital-intensive, 
heavy industrialisation strategy created the lowest employ­
ment, particularly for the rural population, while agricul­
ture and livestock based strategies created the maximum 
employment potential.
However, before commenting on the findings of the above 
simulation studies, it is important to question some of the 
assumptions made by these models. The difficulty in quanti­
fying socio-political relationships in affacting income 
distribution and poverty led that these variables are 
assumed in such econometric models to remain constant which 
is obviously not the case in a developing country. One can, 
in fact, stress that in such a country there is a conscious 
effort and aspiration to reform institutions, political and 
social structures, attitudes and motivations. In such a 
situation, the assump-tion that they remain constant reduces
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the importance of the results obtained by such econometric 
analyses. Besides some technical problems remain unsolved, 
as Sinha et al have conceded; if there is a drastic 
redistribution of land and other assets, the production 
function coefficients generated cannot be relied on as a 
guide to future policy, therefore casting doubt on the 
relevance of their results. It was emphasised that "It is 
necessarily a very rough approximation, since it is almost 
impossible to anticipate or to quantify the likely changes 
in cropping patterns and input use... which would follow from 
such a major modification in the social and economic 
structure. As such, the results of this simulation have to 
be viewed with caution."95
Nevertheless, the insights advanced by such studies are of 
immense help in determining factors which are of importance 
in a study of income distribution and poverty. It shows that 
a once and for all income transfer may bring only a 
temporary improvement in the income position of the poor and 
the level of employment. More important, the central recom­
mended proposition is that long term effects on the distri­
bution of income and poverty can only be brought about by 
structural changes in the economy - by a development strate­
gy which explicitly incorporates the generation of employment 
and the redistribution of assets including its related 
productive resources.
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1.5- Summary.
The above survey of literature does show that income 
distribution and poverty are determined by the complex 
interaction of many social, economic and political factors. 
Their effects vary among different countries owing to the 
differences in endowments, economic systems, pattern and 
stage of development. It is not even possible to determine 
the effects of such factors for a particular society, due to 
their large and inter-connected numbers, the lack of disag­
gregated data and information (some are difficult to 
measure). In fact, it is all these which are responsible for 
the lack of a comprehensive theory, explaining how income is 
distributed. Yet from the varied contribution to an under­
standing of income distribution of many economists 
(Classical, Marxists, and Neoclassical) , international 
organisations, and the empirical support of the recent 
econometric analyses, can be inferred some important factors 
determining changes in both income distribution and poverty. 
Such factors are the pertinent roles of development strate­
gies and policies but much more so the redistribution of 
assets and the generation of employment opportunities. 
These, in their own turn, depend on appropriate social and 
political institutions as well as the ability of the poor 
(i.e. trade unions to improve labour conditions) to organise 
and struggle for improvements in their share of the 
country's income. Since land is limited in many developing 
countries, asset redistribution can only provide miniscule 
land holdings, particularly in view of rapid rate of popula­
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tion growth. Therefore, creation of employment opportunities 
will depend largely on rapid growth of the non-agricultural 
sector. But employment creation may be thwarted by a wrong 
development strategy and inappropriate choice of technology.
It is in this context that the Algerian development strategy 
is being analysed here. Based predominantly on petrochemi­
cals, the development strategy in Algeria has been oriented 
towards highly capital intensive, state directed industria­
lisation strategy. How such a strategy has shaped the 
distribution of income and poverty, is the subject of.the 
subsequent chapters.
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Chapter II
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ALGERIAN ECONOMY AND ITS
EVOLUTION.
This chapter tries to examine evolution of the Algerian 
economy and the structure which resulted from the implemen­
tation of the development strategy of the post-independence 
Algeria. In this respect, examining the inherited socio­
economic structure from the colonial era is rather impor­
tant, because it portrays the conditions under which Algeria 
attempted to restructure itself after independence.
2.1- The Pre-independence Algerian Economy.
The Algerian economy before independence was mainly designed 
to serve the interests of metropolitan France in general and 
of the European settlers in particular. In order to meet 
this overall objective, the colonial government brought 
about a major transformation in the social and economic 
aspects of the Algerian society. The process through which 
such a transformation was brought about started during the 
early years of occupation. In strengthening the occupation 
the Europeans in general and the French in particular were 
encouraged to settle in Algeria. With a view to facilitate 
their settlement, the colonial government radically altered 
the Algerian property structure. The traditional property 
structure was composed of four main categories:
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1) Arsh land, private but non-alienable property, signified 
both the tribe and the land which tribesmen share; land 
property was under common ownership but the output yielded 
by each family belonged to it, i.e. the family group had the 
right of utilisation - usufruct right - which was obtained 
through work. Land was transferred to * a family member by 
inheritance, but could not be sold under any circumstances.
2) Melk land, equivalent to private alienable property, 
i.e. designated private property and with associated right 
of ownership. It could be sold, but generally only within 
the tribe.
3) Habous land, land donated to religious foundations or 
cultural institutions, as non-alienable property, it could 
not be sold. It served different purposes, such as 
construction and maintenance of mosques and schools.
4) Azel land, or the Beylik land, which was the public 
domain under the control of the district Turkish governor 
"Bey”, constituted the best arable land. Part of it was 
under the system of sharecropping called the Khammassat,1 
where land was cultivated by ’Khammes’ for the benefit of 
the treasury. Other parts were donated to certain families, 
or a particular tribe as reward for services rendered to the 
state, but only with the right to usufruct. It could not be 
alienated by any kind of transfer.
However, the appropriation process of native lands by the 
colon, and the introduction of European laws and
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administrative arrangements destroyed the prevailing collec­
tive forms of land ownership, kinship unity and community 
life of social solidarity-. This affected the whole social 
organisation of the society. In fact, the policy was largely 
guided by the view that a system of private property should 
be encouraged and reinforced by the French law. In so doing, 
it profoundly disrupted the pre-existing legal order, while 
substituting French law for the tribal juridical system.
The French colonists, by various measures and mechanisms, 
such as the exercise of harsh military and administrative 
coercion, with arbitrary laws, seized Habous estates and 
expropriated the communal Azel land and Arsh land;2 
destroying the very basis of the prevailing Algerian struc­
ture of traditional rural society, breaking the tribal 
structure, driving the people out of the best arable lands, 
transforming some of them to wage labourers, serving the 
needs of the European settlers' agriculture.3 Table 2.1 
shows the evolution of European settlers' land.
Table 2 .1 Evolution of European settlers land 1830 - 1950
period Lands added to colonial 
holdings in hectares
year Net colonial holdings 
in hectares
before 1870 504,116 1870 504,116
1870 - 1900 1,144,015 1900 1,648,131
1900 - 1912 7,669,315 1917 2,317,446
1917 - 1930 528,219 1930 2,345,666*
1930 - 1950 , 360,464 1950 2,706,130®
*) the small net change between 1917 and 1933 reflects the sale of 
about 500,000 hectares to the indigenous population from settlers.
6) these lands belonged to about 25,000 Europeans.
source: D.Sari: Depossession des Fellahs (1830 - 1962). S.N.E.D., 1975. p. 97.
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Hence, most of the holdings owned by the colon4 were 
obtained through extortion, forced sales imposed on 
Algerians, foreclosure and other forms of legal or economic 
pressure, or outright dispossession.5 These measures 
allowed the French settlers to have their own estates on the 
best agricultural lands, while the Algerian peasantry was by 
and large separated from the means of production. This 
profound transformation led to the impoverishment of a large 
segment of the population, which was uprooted, and alienated 
from their native lands, and forced to adapt - as wage 
earners and sharecroppers - to new economic conditions - the 
rise of a capitalist agriculture.6
The above process, not only transformed land into an 
exchange commodity, but also separated the producers from 
the means of production, creating a steadily increasing 
landlessness, as the number of rural landowners decreased by 
20% while the number of rural workers increased by 2 9 per 
cent during the 1900-1950 period. Furthermore, this process 
made the native an employee and/or forced him to eke out a 
living on more and more marginal lands for a bare subsis­
tence. The livelihood of the peasants became much more 
insecure, and increasingly they became vulnerable to poverty 
and its resultant consequences. This situation was clearly 
summarised by a French administrator as follows: "After the 
introduction of the individualisation of property [and] once 
the land is definitively appropriated, inequality begins 
with the landowners on one side and the proletariat on the 
other, as in our civilised societies."7
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During the colonial era the Algerian economy was mainly 
based on agriculture, as were most developing countries at 
that time. More than 75 per cent of the population, and more 
than 65 per cent of the working population were living on 
the land. It provided the bulk of all export products (table 
1 appendix 2), but operating on a 'dualistic system of 
production. The modern sector was owned by only about 25,000 
European landowners; it constituted the best arable land 
(with 75 per cent of total irrigated land) situated in a 
high rainfall area of 400 - 600 mm/p/a along the coast,
stretching at most 100 miles inland, and accounted for more 
than 2.5 million hectare, representing one-third of total 
arable land (7.5 million hectare).8 This sector was
employing skilled labour, improved inputs - better seeds and 
fertilizers as well as financial backing - operating on a 
large scale and mainly oriented to exports.
The backward traditional sector was characterised by small 
plots of infertile land with less than 400 mm/p/a. rainfall, 
using traditional techniques and mainly devoted to subsis­
tence production for the majority of the Algerian popula­
tion.9 This traditional sector hardly benefited from public 
facilities, where, for example, during the fifties, out of 
458 million francs of credits attributed to agriculture, 
only 55 million francs (i.e. only 12%) went to Algerian 
peasants.10 This was equivalent to a credit per hectare of 
arable land of about 161 francs for the European settlers
against only 11 francs for the Algerians.
Owing to the fertility of land, farming methods, choice of 
crops and capital investment, the colon agricultural sector 
accounted for 60% o.f gross agricultural income; and for 74.5 
per cent of all traded agricultural products, whereas the 
Algerian part represented the residual (see table 2.2).
Table 2.2: Structure of Agriculture income between the two communities in 
late 1950s, in millions of French Francs.
Algerian Farmers European Farmers Total
Vegetable production 62.9 155.2 218.1
Animal production 46.1 9.7 55.8
Gross agricultural Income 109.0 164.9 273.9
Self consumption - 54.2 -• 4.7 - 58.9
Commercialisation 54.8 160.2 215.0
Gross Agricultural Income in % 40.0 60.0 100.0
Commercialisation in % 25.5 74.5 100.0
Source: Constructed from Tableaux de I'Economie Algerienne 1960.
These apparent differences reflect the dualism of an economy 
in which a modern rich colon sector was juxtaposed with an 
impoverished traditional Algerian sector. The colon (in 
agriculture) were enjoying a high standard of living, as 
represented by an income per capita of $2058 in 1954, 
equivalent to as much as 36 times the average income of the 
Algerian agricultural population with only $57. The average 
income of the colon was three times as high as the average 
one of the metropolitan France $77 0.
The prevalence of poverty among the Algerian population was 
also due to the limited scope of the non-agricultural sector 
to provide enough employment opportunities for the labour
which could not be absorbed within agriculture. Unemployment 
in the non-agricultural sector was widespread among the 
Algerians. According to Samir Amin, "In 1955, unemployment 
rate in non-agriculture among the Algerians was in the range 
of 25 - 33 per cent, whereas for the European settlers, it 
was practically unknown."11 Such a state of affairs was the 
ultimate outcome of an almost stagnant economy, where the 
overall growth of the Algerian economy, during the period 
1880 - 1955, was hardly keeping pace with population growth, 
(table 2.3).
Table 2.3: Annual Growth rates of output 1880 - 1955 in %.
Agriculture 1.5
Industry 3.1
Services 2.0
Total production 1.9
Population 1.6
Production per head 0.3
Source: S. Amin, in: The Maghreb in the Modern World: Algeria,
Tunisia, Morocco. Chivers, Penguin edition, 1970. p. 46.
The disparities between the two communities were seen in all 
the socio-economic and political aspects from education to 
level of living and political rights. An indication of the 
situation of low status and the incidence of poverty the 
Algerians were subject to, can be clearly portrayed by the 
inequalities of income between the two communities.
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2.1.1- Income distribution pattern during the p re­
independence period.
The privileged position of the European settlers - as 
discussed above - was manifested in an unequal distribution 
of income. In 1951 the poorest two-third of the population - 
all were Algerians - got only 26% of total income, whereas 
6% of the population - all were Europeans - got about 32%. 
The average per capita income ratio between the Algerians 
and the European settlers was 1 to 5.3. Income inequality as 
represented by the Gini coefficient was 0.54 (table 2.4).
Table 2.4: Distribution of income in 1951 in us$ and in %.
Group population % income %
Group 1: Bourgeoisie- all European Settlers 0 .17 4.7
(per capita income 3,181)
Group 2: Upper professions, farmers 6.60 29.0
of which: European Settlers (6.12) (27.0)
Algerians (0.48) (2.0)
(per capita income 502)
Group 3: Salaried workers, shopkeepers, artisans 10.60 22.0
of which: European Settlers (4.7) (10.0)
Algerians (5.9) (12.0)
(per capita income 240)
Group 4: Urban Proletariat- all Algerians 17.7 19.0
(per capita income 121)
Group 5: Agricultural workers - all Algerians 65.0 26.0
(per capita income 45) 100.0 100.0
Average per capita income of all:
Europeans Settlers 431.30
Algerians 82
Algeria’s population 120
Gini coefficient 0.54*
*) calculated by the author.
Source: Constructed from: "Algeria: A post Revolutionary Elite." I.W 
Zartman, in: Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle 
East, (ed) F. Tachau Schenkman. London 1975. p. 258.
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However, in 1954 the ratio of the average per capita income 
of the Algerians and the European' settlers was much higher, 
with a ratio of 1 : 12.4. The gap was much higher in the 
agricultural sector, where income differentials was of 1 to 
36 respectively.12 (table 2.5). The overall Gini coefficient 
was 0.57, (see table 2.6). These income differentials largely 
resulted from the unequal distribution of assets and from 
the official assistance that the colon received from the 
colonial government.
Table 2.5: Income per head (Algerians & Settlers) in US$* in 1954.
Algerians Settlers
Agriculture 57.40 2,058
Non-agriculture 131.60 924
of total population 82.60 1,022
The overall average per capita 180.30.
*) The actual figures were given in sterling.
Source: Constructed from: "L’Agriculture Algeri&nne." N c Special. Le
Developpement Africain (Paris, Octobre 1961) p. 143. as cited by O. 
Norbye: "The Economy of Algeria," in Lury and Robson (eds) The
Economies of Africa. George Allen & Unwin. London 1969. p. 479.
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Table 2.6: Distribution of income in 1954 in US$ and in %.
Group population % income %
Group 1 : European Settlers in agriculture 0.9 10.3
(per capita income 2,058)
Group 2 : Europeans in Non-agriculture. 9.5 48 .7
(per capita income 924)
Group 3 : Algerians in agricultural activities 30.4 22.2
(per capita income 131.60)
Group 4 : Algerians in Non-agri. activities* 59.2 18.8
(per capita income 57.40)
100.0 100.0
Gini coefficient 0.57^
#) Calculated by the author.
Source:■Constructed from table 2.5 above.
2.1.1.1- Assets Distribution.
The average size of land holdings for the European settlers 
was much higher than the average size of the Algerians, 
i.e. 124 hectares for the colon and only 11.6 hectares for 
the Algerians. The majority of the Algerian landowners lay 
in the category size of (1 - 10) hectares and the higher 
ratio of land area was that of the category (10 - 50) 
hectares, whereas the bulk of the colon landowners appeared 
in the category size of over 100 hectares, representing over 
87 per cent of their total area; (tables 2.7A, 2.7B and
2.7C).14 Such a structure of land distribution explains, to 
some extent, the colon higher income share in total income 
(in relative terms) and the higher inequality within the 
agriculture sector in particular and in the whole economy in 
general.
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Table 2.1 A: Land distribution among Algerians, (1950 - 51) .
Categories of Individual holdings Areas of holdings in 1000 ha
size holdings in Numbers in % in Numbers in %
less than 1 ha 105,954 16.8 37.2 0.5
1 10 ha 332,529 52.7 1,341.2 18.2
10 ha - 50 ha 167,170 26.5 3,185.8 43.4
50 ha - 100 ha 16,580 2.6 1,096.1 14.9
100 ha and over 8,499 1.4 1,688.8 23.0
Total 630,732 100.0 7,349.1 100.0
Gini coefficient of land concentration 0.62*
*) Calculated by the author.
Source: As table 2.7C below.
Table 2.7B: Land distribution among Settlers, (1950-51).
Categories of Individual holdings Areas of holdings in 1000 ha
size holdings in Numbers in % in Numbers in %
less than 1 ha 2,393 11 0.8 . . .#
1 10 ha 5,039 23 21.8 0.8
10 ha - 50 ha 5,585 25 135.3 ' 5.0
50 ha - 100 ha 2,635 12 186.9 6.8
100 ha and over 6,385 29 2,381.9 87.4
Total 22,037 100 2,726.7 100.0
Gini coefficient of land concentration 0.63*
#) less than 0.1%; it was about 0.03%. 
*) calculated by the author.
Source: As table 2.7C.
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Table 2.1C: Overall land distribution in Algeria, (1950 - 51)
Categories of Individual holdings Areas of holdings in 1000 ha
size holdings in Numbers in % in Numbers in %
less than 1 ha 108,347 16.6 38.0 0.4
1 -10 ha 337,568 51.7 1,363.0 13.5
10 ha -50 ha 172,755 26.5 3,321.1 33.0
50 ha -100 ha 19,215 2.9 1,283.0 12.7
100 ha and over 14,884 2.3 4,070.7 40.4
Total 652,769 100.0 10,075.8 100.0
Gini coefficient of land concentration 0 .70*
*) calculated by the author.
Source: Constructed from Tableaux de l ’Economie Algerienne,
Statlstique GenSrale de l ’Alg&rie, 1960. p. 129.
It is worthwhile stressing that land concentration among the 
Algerians was high, as it is shown in table 2.7A. As a 
result, the incidence of landlessness was high. However, 
tables 2.7A, 2. 7B and 2. 7C portray the whole situation of
land holding by size within and between the two communities 
and their respective Gini coefficients of land concentra­
tion.15 In fact, the situation of the Algerian peasants, at 
the end of the 1950's did not improve; it deteriorated as a 
result of continuing economic stagnation on one hand and 
population increase and devastation of the liberation war on 
the other.
All in all, the inequality in income distribution and in 
assets between the Algerians and the European settlers is 
reflected in the differences in the standards of living in 
all of its components. For instance, the consumption of meat
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by one million European settlers exceeded the consumption of 
over 8 million Algerians; it was, in fact, 43,500 tons 
against 43,000 tons respectively. The settlers consumed on
average 130 grammes per head per day (of-various meats),
compared with only 10 grammes on average for the 
Algerians.16
In education, the gap between the two communities was very 
wide. In 1944, while illiteracy among the Algerians was 90%, 
it was only 6 per cent among the European settlers. Algerian 
children in primary school were only 8 per cent of all the 
school age (against 90% for European settlers). The rate for
the Algerians rose to about 22 per cent in 1954 and to about
37 per cent in 1961/62. The number of Algerians at secondary
school was about 4,000 in 1950 against 22,000 for European
settlers. Their number rose to about 7,000 against 29,000 in 
1954 and to 11,000 against 34,000 in 1959 respectively. At 
the university, only 14% were Algerians, i.e. about 700 
against 4,300 of European settlers; a ratio of 1 to 6 
respectively in a population of 90% Algerians.17 In early 
1962, out of the total 27,000 educators in all institutions 
of learning, less than 2,000 were Algerians.18
However, during the colonial era, the economic and socio­
political structure was fashioned in a way the European
settlers had enjoyed a high standard of living while the 
Algerians, in general, were experiencing poverty and low 
status.
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2.2 - The Algerian Economy at early years of Indepen­
dence. (The period of Recovery 1962 - 1966) .
When the independence was obtained in July 1962, the 
Algerian society inherited structural problems of political 
and socioeconomic dimensions. The eight years of war (1954 - 
62) had left over one million dead; 2 million people in 
concentration (regroupment) camps under harsh conditions, 
and half a million refugees in Tunisia and Morocco.
Moreover, 400,000 people migrated to France; 2 million 
people were under- and unemployed. More than 80 per cent of 
the population was illiterate. Malnutrition was reported to 
be widespread in a population growing by about 3 per cent 
per annum. Within the rural areas (which were the major 
battle fields) , the problem of social and economic
disequilibrium was particularly troublesome. Vast areas of
farm land were ruined during the liberation struggle,
livestock and implements were lost, wells sanded over, and 
the distribution system totally destroyed.
Moreover, demographic pressure, land hunger and the shocks 
of war contributed to a burgeoning urban population. Only 
between 1960 and 1964, 800,000 landless peasants flooded to 
the cities in search of work, raising the national percen­
tage of urban Algerian population from one quarter to one- 
third, straining the resources of the cities and endangering 
a wide range of health, housing, employment and educational 
problems.
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Urban areas were also the victims of destruction and 
sabotage caused by the secret army organisation (OAS)19 
which was dedicated to the idea that Algeria must remain 
part of France, otherwise it must be reduced to what it had 
been in 1830 (the conquest year), i.e. the Algerian popula­
tion should not have the benefit of any thing that had been 
brought or created by the European settlers.20 The destruc­
tion was in all sectors, from machinery in industry and 
agriculture to public records. Important government files 
were destroyed or carried abroad. Public buildings, schools, 
shops, restaurants, hotels, almost everything that belonged 
to the colon were destroyed. Property damage through 
sabotage accounted for over $1 billion.21 As a result, many 
firms and public enterprises and services become idle and in 
inoperative conditions.
It is clear that at the independence, Algeria had inherited 
a rather weak and war-exhausted economy. Further strains 
were put by the sudden departure of the European settlers, 
comprising the bulk of the country’s skills in the various 
economic occupations. This process not only spelled the loss 
of skills needed to maintain the modern economic sectors 
during a critical transitional period, but also resulted in 
a net decline in revenues, productive capabilities and mana­
gerial talents required for the effective maintenance of 
government services.22 All these resulted in a sharp drop in 
gross domestic product (in constant prices) from AD75.5 
billion in 1959 to AD48 billion in 1962, (table 2.8) . It 
decreased by an average rate of about 11 per cent per annum.
Table 2.8: Evolution of GDP during 1959 - 1962, in billions of AD.
Year 1959 1960 1961 1962
GDP (current prices) 14.2 13.2 11.8 9.7
GDP (constant prices)* 75.5 60.1 59.6 48.0
*) In 1980 prices.
Source: Compiled from International Financial Statistics Year Book 
1987. I.M.F. 1987. pp. 184 - 185.
The problem that was facing Algeria, in such a situation 
immediately after independence, was how to achieve economic 
development and a diversified economy from a situation of a 
declining economy which depended largely on the exports of 
raw materials. It lacked capital for industrial and agricul­
tural development, and while there was massive unemployment, 
there was also an acute shortage of skilled labour. With 
such a heritage of economic and social problems, it was not 
easy to accelerate the process of economic development.
The great landmark which characterised the Algerian economy 
and society during 1962 - 1966 period was the emergence of 
self management (autogestion) in 1962. It started in the 
second half of 1962, when the workers spontaneously took 
over the farms and firms abandoned by the European settlers 
and started to operate them. The workers seized the vacated 
colon estates and started operating them as self managemed 
farms,23 managed by a committee of workers headed by an 
elected president. Faced with such an action the government 
endorsed the take-over and by the end of 1963, all the 
remaining European farms were nationalised and passed over 
to the self-management sector, (or the 'socialist sector',
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asr it is often referred to). This sector, once established, 
comprised over 2.3 million hectares, i.e. roughly 30% of the 
total arable area divided into about 2,000 units (domaines) , 
among them 300 veterans cooperatives, with an average size 
of 1,150 hectares (table 2.9). It provided employment to about
Table 2.9: Structure of Domaines under Self-Management 1970.
Size of Domaines
Domaines 
in numbers
(units) 
in % in 1,000
Area 
ha in %
less than 100 ha 106 5.3 5 0.2
100 ha - 500 ha 479 24.0 159 6.9
. 500 ha - 1000 ha 634 31.8 520 22.6
1000 ha 2000 ha 554 . 27.8 ' 856 37.2
2000 ha and over 221 11.1 7 62 33.1
Total 1, 994 100.0 2,302 100.0
Source: Tableaux de 1'Economie Alg&rienne. 1971. S.E.P. p. 115.
135,000 permanent workers and 120,000 seasonal workers. It 
constituted the modern a g r icultural sector, accounting 
for about 60 per cent of agricultural production in value. 
The other 70 per cent of the arable land, largely arid and 
unfertile, remained in the hands of the private sector 
providing subsistence to about 8 million of the population. 
This sector accounted for only 40 per cent of the output (in 
value terms). This situation continued to prevail until 1972 
when a programme of "agrarian revolution" was introduced, 
which will be discussed below. During the 1962 - 1 967 
period, the type of investment that had been carried out was 
mainly in light industries, establishing only 14 factories24
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(table 2.10).
Table 2.10: Industrial Public sector and established factories during
1962 - 1967 period.
in Number (s) Investments * Nr of Jobs
Textiles 5 325 4,199
Leather: Tanneries 2 40 501
Shoes 4 16 525
Food:Sugar Mills 1 85 321
Fruit Juice 1 13 140
Mineral Water 1 2 30
Total 14 481 5, 646
*) In millions of AD.
Source: L 'Industrialisation en 1967, in: Situation Economique en
Alg6rie. C.C.I.A., 5th edition 1967. pp. 80 - 82.
In 1966, the government nationalised the banking sector, 
mining industries and all underground resources, except the 
hydrocarbons, which were in the hands of the multinationals. 
The hydrocarbon firms were repatriating an increasing 
a m o u n t  of capital from the country. Such a repatriation 
increased from AD288.4 million (representing 9 per cent of 
total exports in 1963) to ADI,291.7 (representing more than 
35 per cent of total exports in 1966); (see table 2.11).
Table 2.11: Total Exports & Repatriated Capital (AD millions) 1963 - 66.
1963 1964 1965 1966
1- Exports 3,185.0 3,486.0 3,386.0 3,655.0
2- Repatriated capital 288.5 615.4 895.0 1,291.7
Percentage: 2/1 9.1 17.7 26.4 35.3
Source: Comptes Nationauxr S.E.P, 1963 - 69, as cited by A.
Benachnhou, in: Planification et D6veloppement en Alg&rie. 1962 -
1980. S.E.N.D., Algiers 1982. p. 21.
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All in all, although significant structural changes in terms 
of reorganisation of land, and nationalisation of some 
industries and services were achieved, the period did not 
experience a major upsurge of economic activity. The first 
task during this period consisted in bringing the existing 
enterprises into operation after the devastation of the war. 
In spite of the establishment of some light industries, the 
economy was almost stagnating. GDP in 1967, in constant 
prices, was almost the same in 1963; (see table 2.12).
Table 2 .12: Evolution of GDP in AD billion 1963 - 1967.
Year 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
GDP (current prices) 13.1 14.1 15.2 14.7 16.2
GDP (constant prices)* 62.8 63.5 65.7 60.2 63.4
*) In 1980 prices.
Source: Compiled from International Financial Statistics Year Book 
1987. I.M.F. 1987. pp. 184 - 185.
It was such a stagnation that led the Algerian government to 
prepare a 'global development' strategy for the period 1967 
- 1980. Since 1967 Algeria accepted planning as a way of 
organizing development, aiming at achieving a number of 
interrelated national objectives which was spelled out in 
its long term development strategy for the 1967 - 198 0 
period. Some basic features of the Algerian development 
strategy is being discussed below.
73
2.3- The Development Strategy, its perception 
and. implementation.
A development strategy was outlined in 1966 by the 
'revolutionary council', and ten years later, it was 
reaffirmed in detail in the national charter, approved by 
referendum in June 1976; it aimed at reaching the following 
objectives by 1980:
- The creation and organisation of a productive base in 
order to reach by 1980 a rate of self-sustained growth 
sufficient to ensure full employment.
- Economic independence.
- The improvement of the standards of living of the 
population and reduction of disparities in the distribution 
of income and substantially strengthening the national 
commitment to regional development objectives.
These objectives were to be attained by the implementation 
of a long term strategy which was centered around the 
following:
- Industrialisation through a "coherent industrial structure" 
to achieve growth and employment objectives. That is, the 
objective of greater diversification of the economy was to 
be achieved by a rapid expansion and broadening of 
•industrial activities that would provide greater employment 
opportunities.
- Structural reforms aimed at increasing the role of the
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state over the basis of production and accumulation. 
-Central planning of the whole economy.
The introduction of workers' participation in the 
management of state enterprises.
Subsequently, this strategy was to be reflected in the 
policies and measures contained in the different national 
development plans. In launching the development strategy in 
1967, industrialisation was the keynote of the government 
economic policy. The strongest emphasis was placed on the 
establishment of heavy industries involving the hydrocar­
bons, iron steel, mechanical, electronic, metal and petro­
chemical industries to serve as a basis for economic 
development.
The rationale of the government policy was to give a big 
push to the industrialisation process by establishing the 
kind of industries which provide inputs to other industries 
and to other sectors of the economy.
2.3.1- The basis of the strategy.
In placing the Algerian strategy within a theoretical 
context, it can be said that it is a type of unbalanced 
growth, based on the hydrocarbon export sector and on the 
setting up of capital goods sector, with heavy restrictions 
placed on the imports of luxury goods, and high tariff taxes 
on imports of some consumer goods.25 The strategy was 
strongly influenced by the theoretical work of economists
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such as Frangois Perroux, A.O. Hirschman, and notably G. 
Destanne de Bernis.
The proposed strategy was based on the notion of 'industries 
industrialisantes' [industrializing industries]- a concept 
derived from Perroux's concept of growth pole industries. 
These industries, in terms of G. de Bernis,26 are those that 
give rise to a series of associated industries both up­
stream and down-stream, and which not only build the 
industrial sector, but help to modernise the agricultural 
sector, increase the level of living of the population and 
transform the country's resources into product needed by the 
country itself. The entire national economy would, thereby, 
be stimulated. This would, in the view of the strategy, 
create the necessary condition for inter-sectoral integra­
tion of the national economy. In a sense it was aimed at 
developing and integrating the national economy in such a 
way to make local industries clients and suppliers among 
themselves. It contains the idea of backward and forward 
linkages of A. Hirschman,27 suggesting that the setting up 
of the industry brings with it the availability of a new 
expanding market for its inputs; and that the domestic 
availability of a product brings into being an active force 
which utilises the product as inputs in new activities.
The ’industrializing industries1 include energy related 
industries, petroleum and gas which provide fuel, feed stock 
and finance for the industrialisation process with petroche­
micals representing the basis for a whole range of new
industries: iron and steel, metallurgical and mechanical
industries and chemicals; they provide new materials and 
machinery for other sectors of industry engaged in a 
production of finished goods such as vehicles, farm machi­
nery, pumps and irrigation equipment... etc.28 This implies an 
explicit reference to industrialisation strategy advocated 
by Feldman, Mahalobonis, and others who emphasised the 
decisive role of the capital goods sector and within it the 
machine tool sector in the process of industrialisation. It 
was believed that ’industrialising industries', by their 
stimulating capacities, would generate a systematic filling- 
in of the inter-industry matrix. In fulfilling these criteria 
'industrialising industries' are expected to induce a 
general expansion, and permit integration as well as an 
'autonomous development' process.
For the implementation of the above strategy, meanwhile, the 
government placed its hope on the rich oil and gas resources 
as a source of revenues to finance much of the planned 
economic and social development, and as inputs by supplying 
cheap energy and raw materials to other industries which 
themselves supply other sector of the economy. The 
government wanted to mobilise all the resources endowment of 
the country, aiming to bring the country's underemployed
resources together in order to exploit the opportunities
*
they had revealed. Whether the above strategy was really 
coherent or not, and whether it fulfilled the principal 
objective of a sustainable improvement of the living 
standard of the population or not, will be discussed below.
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2.3.2- The Ideological Foundation of the Strategy.
As far as the origin of the Algerian development strategy is 
concerned, it can be said that the main guide lines can be 
found in the basic official texts which were elaborated by 
the National Liberation Front Party (F.L.N). The first of 
these texts, the Tripoli programme which was set down in ,May 
- June 1962, just at the eve of independence, considered 
that Algeria was about to launch a long and arduous struggle 
for eliminating poverty and deprivation of the Algerian 
masses, with the ultimate objective being the creation of a 
just society. It emphasized the fundamental choice of a 
socialist path in organizing the Algerian economy and 
society; the take-over of production by the state was seen 
as an explicit transition to socialism.
As the Algerian economy was completely dependent upon the 
French one, the Tripoli programme’s aim was to set up an 
independent economy through the nationalisation of all 
natural resources, wholesale trade, banking system and all 
financial institutions. It adopted central planning as a 
guide line for the socio-economic development of the country 
with the state control over the main elements of the 
development process.
The development of the agricultural sector was said to be 
achieved by radical land reform measures, the limitation of 
private property and the collectivisation of the land. It 
stressed the establishment of an industrialisation strategy 
as a leading factor in economic development. In fact, it
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stated that:
"the progress of agriculture and mobilisation of the 
masses can help the country to advance only if the 
proper technical and economic foundation is provided by 
industrial progress... But the real long term development 
of the country is tied to the establishment of the 
basic industries which are necessary to meet the 
demands of a modern agriculture. Algeria has a great 
potential for the development of petroleum and 
metallurgical industries. It is a function of the state 
to create the condition appropriate to the establi­
shment of such heavy industries."29
Later on, the national charter (197 6) re-emphasised the role 
of industrialisation in general and basic industries in 
particular, which appeared to be the main driving force for 
the transformation of the whole socio-economic structure. It 
stated that the industrial revolution must set the founda­
tions for a basic industry itself capable of engendering new 
industries whose expansion must permit the creation of 
development dynamics in the economy in general and in the 
industry in particular. In fact, the development plans 
themselves reflected this concern; the first four year plan 
(1970 - 1973) stated that "during the deep change we are 
experiencing, our strategy is to consider industrialisation 
as the first sector of development."30 The second four year 
plan (1974 - 1977) aimed at laying the foundations of a 
’sound industrial' base and speeding up the implementation 
of its long term development strategy to the maximum, mainly 
in view of the improved financial prospects resulting from 
the increased hydrocarbon prices of 1973/74.
While the five year plan (1980 - 1984) gave more emphasis to
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meeting social needs, such as housing, health and education, 
industry remained the basis of the government long term 
strategy with a shift in emphasis from heavy to light 
industries. In fact, all national development plans so far 
have stressed the role of industrialisation as a first 
priority in the chosen development strategy. This was 
reflected in the allotment of the investments between the 
different sector of the economy.
The questions that arise from the above development strategy 
are: how can the Algerian development strategy, which
emphasized heavy industries with less emphasis on other 
sectors, fulfill the realisation of an introversion of the 
national economy? Was the pattern of investment that was 
mainly channelled to heavy industries involving the modern 
capital intensive technology appropriate to the conditions 
of the Algerian economy with a high rate of unemployment and 
underemployment, and the lack of skilled labour? How was the 
distribution of income and alleviation of poverty perceived 
and tackled, and how did the Algerian planners aimed to 
achieve growth with equity? Some of these issues will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapters.
2.4- The Economy under Planning.
During the period 1967 - 1984, four national plans were 
implemented, starting with a triennial plan (1967-69), two 
four year plans (1970-73), (1974-77), and then a five year
plan (1980-84) . The period 1978-79 can be said to be a
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period of consolidation and of completing the projects which 
were part of the previous plans and could not be completed 
in the time specified earlier. Another five year plan (1985 
- 1989) is under implementation.
From the beginning, the state intended eventually to control 
all internal transport,.domestic wholesale trade and foreign 
trade. The government focussed primarily on reviving the 
economy and reorganizing the institutional structure by 
taking control of the major economic and financial sectors 
in order to effectively implement national planning. The 
hydrocarbon sector, the main source of foreign revenues, was 
nationalised in February 1971, and by 1975, about 75 per 
cent31 of the industrial sector was state-owned. The state 
has been the major agent in capital accumulation and 
investments, and has had a determining role in the organi­
sation of the whole economy.
The annual rate of investment to gross domestic product 
increased from 26.4 per cent during the triennal plan (1967- 
69) to 48.6 per cent during the five year plan (1980-1984), 
with an average rate of 40.8 per cent for the whole period 
(1967 - 1984); (table 2.13).
Table 2.13: Annual Investment rate to GDP in % (1967 - 84).
1967-69 1970-73 1974-77 1978 1979 1980-84 1967-84
24.4 33.5 46.8 54.7 49.7 48.6 40.8
Source: for 1967-78, Synthese du Bilan... 1967-78. op cit. p.12. For
1979-84, Rapport G6n6ral du Plan Quinquennal (1980-84), M.P.A.T. 
January 1980. p. 33.
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This high rate of investment, compared to the average one of 
developing countries (26 per cent),32 resulted from: a) the 
increase in foreign earnings (mainly from oil) which 
r e a c h e d  the record of $14.1 billion in 1981,33 b) the 
increase in borrowing from foreign capital markets where the 
total foreign debt rose from about $1.5 billion in 1972 to 
about $23 billion in 1987,34 and c) the increase in domestic 
borrowing.35
The sectoral distribution of investment did not entirely 
follow the pattern envisaged by the plans; the growth of 
investment in non industrial sectors was relatively slow 
while investment in industry continued to grow rapidly. 
Investment in industry, particularly heavy industry repre­
sented by the hydrocarbons and basic industries, rose more 
rapidly than planned. While 54.7 per cent of total planned 
public investments were allocated to the industrial sector, 
in reality it absorbed 60.3 per cent of total achieved 
public investment during 1967 - 1978 period; (table 2.14).
Table 2.14: Public investments (planned and achieved) by sector in 
percentages for 1967-84 period.
1967-69 1970-73 1974-77 1978 1967 - 78*
plan achi plan achi plan achi plan achi plan ach
Agriculture 17.9 20.5 17.8 12 15.2 7.4 8.7 7.5 9.2 8.8
Industry 59.6 53.6 44.7 57.3 43.5 61.2 54.5 61.3 54.7 60.3
-hydroca (25.1) (27.5) (16.5) (26.5) (17.7) (29.2) (24.0) (29.2) (24.3) (28.7)
-Basic ind(24.1)(17.2) (18.8) (20.7) (19.8) (23.1) (19.3) (23.1) (19.4) (22.5)
-other ind(10.4) (8.9) (10.4) (9.7) (7.0) (9.9) (11.2) (9.0) (11.0) (9.0)
C. Public W. _ 1.8 2.5 2.8 2.0 2.6 2.0 2.4
Services 5.1 3.9 6.7 7.1 9.5 8.4 7.4 7.6 7.3 7.3
Infrastructure 3.7 3.1 4.1 3.3 3.4 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.8
Social 13.7 18.9 26.7 18.5 25.9 17.5 24.9 18.4 24.2 18.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
*) 1979 is not available.
Source: For 1967 - 78, Synthese du Bilan Economic et Social, op cit. 
pp. 7-9. And for 1980 - 84, Rapport G6n6ral du Plan Quinquennal (1980- 
84). op cit. p. 49.
While in heavy industrial sectors investments exceeded the 
targets, in light and small scale industries (represented in 
the table 2.14 by other industries) investments lagged 
behind the targets. The plan's target shortfalls were even 
more serious in agriculture. During the second four year 
plan (1974-77), agricultural investment accounted for only 
7.4 per cent of total achieved planned investments, against 
a target of 15.2 per cent. Other sectors (i.e. infrastruc­
ture and social secotrs) were below the targets as well. In 
fact, such an investment pattern affected differently the 
growth of these sectors,36 and as a consequence, affecting 
the way in which income is distributed, which will be 
discussed below in chapter 3.
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The first five year plan (1980 - 1984) was aimed at impro­
ving the situation by allocating more resources to other 
sectors (apart from industry), as is seen from the distri­
bution of investments between various social and economic 
sectors (see table 2.15), where housing, health, education and
Table 2.15: Structure of public investment of the first four year plan 
1980 - 84, in billions of dinars.
Sector In AD in %
Agriculture 47.1 11.8
Industry 154.5 38.6
Means of implementation 20.0 5.0
Transports 13.0 3.2
Storage - Distribution 13.0 3.2
Telecommunication 6.0 1.5
Economic Infrastructure 23.2 5.8
Railway Infrastructure 5.0 1.3
Housing 60.0 15.0
Education - Training 42.2 10.5
Health 7.0 1.7
Collective Equipement 9.6 2.4
Total 400.6 100.0
Source: Constructed from Plan Quinquennal 1980 - 1984.
training received 27.3% of total investment.37 Agriculture
received about 12 per cent, higher than the proportion it
received during 1967-78, which was about 9 per cent as shown
in table 2.14. However, its implementation showed a diffe-
rent story; GDP measured in constant prices increased by an
average rate of 4.3% per annum, well below the plan's target
of 8.2% per annum. While the industrial sector increased by 
an average rate of 9.6 per annum, the agricultural sector 
was stagnating, increasing by only less than one per cent
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(0.7%) per annum.38 Such a stagnation of the agricultural 
sector was due to a number of factors, as will be discussed 
below.
Before one examines the implications of such development 
strategies on employment, income distribution and poverty, 
it may be worthwhile to analyse the evolution of different 
economic sectors which may have some bearing on the main 
subject matter of this thesis.
2.4.1- The Industrial Sector.
The industrial investment which took the lion's share in 
total public investment was mainly devoted to hydrocarbons 
and heavy industries such as mines, steel, metal, mechanic 
and electrical industries. These industries absorbed more 
than 8 0 per cent of total industrial investment during the 
1967 - 77 period; (see table 16) .
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Table 2.16: Structure of Industrial Investment during (1967-77) in
million of Algerian Dinars.
Sector Amount in AD in %
Hydrocarbon Industries 26.4 40.6
Mines 1.97 3.0
Manufacturing of Iron 8.77 13.5
I.S.M.M.E.* 7.64 11.8
Construction Material 5.05 7.8
Gas, Electricity & Water 2.30 3.5
Sub-total 52.13 80.2
Chemical Industries 4.97 7.6
Food and Drink 2.10 3.2
Textiles 2.12 3.3
Shoes and Leather 0.29 0.5
Wood, Paper 2.25 3.5
Others. 1.10 1.7
Sub-total
Total of Industries
12.83 
64. 96
19.8
100.0
*) Steel, Metal, Mechanic and Electric Industries.
Source: Constructed from Hamid M. Temmar: Stategie de Developpement
Independent: Le Cas de l'Algerie. O.P.U. Algiers, 1983. p. 160.
The remaining 20% were in light industries such as food and 
drink, textiles, shoes, leather, wood, paper, and others. 
The industrial production increased in constant prices by an 
annual average rate of 6.2% during the 1967 - 1978 period.39 
However, such a growth rate was very costly, owing to a 
variety of reasons: higher components of imported capital 
goods and services whbse price rose sharply in the world 
market, especially from 1974/75 onwards. Location of 
projects in regions where there was no previous industrial 
experience and infrastructure, and insufficient domestic
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construction capacity, led to high construction costs and 
substantial delays in project execution, extending the 
period from construction to production over several years. 
There were also other constraints and difficulties, such as 
the problem of mastering the adopted advanced technologies, 
which stems from lack of industrial experience, shortage of 
skilled labour, and limited managerial capacity at plant 
level. All these, consequently, led to underutilisation of 
capacity. Such a situation was recognized in the general 
report of 1980-84 plan, which pointed out that: "While the 
five year plan is launched in an economic environment marked 
by the high Cost of development actions and programmes, low 
effi-ciency of the production machinery, long capital 
freezing periods."40 Over-staffing has been noticed in all 
public enterprises and, in fact, constituted an element 
responsible for the low productivity in these industries, 
(see below).
The managerial function in the public sector suffered from 
bureaucracy, slow decision making, and an insufficient 
concern about increasing production and productivity. As 
long as public enterprises had institutionalised guaranteed 
outlets for their products, they did not concern themselves 
with product quality and increasing productivity, and tended 
to avoid the risk associated with introduction of new 
products and innovating activity in general. The failure to 
offer incentives to managers and workers had had an impor­
tant effect on the efficiency with which these enterprises 
were operating and the surplus that they generated, and
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hence on their contribution to growth and development.41
As a rough approximation, productivity, expressed by average 
output per worker in non-agricultural material production, 
decreased substantially over the 1967-78 period by an annual 
average rate of 3.8%. The decrease was even substantial in 
the hydrocarbon and public work construction sectors; (table 
2.17). In 1978, average productivity (in constant dinars) 
was 50 per cent less than it was in 1967. The situation did 
not improve even during the 1979 - 84 period, (see table 2.18).
Table 2.17: Productivity in non-agricultural material production in 
constant prices of 1978.
Sector 1967 1969 1973 1977 1978
Industry & Hydro- 
-Industry 
-Hydrocarbon
150,114 
(36,607 
(2,363,500
138,509 
35,902 
2,100,875
120,604 
37,520 
962,773
86,687 
31,746 
563,300
85,532
31,100)
616,250)
C. & P. works* 65,464 73,720 37,563 31,970 32,148
Average 119,132 116,675 84,315 60,149 59,854
*) Construction & Public works including petroleum construction.
Source:"Constructed from: Synthese du Bilan Economic et Social de la 
Decennie 1967 - 1978. Algiers, may 1980.
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Table 2.18: Productivity in non-agricultural material production in 
constant prices of 1978, (1979 - 1984).
Sector 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Industry#
C. & P. works*
103565
36557
92508
34693
87229
32315
92942
32723
95980
31873
110045
31465
Average 68622 62380 58459 . 60353 59758 59683
*) Construction & Public works, including petroleum construction.
#) Including Hydrocarbon sector; for lack of enough information to 
separate the two.
Source: Constructed from: Statistiquesr Revue of O.N.S. N Q15 April - 
June 1987, p. 11 and p. 67; and International Financial Statistics 
Year Book 1987. I.M.F. 1987, pp. 186 - 87.
Such a substantial decrease can be said to be the outcome of
many factors among them:
Overstaffing of public enterprises: Many economists42 and 
government officials agree that Algeria had not only a 
surplus of labour among its overall labour force, but also 
among the employed work force. In this respect, the Ministry 
of Planning, in its report on the evaluation of the period 
1967-7 8, emphasised that "The decrease in productivity was 
partly due to the overloaded personnel mainly in industry 
and hydrocarbon sectors."43 It was reported that during the 
implementation of the second four year plan (1974-77) , an 
employment policy (regarded as optimistic) was adopted to
encourage systematically all sectors in recruiting an
abundant labour force. Such a policy led to the multiplica­
tion job opportunities and sometimes even the creation of 
fictitious posts; the ratio of these fictitious posts to the 
required ones varied between 75 and 110%.44 As P. Robineau
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pointed out "Many public enterprises recruit more personnel 
than they really need because of the strong pressures 
brought to bear by job seekers."45 The situation is compli­
cated by the fact that widespread overstaffing coexists with 
considerable shortages for certain skills and educational 
specialisations.46
Job turnover: Another factor was the movement of workers 
between sectors. In 1982 2 6 per cent of labour in the public 
sector, constituting high grades of levels 6 & 5, i.e. techni­
cians, middle executive, executives and high technicians, 
moved to the private sector where there was higher remune­
ration, conversely about 34 per cent of the labour (mainly 
unskilled) of the private sector47 moved to the public 
sector where there was much more security in employment and 
higher wages. This shift of workers caused distortions in 
the allocation of the labour force and considerable instabi­
lity of employment. It was also detrimental to planning and 
to learning processes and productivity.48 As a result of 
these constraints and conditions, it was hard to create an 
economically viable industrial sector.
All such factors may underline the economy's low perfor­
mance, and the drain of national resources which acted as an 
increasing constraint on the pace of the development process 
(see chapter 5) . In fact, the continuing covering of the 
losses of the public sector industries by the state to 
enable them to continue operating, tended to prolong the 
state of inefficiency of such industries, and went against
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the long-term interests of the country. Out of the existing 
400 enterprises (of the public sector), only 70 were 
breaking even.49 "In 1984 - 1987 period, the deficit of the 
public enterprises," declared the Algerian President, 
"amounted to AD110 billion."50 Such a deficit represented 
more than 43 per cent of 1987 GDP. Nevertheless, the indus­
trial sector became increasingly important in the national 
economy both in terms of output and employment. In 1982 it 
accounted for 47% of total output, and 13.5% of the employed 
labour force, against 46%, and 7% respectively in 1967.
2.4.2- The Agricultural Sector:
The agricultural sector's structure which prevailed during 
1962-66 period continued until the end of 1971,51 when a 
programme of agrarian reform, known as the "Agrarian 
Revolution" (AR), was announced to deal with the great mass 
of the agricultural population outside the self managed 
farms. This programme aimed at bringing resources and social 
justice to the peasants, by breaking up of private latifun- 
dia and the redistribution of large privately owned and 
state owned land among the peasant population. Since land 
represented a large proportion of wealth in the rural areas, 
its concentration into a few hands was one of the main 
causes of income inequality. Such a redistribution of land 
was seen as an important means of achieving equity. However, 
the main declared goal of the agrarian reform programme was 
at:
"building a new, just and open society to all, but protec-
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ting in priority, workers' dignity... This is why the 
agrarian revolution, beyond its simple social justice 
preoccupations, means radical transformation of rural 
world, living and working conditions... For the agrarian 
revolution to be a fundamental genuine element of 
progress for the most destitute masses, it must provide 
them all with factors of progress."52
The programme also aimed to increase self sufficiency in 
agricultural products particularly in foodstuffs, widen the 
market for the industrial sector, improve rural living stan­
dards, and halt the migration to urban centres.52 The inten­
tion was to change the whole socio-economic structure of the 
traditional agricultural sector54 by organising the peasants 
into cooperatives. It aimed also to resettle the benefi­
ciaries55 of the agrarian revolution into socialist villa­
ges, and to undertake a system of social reform in the coun­
tryside by abolishing the system of share-cropping (Kham- 
massah) and the cancellation of rural usurious loans; (rural 
interest rates were often known to exceed 50% per annum).
The beneficiaries were required to join multipurpose service 
cooperatives which were supposed to assist the farmers in 
obtaining credit, marketing their produce, and providing 
other facilities. A national average land ceiling of about 
45 hectares56 was imposed for private cultivators; the excess 
being expropriated - indemnifying the owners with 15 year 
state bonds. Absentee proprietorship was abolished, (only 
half an hectare of irrigated land or 5 hectares of dry land 
was allowed to the absentee). The market for farm land was 
officially abolished.57
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However, the implementation of the agrarian revolution was 
entirely through state initiative without any spontaneous 
actions on the part of the peasants, in obvious contrast to 
the farm workers' occupation of colon's farms in the second 
half of 1962. The scheme was mainly implemented in a two 
phased58 programme of national action.
The first phase January 1972 - June 1973, abolished share- 
cropping, annulled sharecroppers debts, and distributed some
700,000 hectares of state land to 54,000 peasant farmers, 
organised into small production cooperatives.
The second phase, mid June 1973 - mid June 1975, consisted 
of the nationalisation of the absentee landowners (of over 
45 hectares). During this phase some 650,000 hectares were 
redistributed to 60,000 beneficiaries, organised also into 
production cooperatives.
The number of production cooperatives (of phase 1 and 2) 
totalled about 6,000, i.e. with an average size of about 220 
hectares per cooperative. These production cooperatives were 
to be supported by service cooperatives providing modern 
means of production, storage facilities, marketing, credit, 
planning and extension work. Thus, the agricultural sector 
ended with three sub-sectors:
- The self-management sector or the socialist sector.
- The cooperative sector (of the agrarian revolution).
- The private sector.
The performance of the three different sub-sectors (in terms
of production per hectare) remained meagre in general. This 
was more so for the cooperatives59 and the private sector. 
On the whole, agriculture production has been stagnating or 
even declining during the post Agrarian Revolution period, 
(table 2.19). The index of food production per capita 
decreased from 100 in 1969-71 to 82 in 1982. (table 2.20).
Table 2.19: Yield (quintal per ha) of some agricultural products 1967 - 83. 
Products 1967-69 1970-73 1974-77 1979-83
Cereals 6.5 6.0 6.2 6.0
Pulses 5.0 5.0 7.0 4.4
Market gardening 87.0 84.0 86.0 80.0
Source: Constructed from: "1‘Evolution de 1 'Agriculture Algerienne de
1967-82," in Revue Statistiques N Q 2-1, 1984. O.N.S. op cit.
Table 2.20: Agricultural production index (1969/71 =100)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
101 99 97 87 88 90 92 73 76 77 87 84 82*
*) calculated from F.A.O., Production Year book 1982. p. 77 
Source: F.A.O., Production Yearbook, 1981. p. 79.
In an interview to the government’s daily newspaper "El- 
Moud jahid", 60 the Minister of Agriculture pointed out that 
"Since 1962, the average annual cereal production has not 
been more than 16 million quintals, while in the ten years 
before independence, it had been 20 million quintals. This 
stagnation and decrease, he thought, "could be explained by 
the lack of innovation, and seed varieties which have not 
evolved in more than 50 years." However, he added that "The
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main reason for the insufficiency of our agriculture 
production does not lie in the lack of cultivated land, but 
in low yields” .61 The situation, to my mind, has been a 
result of a combination of several factors:
.a) The investment pattern: As stated above, the agricultural 
sector received only 8.8 per cent of total investment during 
1967-78 period, and 11.7 per cent during 1980-84 period. 
This was inadequate for the development of the sector (as 
portrayed by its stagnation which was also due to lack of 
inputs, transport bottlenecks as well as to weather 
conditions). Such an investment was unequally distributed 
within the sector. The private sector, which accounted for 
55 per cent of total arable land, received only marginal 
support from the government. For instance, the private 
sector acquired only 27 per cent of total supplied tractors, 
and only 25% of total fertilizers, (see table 2.21) .
Table 2.21: Acquisition of tractors and fertilizers by juridical
sector in %.
Sector
arable land
1967-78
tractors
1979-82 1967-82
fertilizers
Public 45 83.3 62.5 73 75
Private 55 16.7 37.5 27 25
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Constructed from "1'Evolution de 1 'Agriculture Algerienne de 
1967-82.", in Revue Statistiques N Q 2-1, 1984 . O.N.S. pp. 48 - 49.
b) Nature of agricultural employment: Like the self-managed 
farm workers, peasants of the cooperatives created by the
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Agrarian Revolution became employees of the state, working 8 
hours a day as wage earners. All members of the cooperatives 
received, irrespective of what happened to production, a 
monthly installment subsidy of AD150 in cash, and AD100 per 
month worth of food. They added up to an income of AD3,000 
per year, which was the minimum subsistence income per 
beneficiary, as set up by the programme of the Agrarian 
Revolution. Workers behaved like salaried staff of the 
public enterprises, who were less motivated by the financial 
results of their enterprise.62 This was not favorable to the 
increase of production63 and productivity.
c) Inter-sectoral income differential: The inter-sectoral 
income differentials were among the reasons that discouraged 
workers to farm land (whether in self-management, the 
cooperative or the private sector), specially by young 
people. The subsidies which were given to imports of foods 
(mainly cereals), most of which compete with domestic 
production, depressed agricultural production and produc­
tivity, as stated earlier. In 1974, income of a worker in 
non-agricultural sector was four times higher than that of 
an agricultural worker.64 Urban sector had the added advan­
tage of better job opportunities, education and health faci­
lities. As a result, agriculture was often left with a high 
proportion of elderly workers. For instance, in the early 
1970s, out of the 110,000 permanent workers of the self­
managed sector, 47 per cent were in the range of 25-44 years 
old, 40 per cent are between 45 and 65 years old, and only 
1.6 per cent are less than 21 years old. The group of 20-40
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years old who form 47% of the collective members, constitute 
70 to 80% of workers who left rural areas.65
d) Misuse of techniques: Despite the fact that there was an 
increase in mechanisation and in other inputs; for instance, 
from 11,000 tractors and 2,700 combine harvester in 1967 to
52.000 tractors and 5,225 machines in 1982,66 agricultural 
yield has almost stagnated, and even declined, as mentioned 
above. Some machines (tractors, seeders, or combine 
harvesters) were inappropriate for being used in remote, 
rugged, and arid areas.67 Moreover, handling machinery and 
other inputs calls for technological know how, often beyond 
farm workers' capabilities. This led to breakdowns and 
maintenance problems. Chemical fertilizers and pesticides 
etc were also misused.
e) Loss of arable land: The shrinkage of arable land
resulting from urbanisation and industrialisation led to 
loss of arable land. One estimate68 indicates that some
30.000 hectares of agricultural land, (i.e. about 0.5% of 
total arable land) mainly in the most fertile areas, of whom 
10 to 12,000 ha were irrigated land, were lost to agricul­
ture as a result of industrialisation and urbanisation. In 
addition, a substantial proportion of available water was 
lost to agriculture because it was used to supply factories 
and towns. Loss of land was not compensated by rural reno­
vation and land improvement schemes.
The stagnation of the agricultural sector and the high 
growth rate of population increase, as well as the increase
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in income, were largely responsible for Algeria’s need to 
import considerable quantities of foodstuffs. In fact, food 
dependency, in a sense of how far food consumption is 
covered by imports from external sources, has reached a high 
level. It has increased considerably over the years, from a 
state of complete self-sufficiency at independence in 1962 
to 75% in 1983; (see table 2.22) . It seems to have reached in 
1988 an acute level, as portrayed by the figures in table 2.23.
Table 2.22: Share of domestic production in Algeria's food needs.
Year self sufficiency ratio
1962*c 97
1967 70
1973 55
1977 35
1983 25
*) Muttin, for instance, gave a ratio of 93% for 1969, suggesting a
higher ratio in 1962. See G. Muttin : "Production Agricole et
Dependence Alimentaire en Alg6rie.", in Revue Maghreb-Machrek, N° 90,
Oct-Nov-Dec 1980. p. 47.
Source: Compiled from: J.P . Entellis: Algeria: The Revolution
Institutionalised, op cit.
Table 2.23: Food Imports in covering consumption in % in 1988.
Goods/items percentages
Wheat and derivatives 50 - 55
Concentrated tomato 76
Fresh Milk 85 - 90
Butter, Smen (Ghee butter) 90
Pulses 97
Cooking oil 100
Coffee, Sugar, Tea 100
Lahda (Milk) 100
Source: Algerie-Actualit6 N Q 1207 Semaine du 1 au 7 Dec 1988. p. 17.
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The cost of food imports has become an immense financial 
burden placed on the economy. It increased from $1 billion 
in 1977 to $2 billion in 1982,69 and reached $2.6 in 1983.70 In 
1986, however, the cost of import declined to $2.2 billion 
mainly because of cut in imports, as a result of the decline 
in external resources resulting from the decline in oil 
prices).71
These food imports represented an important proportion of 
the balance of trade, i.e. representing more than one- 
quarter of its total imports bill in 1983 and one-third in 
1986. Such imports were equivalent to more than 23% of total 
exports' income in 1983 or as much as nearly 35% of revenues 
from oil exports.72 The figure is believed to have risen to 
more than 40% in 1986, as a result of the recent oil glut. 
These would generate an increased pressure on the balance of 
payments, on the state budget, and on investments.
All in all, the agricultural policy in general and the 
agrarian reform in particular, did not achieve the results 
which were "to improve production... and to secure a just 
distribution of the proceeds of agriculture", as stated in 
the ordinance73 declaring the 'Agrarian Revolution'. (See 
chapter 5 for further elaboration on this point).
Nevertheless, there is still some scope for increasing 
production and productivity in Algeria's agricultural sector 
by the use of modern technology, and of adequate 
incentives.74 Cereal yields in Algeria's agriculture are 
still very low compared to Tunisia and Morocco - the two
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neighbouring countries; for Algeria it was 5.6 quintals/ha 
for hard wheat and 6.05 q/ha for soft wheat. In Tunisia, the 
yield was 6.03 q/ha and 10.52 q/ha respectively during 1975- 
79. In Morocco, cereal yield (largely wheat) was 9.3 q/ha in 
197 6 - 79. Hence, it can be inferred that the encouragement 
of the agricultural sector by the adoption of an appropriate 
set of policy measures would increase agricultural produc­
tion and productivity.
It must, however, be emphasised that food intake of the 
country does not depend only on the availability of food but 
also on the capacity of the population to grow its own food 
or buy food from the market. It is in this context that 
employment becomes important. It has already been seen that 
neither the self-managed sector, nor the cooperative sector 
created by the Agrarian Revolution really catered to the 
needs of the rural poor, mainly concerning employment. 
Capital intensive nature of industrialisation could not have 
created adequate employment opportunities for the rapidly 
rising population and the labour force.
2.4.3- Population, Urbanisation and Employment.
Algerian population has increased, on average, by an annual 
rate of 3.3 per cent during 1962-83 period. It doubled in 21 
years from 10.2 million in 1962 to about 20.5 million in 
1983, (and to about 23 million in 1987) ,75 It will be about 
34.5 million by the end of 1999.76 Since the rural sector 
could not absorb the increasing number of people, the
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country experienced a continuing exodus from the rural 
areas. Urban population, which formed 25 per cent of total 
population in 1962, has increased to 51 per cent in 1987, 
with a rate of increase of more than 6 per cent a year 
during the 1962 - 87 period. The rural migration is likely 
to continue throughout the end of this century; i.e. by the 
end of 1999, urban population is expected to represent 65 
per cent of the total population; (table 2.24).
Table 2.24: Rural & urban population in % of total 1962 - 99.
1962 1967 1977 1980 1983 1987* 1989 1999
Rural 75 69 59 57 55 51 49 35
Urban 25 31 41 43 45 49 51 65
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
*) According population census of March - April 1987.
Source: 1962 - 1983: Annuaire Stratlstiques de l'AlgSrie. 1989 - 1999 : 
Rapport G6n6ral du Deuxieme Plan Quinquennal 1985 - 1989. January 
1985. p. 27.
In fact, this high rate of rural/urban migration created 
serious social and economic problems, among them, acute 
housing shortages, and serious over crowding in the urban 
areas. The average number of persons per a housing unit 
increased from 4.2 persons in 1966 to 7 persons in 1977, 77 
and to 7.8 in 1988.78 The development of peripheral bidon- 
villes (shanty-towns) which lack most elementary facili­
ties, and not to mention the problem of education, health, 
and unemployment, constitute a great obstacle facing the 
Algerian economy in its drive towards raising the standard 
of living of the masses.
101
2.4.3.1- Pattern of Employment.
Full employment was one of the main objectives of Algeria's 
long term strategy that was established in 1966. As 
suggested earlier, the industrialisation policy which was 
thought to act as a propellant to significant downstream job 
creation, failed to achieve the stated objective, mainly as 
a consequence of its type of capital intensive technology. 
Job creation in general, during the period of 1967-73, was 
rather limited. It increased on average by a rate of 3.8 per 
cent per annum (table 2.25), which was below the, 4% rate of
Table 2.25: Evolution of employment by sector(in 1000) & average
increase in %, (1967 - 1984).
Sector 1967 1973 1979 1984
annual
1967-73
rate of increase 
1973-79 1979-84
Agriculture 874 873 969 960 ... * 1.7 *
Industry 123 245 401 495 12.2 8.5 4.3
C. & P. Works 71 190 437 655 17.8 14.9 8.5
Services 374 440 600 760 2.7 5.3 4.8
Administration 306 434 615 845 6.0 6.0 6.6
Non-agriculture 874 1,309 2,053 2,755 7.0 7.8 6.1
Total/Average 1,748 2,182 3,022 3,715 3.8 5.6 4.2
*) Close to zero growth rate.
Source: Constructed from: Synthese du Bilan Economique et Social, op 
cit.; and from Statistiques, Revue of O.N.S., Nc 15 April-June 1987, p. 11.
increase in the labour force, while there was a stagnation 
of employment in the agricultural sector during the same 
period. Consequently, unemployment increased from 23.1 per 
cent of total labour force in 1967 to 23.5 per cent in 1973/
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(see table 2.26).
Table 2.26: Employment and Unemployment 1967 - 83, (’000) of labour.
1967 1969 1973 1978 1979 1983
1- Active population 2,273 2, 458 2,854 3,490 3, 612 4,206
2- Employed population 1,748 1,893 2,182 2,830 3,018 3,576
3- Unemployed population 525 563 672 660 594 630
4- Unemployment rate: 3/1 23.1 23 23.5 19 16.5 15
Source: For 1967 - 1978, Synthese du Bilan Economique et Social, op 
cit. p. 136. For 1979 - 1983. Planification et Developpement, Tome 1. 
op cit. pp. 14 - 6.
In early 1974, the government launched a scheme of massive 
job opportunities. There was a rapid increase in employment 
in non-agricultural activities (mainly in urban areas79) 
from 1,309 thousands of workers in 1973 to 2,053 thousands 
in 1979. This suggests that employment in non-agricultural 
sector increased on average by a rate of 7.8 per cent per 
annum during 197 4 - 197 9 period. On the other hand, employ­
ment in agriculture increased only by 1.7% per annum during 
the same period. However, at the national level, employment 
during that period increased by an average rate of 5.6% per 
annum; (see table 2.25 above). With such a rapid increase in 
job opportunities, unemployment decreased from 23.5% of 
total labour in 1973 to 16.5% in 1979; (see table 2.26).
During the 1979 - 1984 period, the rate of employment 
creation slowed down. It increased by a rate of 4.2%, but 
was high enough to generate a continuous decline in the rate 
of unemployment, which reached 15% of total labour force in
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1983. The structure of employment changed considerably as 
agriculture's share in total employment decreased from 50% 
in 1967 to 32% in 1979 and to about 26% in 1984 .80 This 
decreasing trend was due to the fact that the overall 
increase in employment during 1967 - 84 period (about 2 
million) was mainly generated in the non-agricultural sector 
with a share of about 96% of total employment creation, (see 
table 2.27 below) .81 Such a sectoral concentration of 
employment creation reveals the orientation of the Algerian 
development strategy.
However, if the apparent increase in employment in non- 
agricultural activities was impressive in absolute and in 
relative terms, it was less so when set against the high 
level of investment in the sector. For instance, the cost of 
creating a job, i.e. the marginal capital labour ratio (gross 
investment per job) in industry increased (in constant 
dinars)82 from AD483,966 during 1968 - 69 to 842,121 during 
the second four year plan (1974-77), to 930,949 in 1978,83 
and to ADI,404,545 during the first five year plan (1980 - 
84) .84 In fact, such a rapid increase in employment was not 
only accompanied by an increasing cost (in terms of marginal 
capital labour ratio), which can be partly explained by the 
type of capital intensive nature of investment, but it was 
also accompanied by a considerable decline in labour produc­
tivity, (as shown above). Employment was seen by the govern­
ment as an end in itself; the objective was partly for 
redistributive justice and partly for political reasons; 
(unemployed frustrated young people may create unrest, as
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was the case during October 1988) . Employment, in this 
respect, .was taken as a way to redistribute the earnings 
from oil and gas in order to increase social welfare which 
could be shared more by a greater number of the population. 
This state of affairs raises the question of whether or not' 
this apparent increase in employment opportunities can be 
sustained oyer the 1980s and the years to come. Such a 
question leads us to examine first the nature of job 
creation during the 1967 - 1984 period. Examining the 
structure of employment creation by industry during that 
period shows that the most important employment generating 
branch in the national economy was the public works cons­
truction sector. It witnessed the most rapid increase; its' 
share in total job creation accounted for about 30%, while 
the share of industry in total job creation accounted only 
for about 19% during the same period; (see table 2.27).
Table 2.27: Employment creation by industry during 1967-84 in (1,000).
Sector 1967-73 
Nr %
1973-79 
Nr %
1979-84 
Nr %
1967-84 
Nr %
Agriculture -1 ... 96 11.4 -9 -1.3 67 4.4
Industry* 122 28 156 18.6 94 13.5 372 18.9
C. P. W.@ 119 27.4 247 29.4 218 31.5 584 29.7
Services# 66 15.2 160 19.1 160 23.1 389 19.6
Administration 128 29.4 181 21.5 230 33.2 539 27.4
Non-agriculture 435 100.0 744 88.6 702 101.3 1881 95.6
Total/Average 434 100.0 840 100.0 693 100.0 1533 100.0
а) The negative figures denote the fall in employment, either in 
absolute or in relative terms.
*) including hydrocarbons.
#) and communications
б) Stands for the construction & public works.
Source: Constructed from Synthese de la D6cennie 1967 - 78. op cit., and 
from: Statistiques, Revue of O.N.S. N°15 April - June 1987, p. 11.
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Moreover, while the share of the public works construction 
sector in total job creation increased from 27 per cent 
during 1967 - 73 to 29 per cent during 1973 - 79 and to about 
32 per cent during 1979 - 84, the share of the industrial 
sector, which absorbed the highest proportion of total 
investments, decreased from 28 per cent to 19 per cent and 
to less than 14 per cent respectively.
In fact, the public works construction sector appeared to be 
the leading sector in the Algerian economy, as far as
employment is concerned. Such a leading role was the result 
of the implementation of the industrialisation programme 
strategy (involving the construction of industries) , and of 
the vigorous residential building boom which mainly
accompanied the oil boom. This suggests that any slowing 
down or stoppage either in the investment process and/or in 
the oil revenues would have serious consequences on the 
economy in general and on this sector in particular. As a 
matter of fact, owing on one hand to the recent collapse in 
oil prices, and on the other hand to the increasing burden 
of the foreign debt (the debt service ratio increased from 
24.6% in 1981 to 51% in 198685 and to over 83% in 198886) , 
investments declined from an average annual rate of 48.6 per 
cent during 1980 - 84 to 31 per cent in 1986. Such a drop in
the investment efforts with reductions in imports (of
capital, intermediary and raw materials) generated a 
sluggishness in employment creation in the economy in 
general and in the construction sector in particular. The 
proportion of this sector in total job creation decreased
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significantly from about 32 per cent during 1980 - 198 4 
(table 2.27) to 2.6 per cent in 1986 (table 2.28).
Table: 2.28: Structure of job creation by sector in 1986.
Sector in Numbers in %
Agriculture 9, 976 8.6
Industry 17,052 14.7
C. & Public Building 3,016 2.6
Services 30,972 26.7
Administration 54,984 47.4
Total 116,000 100.0
Source: Comit& Interministerial de I'Emplol. op cit. p. 27.
In fact, employment creation has been in continuous decline 
since 1984. It decreased, in relative and in absolute terms, 
from an annual average of about 150,000 jobs during 1980 - 
84 to around 65,000 in 1988; far below the planned objective 
of 170,000 jobs as envisaged by the second five year plan 
(1985 - 89) .
Moreover, 1986 alone has witnessed job losses amounting to
55.000 of which 44,000 were in the construction sector,87 
and a further 25,000 were lost during 1987 - 88. All in all, 
between 1985 and 1988 period 80,000 jobs were lost of which
64.000 i.e 80 per cent were in the construction sector.88 
Such job losses are believed likely to continue during the 
years to come as a result of the "fragility" and 
"vulnerability" of the situation in Algeria with regard to 
the production capacity of the Algerian economy.89
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2.5- Summary.
The evolution of the Algerian economy during the last two 
decades, as shaped by the implementation of the development 
strategy, generated sectoral disequilibrium with a number of 
weaknesses and bottlenecks. Some of these are as follows:
1- Industrialisation did not result in a steady flow of 
products which the domestic market urgently needed. There 
have been serious bottlenecks and performance failures, 
leading to an inflationary situation with adverse income 
distribution implications for the poor. (See chapters 4 & 5).
2- The emphasis on heavy industry (including hydrocarbons) 
and the way plans were implemented resulted in a higher 
level of external indebtedness as well as debt service ratio.
3 - While the huge investment mainly in industry had led to 
the creation of a substantial number of new jobs, it was at 
the cost of high marginal capital labour ratio and the low 
level of productivity.
4 - The failure to put an equivalent amount of effort into 
agricultural development resulted in an increasing requi­
rement for imported foodstuffs.
5 - The continuous drift of population from rural areas to 
the major towns put a very serious strain on the country's 
social infrastructure, particularly on housing and public 
services.
The implications of such a development strategy on employ­
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ment, income distribution and poverty will be examined in 
the following chapters. It is this assessment which could 
show whether the objectives set by the planners in terms of 
social justice have materialised or not.
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Notes to chapter 2.
1. Under this system, the landowner receives four-fifths of 
the harvest for providing land, seeds, oxen, plough, 
etc., and the Khammes receives one-fifth for his labour 
power.
2. Whereas the Melk land, mainly located on marginal
mountain sides, was unsuited to colonist commercial 
farming and remained largely in native hands.
3. While many Algerians were pushed to remote and poor 
areas, and to be dwellers in urban areas, others were 
forced to seek refuge in neighbouring countries.
4. The colon, the European settlers and the French are used 
interchangeably.
5. See Y .A. Sayigh: The Economy of the Arab World. Croom
Helm - London, 1978. p. 525.
6. Moreover, the French disregarded the local traditions 
and value systems, and saw them as symptoms of backwar­
dness. European value systems, French education and 
institutional arrangements were imposed on the 
Algerians. The introduction of vineyards in a Muslim 
society, to meet the requirements of Europeans and for 
export, was on land previously cultivated cereals - the
main staple food in Algeria. The vineyard acreage more
than doubled between 1900 and 1954 (representing about 5 
per cent of total available land, and constituting the 
most fertile land),.
7. See Nouchi Andr6, in: La Croissance du Nationalisme 
Algdrien (1914 - 54). Edition de Minuit, Paris 1962. pp. 
97 - 124.
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8. This meant that the per capita availability of arable 
land was 11.2 hectares for the Europeans and only 0.7 
hectare for the Algerians.
9. See the composition and distribution of the population 
in Algeria, table A2.3 in Appendix 2.
10. See Tami Tidafi, in: L'Agriculture Algdrienne et ses 
Perspective de Ddvelppement. Frangois Maspero, Paris 
1969. p. 28.
11. Samir Amin: The Maghreb in the Modern World. Algeria, 
Tunisia, Morocco. Chivers, Penguin edition 1970. pp. 
70-72.
12. There was no available data to make comparable figures 
for 1951.
13. of whom about 15.5 per cent gained their living engaged 
in towns and cities or as emigrants to France; only 59.2 
per cent gained their livelihood directly from agricul­
tural activities. See Emploi et Sous Emploi. S.E.P. 
1965.
14. It has to be borne in mind, as stressed above, that 
European land was the most fertile.
15. The overall Gini coefficient was much higher than each 
of the corresponding Gini coefficients of the two 
communities because of the "between inequalities". For 
further explanation of this, see chapter 3 and appendix 3.
16. See A. Henni: La Colonisation Agraire et le Sous- 
Ddveloppement en Algdrie. S.N.E.D. Algiers. 1982. p. 
201.
17. Of these Algerian students most came from the privileged 
class, the upper class within the Algerian population.
18. See Sayigh: The Economoics of the Arab World, op cit.
Ill
p. 524. See J. Joachim, in: The New Algeria. Follett
Publishing Company. Chicago, 1964. p. 201.
19. L 'Organisation de l'Armee Secr&te was created in 
February 1961 by extreme right-wing French officers, 
using terorism to prevent the French government from 
signing the cease-fire agreement.
20. It must be admitted that the colonial era did generate 
some positive effects - the setting up of some industries 
mainly of food processing and of other consumer goods, 
some infrastructure: roads, railways, dams, ports,
airports, schools, hospitals, a modern agricultural 
sector, and the explanation and exploitation of oil and 
gas. For further elaboration of this point, see for 
instance, Rene Gendarme: L ’Economie de l'Algerie: Sous 
D6veloppement et Politique de Croissance. Library 
Arnand Colin, Paris 1959. pp. 149 -64.
21. See William H. Lewis: "Algeria Changes its Course", in 
Africa Report. Washington D.C. Monthly Review. Nov 
1965. p. 12.
22. For more information on this point, see for instance: A. 
Marill et al, in: Essais sur I'Economie de 1 ’Algdrie 
Nouvelle. Paris 1965.
23. Management committees were also set up on about 1,000 
industrial and commercial firms. See Ian Clegg: Workers 
Self-Management in Algeria. Allen Lane, the Penguin 
Press. London, 1971. p. 60.
24. Moreover, there were 12 factories under construction: 6 
in food, 3 textiles, 1 iron smelting, 1 petrochemicals 
and 1 compostage. See 1 1 Industrialisation en 1967. op 
cit.
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25. In this respect, it is neither the dependency model of 
Samir Amin (export sector-luxury consumption sector) nor
the model of the import substitution industries as
initiated by some Latin American countries (consumption 
goods industries, at first stage, then towards capital 
goods industries at later stage).
26. See G. de Bernis: "Industries Industrialisantes et
Contenu d'une Politique d 1 Integration Regional", in: 
Economie Appliqu^e. Tome xix N 2 3-4. P.U.F. Paris 1966.
27. See Albert Hirschman, in: A Bias for hope. Essays on
Development and Latin America. New Haven. London. Yale 
University Press 1971.
28. See Richard I. Lawless, "Algeria: The Contradictions of 
Rapid Industrialisation", in: R.I. Lawless and Allan
Findlay, eds., North Africa: Contemporary Politics and 
Economic Development. London. Croom Helm; New York; St 
Martin's Press 1984. pp. 161 - 163.
29. See "The Tripoli Progamme", in: l rAnnuaire de l'Afrique 
du Nord 1962, C.N.R.E.S. Paris 1972.
30. See Plan Quadriennal (1970 - 73), Rapport G&n&ral. 
Preambule. S.E.P. Algiers - 1970. p. 4.
31. See J.A. Paul, "Algeria's hydrocarbon sector", in: OPEC 
and the Middle East, (ed) Russell A. Stone, p. 242.
32. See World Development Report, July 1983, World Bank, p. 
157.
33. See Francis Giles. The Financial Times. London 1st Sept 
1983.
34. See World Debt Tables 1988/89, World Bank; vol iii. p. 
26, and vol ii. p. 4.
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35. See Kara Mustapha, in: Problems of Development 
Financing in Algeria, Unpublished Ph D. University of 
Pittsburg, 1978.
36. While industry increased by an average rate of 6.2% per 
annum, agriculture increased only by 2.6%.
37. See Rapport G&ndral du Plan Quinquennal (1980 - 84) . 
M.P.A.T. January 1980. p. 49. Whether the plan's pattern 
of investment has been fulfilled as planned and whether 
the implementation of the plan has been successful in 
achieving the planned targets; these need to be 
examined; so far, owing to the lack of information, 
these cannot be carried out.
38. Calculated from Statistiques, revue of O.N.S. N5 15 April 
- June 1987, p. 72.
39. See Synthdse du Bilan Economic et Social de la DScennie 
1967 - 1978. Algiers, May 1980. p. 63.
40. See Rapport G&n&ral du Plan Quinquennal 1980 - 84. op 
cit. p. ii.
41. The rate of absenteeism was estimated at 30% in the 
public sector and 5% in the private sector. See Misska: 
Le Monde Diplomatique, Dec 1982. Paris, p. 25.
42. See for instance See A. Bouzidi: "Emploi et chomage en 
Algerie, 1967 - 1983", in: Revue du C.R.E.A. N 2 2, 2&me 
Trimesttre 1984. p. 65.
43. See Synthdse du Bilan Economic et Social de la Ddcennie 
1967 -1978. op cit. p. xiii.
44. See C. Bernard: "Les Resistances ouvrieres dans 1 'Algerie 
en voie d'Industrialisation", in: Annuaire de l'Afrique 
du Nord 1982. Paris 1983. p. 138. See also Misska: 
"1'Algerie du Privilege au Droit", in Le Monde
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Diplomatique. Paris, December 1982.
45. See Patrice Robineau: "Interdependence and Development in 
Algeria." in Christian Cameliau (editor): Inter- 
pedendence and Patterns of Development. O.E.C.D. 1985. 
Paris, p. 161.
46. According to the 1985 - 89 Plan, skilled manpower 
increased from 34 per cent in 1980 to 42.1 per cent in 
1985, and expected to be 51.7 per cent by the end of 
1989. See Rapport G&n&ral du Deuxieme Plan Quinquenal 
1985 - 1989. Ministry of Planning. Jan. 1985. pp. 17 - 18.
47. See Enquete Main d ’oeuvre et Ddmographie 1982. M.P.A.T. 
- 2 - Emploi ' et Mobility Pro‘fessionnelle, serie 
Statistique Sociale, Avril 1984, table 2. p. 12.
48. It was also due to the type of the employed labour. In 
1981-82, more than 65 percent of total workers in non- 
agricultural activities were unskilled labour, with 
probably negligible productivity. That is, the predomi­
nance of unskilled labour tends to lower the average 
skills of the labour force, and as a result to slow down 
the rate of productivity growth.
49. From the Discourse of the Algerian President at the 
opening of the 6th Congress of the FLN party, on 27th 
November 1988. See El-Moudjahid (daily newspaper) 29th 
November 1988, p.4.
50. See El-Moudjahid (daily newspaper) 29th Nov 1988, p.4.
51. In fact, the "Agrarian Revolution", originally scheduled 
to begin in 1966, was delayed, till 1971.
52. See the Agrarian Revolution Charter, pp. 9 - 1 0 .
53. It aimed as well at increasing livestock production in
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the steppe areas where about 20 million ha of postnage, 
mostly in southern Algeria, grazes by animals of nomadic 
herdsmen, have been nationalised. The 8 million grazing 
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Chapter III
Economic Growth & Income Inequality in the Algerian
Economy.
The review of literature in chapter one has already shown 
that development strategy in a developing country will have 
important implications for both the income distribution and 
poverty. But it also came out that the history, tradition, 
and nature of the state determine income inequality and 
incidence of poverty. As such, the present chapter will look 
into the implications of the Algerian development strategy 
for the distribution of income.
Carrying out such a study involves two complementary tasks. 
Firstly, it focuses on the measurement of income distribu­
tion from many perspectives: by factor shares, overall,
urban, and rural.1 Capturing each of these inequalities is 
necessary for determining how the overall inequality is 
changed over the years in the Algerian economy. In other 
words, an inquiry into the nature and magnitude of changes 
in these distributions form the central theme of the first 
task and paves the way to the second task which consists in 
dealing with the main determinants of inequality. This, in 
turn, highlights areas of policy interventions which may 
have implications for the distribution of income. In the 
process of dealing with the first task in this chapter, it 
will be necessary to touch on the second task, but it will
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be dealt with comprehensively in subsequent chapters.
Inequality can be examined on the income as well as on the 
expenditure side. As consumption is a function of income, it 
implies that income distribution in its turn determines to a 
considerable extent the level of the consumption pattern.2 
However, before discussing inequalities in the size 
distribution of personal income and consumer expenditure in 
Algeria, it is useful to review the data source and the 
method used.
3.1- Note on data collection and method:
The data used are derived from various sources, published 
and unpublished studies, allowing us to construct a.picture 
of income distribution in Algeria at two different points in 
time. These data concern mainly:
1) The study of income disparities and purchasing power in 
Algeria between 1968-1979 (henceforth the income study), 
carried out by the national Institute of Studies and 
Analyses for Planning (I .N.E.A.P.)3 which is under the tute­
lage of the Ministry of Planning as a research department. 
It was based mainly on:
- The national survey of income and consumption carried in 
1966-67 for greater Algiers, and 1967-68 for the rest of the 
country.
- The study on employment and salaries carried out between 
1975 and 197 6 in urban areas.
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- The study on the elements of employment and revenues in 
the main towns of Algeria in 1979.
- Different studies on private agriculture carried out as 
part of the national census on agriculture in 1973.
To avoid the problem of under-reporting of income in 
general, the I.N.E.A.P. assumed a rate of underestimation of 
income of 15% for the salaried and 30% for the non­
salaried.4 The justification of these rates was based, as 
reported by I.N.E.A.P. on "observation and experience."5
On the definition of income, household income was taken from 
five main sources:
1- Employment (wage and salaries and non salary revenues).
2- Public transfers (retirements, pensions, scholarships, 
family benefits).
3- Property income, rents from commercial property and 
houses, etc.
4- Self-consumption (income in kind of a consumable 
nature).
5- Private transfers (money orders, etc).
Income, however, did not include:
a) income in kind of durable nature (e.g., domestic 
equipment).
b) fringe benefits, ranging from subsidized housing to free
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foreign travel and holiday subsidies, enjoyed by a certain 
category of paid groups mainly party and state officials 
(army officers and managers of state firms). These are 
probably more unequally distributed than money incomes, 
which would have a considerable influence on the distribu­
tion of income mainly in widening the income gap between the 
highest paid and the lowest groups.
c) realised capital gains from durable goods such as cars, 
lorries, machines, and etc, brought through the public 
sector or from abroad and sold at higher prices.6 It did not 
also include capital gains from ownership of houses, 
apartments, and commercial shops. These may be taken as part 
of the distribution of wealth rather than of income.
Nevertheless, even within covered income sources there are 
some limitations, for instance, self consumption and non­
monetary income render the estimation of income in part 
conjectural and raise complex problems of evaluation.
- The retained product for home consumption and unpaid family 
labour. '
- The tendency of the farmer to understate yields partly for 
cultural values7 and partly for fear of tax revenue collec­
tion. Another problem is the choice of prices for faluation 
of income in kind: constant or current prices, harvest 
prices, wholesale prices, retail prices or procurement 
prices. In short, it is difficult to measure income, 
particularly at the upper and lower ends of the scale. There 
is a likelihood that the highest income groups deliberately
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understate their income for fear of incurring a tax 
liability. At the other end, it is difficult to value own 
consumption and investment in the rural subsistence sector.
There are other limitations not overcome by the income 
study. One of them is that the urban population in the area 
covered by the data of 1966-68 was not exactly the same in 
the statistics of the 1970’s. The urban income data for 1979 
did not represent the whole urban population as it did for 
1968. In an attempt to make these studies consistent and 
comparable, the I.N.E.A.P. carried out a certain analysis 
ending with the conclusion that the average urban income of 
the study on "Elements of Employment and incomes in the main 
towns of Algeria in 197 9" was about 10% higher than the 
average overall urban income in Algeria.8 In fact, such a 
conclusion points to some weaknesses one has come to expect 
from data on income. However, these are the only available 
data on income distribution in Algeria, which tend to cover 
only the "primary income distribution."9
The second source of data is the Algerian household consump­
tion expenditure survey of 197 9-80 which was carried out 
between March 1979 and March 1980 by the National Office of 
Statistics (O.N.S.). It was based on a national household 
survey with a sample of 8,208 households and it mainly aimed 
to:
- Provide a basis for the social and economic planning in 
determining the needs and objectives.
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- Evaluate the food situation, nutrition and the minimum 
dietary requirement of households.
- Shed light on income distribution from the structure of 
household consumption expenditure.10
The sample results were extrapolated to the whole of 
Algerian household consumption expenditure. The validity of 
this extrapolation would, of course, depend upon a number of 
conditions among them: the sampling method which enables the 
whole population to be represented, the attitude of respon­
dents, and the accuracy of the information. Nonetheless, it 
is worth questioning some of the assumptions and the method 
adopted in the survey and indeed of the conclusions. In view 
of this, one has to examine the sampling procedures and the 
method used. The survey was carried out in the following way:
- The general population census of 1977 was used as a frame 
for the selection of the sample survey. The Algerian popula­
tion was divided into six housing sectors as stratified by 
population density areas in a descending order; i.e. from 
high (relative) population density areas to low density 
areas, distributed among five ecological geographic zones. 
These zones were stratified by the type of land area; i.e. 
fertile, semi-arid, hilly (mountainous), arid, steppe and 
saharian.
The population stratified by either housing sectors or by 
ecological geographic zones, and divided into districts each 
containing 120 households. 228 districts were selected from
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this matrix, and a random sample of 36 households was taken 
from each district, as sample units, and another 18 house­
holds for replacements. However, what is interesting to note 
is that the distribution of the chosen districts, either 
among the different housing sectors or among ecological 
geographic zones, was apparently not based on any reliable 
sampling method. There was no mention at all of how the 228 
districts were selected from the 22 sub-strata.11 (See tables 
3.1, and 3.2) .
Table 3.1: Distribution of sample units among different housing sector.
Housing sector Districts ' Nr of household' % of household
Sector 1: Greater Algiers 30 1,080 13.2
Sector 2: Metropolitan Region 39 1,404 17.1
Sector 3: Medium Towns 42 1,512 18.4
Sector 4: Villages 42 1,512 18.4
Sector 5: Rural agglomerate 41 1.476 18.0
Sector 6: Scattered rural 34 1,224 14.9
TOTAL 228 8,208 100.0
Source: Constructed from D6pence de Consommatlon des Manages
AlgSriens, 1979/80. I.N.E.A. P. op cit. p. 15.
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Table 3.2: Distribution of sample units by housing sector and
geographic zones
Sector Zone I Zone II Zone III Zone VI Zone V Total
Sector 1 1,080 1,080
Sector 2 1,404 1,404
Sector 3 288 324 288 288 324 1,512
Sector 4 288 288 288 324 324 1,512
Sector 5 180 324 324 324 324 ; 1,476
Sector 6 180 324 324 288 108 1,224
Total 3,420 1,260 1,224 1,224 1.080 8,208
Source: Depense de Consommation des Menages Alg6riensf 1979/80.
I.N.E.A.P. op. cit. p. 16.
In the survey, under the heading of distribution and mode of 
selecting (drawing) the sample, it was stated that "in the 
first phase, districts are selected randomly with unequal 
probabilities",12 which may mean that probability sampling 
procedures have been used in selecting the sample units. 
This, however, has not been the case, as is seen from what 
follows.
Firstly, it has to be noted that in sampling surveys the aim 
is to use sampling procedures which avoid biases in the 
selection of a sample in order to achieve the maximum accu­
racy in representing the whole population. For the survey in 
question, the appropriate procedure in selecting the sample 
units is to select the districts in accordance with a proba­
bility proportional to size. In other words, the probability 
of districts being selected from a housing sector or from an 
ecological geographic zone is equal to the proportional size
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of the housing sector or the geographic zone in the overall 
population. Then, with simple random sampling, one would 
select the number of households within each district. The 
number of households to be assigned in each housing sector 
of the country would be determined by the percentage of the 
households living in each housing sector, or geographic 
zone, (see table 3.3). For instance, sector 6 has a popula-
Table 3.3: Distribution of Algeria's household by housing sector.
Setor 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5 Sector 6 Total
Household 221749 169190 473782 176416 190540 1260610 2491287
in % 8.9 6.8 19.0 7.0 7.7 50.6 100
Source: D6pense de Consommation des Manages Alg6riens, 1979/80. 
I.N.E.A.P. op. cit. p. 22.
tion number five times as large in sector 1; so it is 
expected that the sample units in sector 6 have to be given 
five times the chance of being selected as the ones from 
sector.1. This means that the number of sample units in 
sector 6 would be more than five times as large as the 
sample units in sector 1. It follows that the distribution 
of sample units which would guarantee proper coverage and 
representation of each housing sector, should have been as 
shown in table 3.4. Accordingly, the expected distribution of 
the sample units among the 22 sub-strata would be as shown 
in table 3.5. Such a sampling distribution would have 
ensured not only that housing sector households would be 
correctly represented in the sample, but also would tend to 
increase the precision of the results as well.
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Table 3.4: The expected distribution of the sample size by housing sector.
Housing sector Districts N° of household % of household
Sector 1: Greater Algiers 21 756 9.2
Sector 2: Metropolitan Region 15 540 6.6
Sector 3: Medium Towns 43 1548 18.9
Sector 4: Villages 16 576 7.0
Sector 5: Rural agglomerate 18 648 7.9
Sector 6: Scattered rural 115 4140 50.4
TOTAL 228 8,208 100.0
Source: Constructed from the above tables - 3.1 and 3.3.
Table 3.5: Expected distribution of sample units among the 22 sub-strata.
Sector Zone I Zone II Zone III Zone VI Zone V Total .
Sector 1 756 756
Sector 2 540 540
Sector 3 648 180 108 324 288 1,548
Sector 4 144 72 72 108 180 576
Sector 5 180 72 180 108 108 648
Sector 6 826 504 1,512 612 684 4,140
Total 3,096 826 1,872 1,152 1,260 8,208
Source: Constructed from the above tables - 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4.
From the two sampling distributions of tables 3.1 and 3.4, 
i.e. the observed and the expected one, it appears that only 
sector 3 (the medium towns) had a number of sample units 
more or less proportional to its size, as its share in the 
observed distribution .sample was almost the same as in the 
expected one. Sectors 1, 2, 4, and 5, were over-represented 
in the sample, whereas sector 6 which, forms the scattered 
rural population with more than 50 per cent of total
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households, was marginally represented, as its share was 
only about 15 per cent of the sample units. This could well 
mean that under-representing people living in scattered 
rural areas, whose consumption levels are lower than the 
ones of other areas, would bias average national consumption 
upwards, and may, consequently, understate the level of 
inequality and of poverty. However, the non-sampling errors 
implied are very significant in depicting inaccurate 
results. They are different from what the statisticians may 
call sampling errors13 which arise mainly from trying to 
represent a population with a sample and which are usually 
not significant.
In fact, there is a very significant difference between the 
observed sampling distribution and the expected sampling 
distribution. Such a conclusion is reached on the basis of a
statistical analysis, using X technique as a test of hypo­
thesis. In this respect, the sample value of % 2 = 74.99 is 
clearly very significant14 since the critical value at 1%
level of % 2.oi = 15.09 (with 5 degrees of freedom), which 
clearly enables us to establish that the sample data do not 
come from the specified population. This suggests that the 
national sample survey (N.S.S.) on consumption expenditure 
does not cover properly the entire population, as the sample 
is unrepresentative of the household population. A further 
indication of the unrepresentativeness of the sample is the 
under-estimation of the numbers and proportion of small 
households and families in remote areas, and in unstable 
places. For instance, nomad households, and those living in
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hotels because of the housing crisis, were excluded 
altogether from the survey.15
Moreover, besides the replacement sample which represented 
50 per cent of the total sample units, there was 1.3 per 
cent16 of non-response among the sample size. We don't know 
whether the replacement sample had been used to replace a 
certain category of income class or not, because we don't 
know the distribution of the non-respondents among the 
income classes . Not knowing the distribution of non­
respondents, (i.e. which groups were replaced), there may be 
a selectivity bias towards those who choose to respond. This 
would certainly affect the representativeness of the 
sample.17 Nevertheless, the data of this survey are going 
to be used with some reservations because other sources are 
not available.
3.2- Income Distribution during 1962 - 1980 period.
The distribution of income in the process of economic 
development in independent Algeria can be examined at two 
main different points in time, in 1967/68 and in 1979/80. 
The 12 years period between these two points in time covered 
the three year plan (1967 - 69), the first four year plan 
(1970 - 73) , and the second four year plan (1974 - 77) . This 
period also coincided with the rapid increase in oil prices 
of 1973/74 and of 1979. The average annual economic growth 
rate during this period was about 7.2 per cent18 (in constant 
prices of 1978). So, it is interesting to see how income
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distribution changed during this period. At the beginning of 
such a period, the distribution of income showed that 70 per 
cent of the population got only 35.5 per cent of total 
income; whereas the top 5 per cent of the population got 28 
per cent. The concentration of income, as reflected in the 
Gini coefficient, was 0.46. (See table 3.6).
Table 3.6: Distribution of income in 1967/68.
Population in % Income in %
58 23.0
12 12.5
21 26.5
4 ' 10.0
4 18.0
_1 10.0
100
Gini coefficient 0.46*
100.0
*) Calculated by the author.
Source: A.A.R.D.E.S.: Family Budget Survey 1967/68.
Economic growth prior to 1967/68, (i.e. between 1962/63 - 
1967/68), was on ayerage about 2 per cent per annum. At the 
end of the.period in question, i.e. in 1979/80, distribution 
of household consumption expenditure, (keeping in mind the 
limitations, and the deficiencies of the data, as discussed 
above), showed a low inequality index of a Gini coefficient 
of 0.35. (See table 3.7).
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Table 3.7: Distribution of Consumption Expenditure in 1979/80.
Expenditure brackets per caput expenditure population expenditure
in AD (average) in % in %
less than 800 518 3.8 0.8
800 - 1,000 860 3.2 0.9
1,000 - 1,200 1,133 4.4 1.5
1,200 - 1,500 1,371 7.3 3.2
1,500 - 2,000 1,826 18.6 10.7
2,000 - 2,500 2,344 13.5 10.1
2,500 - 3,000 2,856 11.0 10.0
3,000 - 3,500 3,337 9.3 10.0
3,500 - 4,000 3,838 6.8 8.3
4,000 - 4,500 4,335 5.1 7.0
4,500 - 5,000 4,826 4.2 6.5
5,000 - 5,500 5,322 3.1 5.4
5,500 - 6,000 5,842 1.9 3.6
6,000 - 6,500 6,338 1.4 2.9
6,500 - 7,000 6,862 1.6 3.5
7,000 - 7,500 7,350 1.0 2.4
7,500 and over 10,767 3.8 13.2
Average/or total 3,298 100.0 100.0
Gini coefficient 0.35*
*) Calculated by the author.
Source: Depense de consommation des Manages Alg6riens. op cit.
Nevertheless, what is the likely trend of income inequality 
which accompanied the process of economic development in 
Algeria during the 1967/68 - 1979/80 period? From the 
changes in income inequality between the two points in time, 
it can be inferred that there was a clear trend throughout 
the period in question; see figure 3.1. Income distribution
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did improve during the 1967/68 - 197 9/80 period, as portrayed
by the decrease in the index of Gini coefficient from 0.4 6 
in 1967/68 to 0.35 in 1979/80 . 19 In this respect, it seems
that inequality continued to decrease while economic growth
rate continued to be rapid, which is contrary to the Kuznets
hypothesis, see figure 3.2. Such a pattern was also noticed 
in other countries.20
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However, the decrease in the trend of income inequalities 
does not portray which groups of the population gained 
most, and which groups did not. The trend in income inequa­
lities should be, therefore, supplemented by a more detailed 
examination of income by sources, its generation, and its 
trend during the period in question. Such an examination 
would capture the forces which .generate that particular 
distribution of income, and how growth did spread its 
benefits and costs among different socio-economic groups. 
Accordingly, it will enable us to single out the positive 
and the negative elements in shaping the distribution of 
income; i.e; to determine the features that manifest better 
income distribution than others in order to provide a clear 
picture of its trend over a particular period. As far as the 
Algerian economy is concerned, and given the limitations of 
the data, such an examination can be carried out between the 
income of different socio-economic groups over 1968 - 197 9 
period in urban and in rural areas.
3.3- Income Distribution in Urban Areas.
Algeria has become, as shown above, an increasingly urbani­
sed country. According to the population census of 1987, 51 
per cent of the population live in urban areas of 10,000 
people or more. By the end of 1999, more than 65 per cent21 
of the population will be living in urban areas, which will 
represent a major turn in the history of urbanisation in 
Algeria. In 1981, the urban areas accounted for 68 per cent 
of total industrial workers, 70 per cent of commerce and 57
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per cent of services. Employment and income have been 
growing rapidly in urban areas, a process usually referred 
to as urbanisation. The available data on income distribu­
tion in urban areas permit to show its evolution between two 
different points in time, in 1968 and in 1979. In 1968 the 
size distribution per head showed that the top 5 per cent of 
the population got about 21 per cent of total income, 
whereas the lower 32.5 per cent got only 8.6 per cent, i.e. 
with an inequality index of 0.44. (See table 3.8).
Table 3.8 : Distribution of income per head in urban areas 1968.
Income brackets in AD population in % income in %
less than 400 32.5 8.6
400 800 31.6 22.6
800 1200 16.2 19.6
1200 - 1800 11.0 19.7
1800 - 2400 4.2 11.0
2400 - 3000 2.0 6.2
3000 - 4000 1.2 5.1
4000 and <over 1.3 7.2
Total 100.0 100.0
Gini coefficient 0.44*
*) Calculated by the author.
Source: DisparitSs des Revenus et Pouvoir d ’Achat en AlgerIe 1968 -
1979, I.N.E.A.P. F6vrier 1981, p. 65.
In 197 9, urban income inequality (per head) decreased to an 
index of 0.40, (see table 3.9 on the next page), and the 
distribution of consumption expenditure showed an even more 
equal distribution with a Gini coefficient of 0.317 (see 
table 3.10).
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Table 3.9: Distribution of income per head in urban areas 1979.
Income brackets in AD population in % income in %
less than 2500 35.9 14.5
2500 - 3500 23.8 16.6
3500 - 4500 12.8 12.0
4500 - 6000 11.5 13.9
6000 - 9000 8.5 14.5
9000 - 17500 5.8 16.8
17500 - 30000 1.3 6.7
30000 and over SLA 5.0
100.0 100.0
Gini coefficient 0.40
Source: Constructed from Disparit6s des Revenus et Pouvoir d'Achat en 
Algerle 1968 - 1979. I.N.E.A.P. F^vrier 1981.
Table 3.10: Distribution of expenditure per head in urban areas 1979/80.
Expenditure brackets population in % expenditure in %
less than 800 1.2 0.2
800 - 1,000 0.9 0.2
1,000 - 1,200 1.5 0.5
1,200 - 1,500 4.0 1.4
1,500 - 2,000 12.0 5.6
2,000 - 2,500 12.3 7.4
2,500 - 3,000 12.9 9.4
3,000 - 3,500 11.6 9.3
3,500 - 4,000 8.8 8.7
4,000 - 4,500 7.3 8.1
4,500 - 5,000 6.2 7.6
5,000 - 5,500 4.6 6.2
5,500 - 6,000 3.6 5.4
6,000 - 6,500 2.2 3.6
6,500 - 7,000 2.3 4.0
7,000 - 7,500 1.6 3.1
7,500 and over 7.0 19.3
Average/or total 
Gini coefficient 0.31*
100.0 100.0
*) Calculated by the author.
Source: D&pense de consommation des MSnages AlgSriens. op cit.
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The fact that the size distribution of consumption expendi­
ture was more equal than the size distribution of income 
tends to be the general case because savings (one of the 
component of income) tend to be distributed more unequally 
than consumption (the other component of income).22 It 
follows that income is more equally distributed than 
savings, and is less equally distributed than consumption 
expenditure. In fact, this is the case in many countries 
where most of the savings in the country are attributed to 
the upper ordinal groups whose propensity to consume is the 
lowest. In other words, the more the income inequality is, 
i.e. the greater the share of the upper income group that 
this implies, the more skewed the distribution of savings is 
in the country.
Nonetheless, there is a change in income inequality index in 
urban areas from a Gini index of 0.44 in 1967/68 to 0.40 in 
1979/90, see tables 3.8 and 3.9. It may be interesting to 
see how such a change in income inequalities between these 
two points in time was brought about. In view of this, the 
trend in income of different socio-economic groups over 1968 
- 1979 period is worth examining. The two main socio­
economic groups are the non-salaried and the salaried labour 
ones, as they form the bulk of the population.
3.3.1.— Trends in Income of the Non-Salaried 
Households.
The trend in the evolution of income within the non-salaried
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(or property) household groups23 between 1968 and 1979 
reveals that while the per capita income of the craftsmen 
and tradesmen households (the lowest income category among 
this group) witnessed slight changes of less than 1 per cent 
in real terms between 1968 and 197 9, the per capita income 
of the employer (the higher income category) increased in 
real terms by an annual rate of 3.4 per cent during the same 
period. (See table 3.11).
Table 3.11: Trend in income per head of non-salaried households.
Household head 
occupation
1968 
income in AD
1979 
income in AD
Annual growth rate* 
nominal real
Craftsmen 1511 4291 9.1 + 0.9
Tradesmen 1765 4301 7.7 - 0.5
Employer 4676 17468 11.6 + 3.4
Average 1892 5589 9.4 + 1.2
* As deflated by the average annual increase in the index of prices 
which was 8.2 per cent between 1967/68 and 1979/80, see price index at 
average income levels, in table 4.10 (chapter 4). p. 197.
Source: Constructed from Disparitds des Revenus et Pouvolr d'Achat en 
Alg6rie 1968 - 1979. I.N.E.A.P. op. cit.
Accordingly, the income disparities between the two catego­
ries increased considerably. The income disparity ratio 
between the two increased from 1 : 2.8 in 1968 to 1 : 4.1 in 
1979. As a result, inequality in income distribution among 
these household categories increased considerably. The Gini 
coefficient rose from 0.11 in 1968 to 0.23 in 1979; (see 
table 3.12).
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Table 3.12: Income distribution among non-salaried household groups.
1968
population income
1979
population income
Craftsmen* 24.3 19.7 7.8 5.8
Tradesmen 70.2 66.5 80.8 60.3
Employers 5.5 13.8 11.4 33.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Gini coefficient# 0.11 0.23
* The definition of craftsmen between the two periods, may not be 
strictly the same.^4 #) Calculated by the author.
Source: Constructed from I.N.E.A.P. op. cit.
3.3.2- Trends of income in the salaried labour.
The evolution of income of the salaried labour group may be 
better examined in two sub-groups, the manual and the 
professional salaried workers.
3.3.2.1- The manual salaried workers.
The manual salaried workers comprise three main categories: 
the unskilled manual workers in service industries, in manu­
facturing and construction, and the skilled workers. The gap 
between their household income per head narrowed in 197 9 
from what it was in 1968. The per head income of the lowest' 
income category, i.e. the unskilled workers in manufacturing 
and 'construction, increased more rapidly than the other two 
income categories. There was also a considerable decrease in 
the population share of the lowest income category; (see 
table 3.13) . This may suggest that there was an improvement
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Table 3.13: Trend of income per head of manual salaried households.
Socio-economic 1968 1979 Annual growth
group population income populat8 income nominal real
in % in AD in % in AD rate rate#
Unskilled in services 1090 2826 8.3 ...*
65.8 26.4
Unskilled (manuf/const8) 791 2880 11.4 +3.2
Skilled workers 34.2 1250 73.6 3479 8.9 +0.7
Total / or average 100.0 1020 100.0 3180 9.9 +1.7
*) less than half per cent.
#) As deflated by the average annual increase in the index of prices 
which was 8.2% between 1967/68 and 1979/80, see price index at average 
income levels, in table 4.10 (chapter 4). p. 197.
Source: Constructed from I.N.E.A.P. op. cit.
in the distribution amongst the manual workers. Such an 
improvement can be said to be mainly due to the higher 
increase in the wage rate of the unskilled salary workers, 
(see below table 3.27), which resulted in reducing the 
skilled/unskilled income differentials.
3.3.2.2- The Professional salaried workers.
In the socio-economic group category of professional sala­
ried workers, there had been an increasing income disparity 
between the different household categories of this group. 
Income inequality among this household socio-economic group 
increased considerably as portrayed in the rise of the Gini 
coefficient from 0.11 in-' 1968 to 0.21 in 1979. Such an 
increasing disparity was mainly as a result of the fact that 
the per capita income of the employee household, (the lowest 
income category within the group), witnessed a deterioration
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\in real terms, while the per capita income of the middle 
executive (the middle income category), and of the executive 
(the upper income category) remained constant in real terms 
during the same period; (see table 3.14).
Table 3.14: Trend of income per head of household professional workers.
Household head 1968 1979 Annual growth
occupation population income populat® income nominal real
in % in AD in % in AD rate rate*
Employee 73.2 1750 63.8 3617 6.2 - 2.0
Middle Executive 18.7 2465 28.2 6152 7.9 - 0.3
Executive, L.P. # 8.1 5192 8.0 12880 7.9 - 0.3
Total, average 100.0 ; 2134 100.0 5104 7.5 - 0.7
#) L.P. stands for liberal profession.
*) As deflated by the average annual increase in the index of prices 
which was 8.2% between 1967/68 and 1979/80, see price index at average 
income levels, in table 4.10 (chapter 4). p. 197.
Source: Constructed from I.N.E.A.P. op. cit.
Taking all the salaried people (wage earners) as a group, it 
appears clearly that income differentials did decrease. The 
average income ratio between the manual (the lower income 
group) and the professional workers (the upper income group) 
decreased from 1 : 2.1 in 1968 to 1 : 1.6 in 1979. In fact, 
the decrease in income disparities among wage earners is 
portrayed by the decrease in the index of the Gini coeffi­
cient from 0.25 in 1968 to 0.19 in 1979. It is certainly 
these substantial declines which are behind the improvement 
in the distribution of income in the urban areas.
However, the examination of overall trend in per capita
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income disparities between different household categories, 
as presented in table 3.15, not only permits us to single 
out which household income groups lost and gained in 
relative terms, but also to obtain a more precise picture of 
such changes in income distribution. The following conclu­
sions can be drawn:
Table 3.15: Evolution of income per head by household head occupation 
in urban areas.
Socio-economic 1968 1979 Annual growth
group (by household populat0 income populat0 income nominal real
head occupation) in % in AD in % in AD rate rate*
Non-salaried 15.8 1892 13.6 5589 9.4 + 1.2
- Craftsmen 3.8 1511 1.1 4291 9.1 + 0.9
- Tradesmen 11.1 1765 11.8 4301 7.7 - 0.5
- Employer 0.9 4676 0.7 17468 11.6 + 3.4
Professional salaried 19.8 2134 43.7 5104 7.5 - 0.7
- Employee 14.5 1750 27.9 3617 6.2 - 2.0
- Middle executive 3.7 2465 12.3 6152 7.9 - 0.3
- Executive & L. profes0 1.6 5192 3.5 12880 7.7 - 0.5
Manual salaried 38.6 1020 33.4 3180 9.9 + 1.7
- Unskilled(in services) 9.3 1090 2826 8.3 + 0.1
8.8
- Unskill, (manu/const 16.1 791 2880 11.4 + 3.2
- Skilled workers 13.2 1250 24.6 3479 8.9 + 0.7
Agricultural activities 12.6 565 5.3 2830 14.4 + 6.2
- Agricultural farmers 2.9 870 1.2 3992 13.5 + 5.3
- Agricultural workers 9.7 474 4.1 2480 14.8 + 6.6
Unoccupied 13.2 722 4.0 904 1.9 - 6.3
-Inactive# (11.3) 758 - ' - - -
-Unemployed# (1.9) 510 — — — —
Total / or average 100.0 1304 100.0 4229 10.3 + 2.1
* As deflated by the average annual increase in the index of prices
which was 8.2% between 1967/68 and 1979/80, see price index at average
income levels, in table 4.10 (chapter 4). p. 197.
#) From Analyse Nutritionnelle, U.N.D.P./F.A.O. op cit.
Source: Constructed from Disparit6s des Revenus et Pouvoir d ’Achat en 
Alg6rie 1968 - 1979. I.N.E.A.P. op. cit.
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a) The per capita income of the unoccupied (i.e. the 
inactive and the unemployed) household head categories 
deteriorated significantly in relative and in absolute real 
terms between 1968 and 1979. This might suggest that the 
development strategy of Algeria failed to raise the income 
of these groups either through employment opportunities for 
the unemployed25 or through increasing and/or directing the 
appropriate public transfer to this socio-economic group.
b) Although the per capita income of households in agricul­
tural activities increased considerably between 1968 and 
197 9, it remained in 1979 22 per cent less than the average 
per capita income of the manual salaried households. This, 
however, reveals the existence of a segmented labour market 
in Algeria,26 which may explain partly the agricultural 
wOrkers desire to leave agricultural activities to seek work 
in non-agricultural activities.
c) The lower wage income earners whether in agriculture or 
in non-agricultural activities had a more substantial 
increase in their per capita incomes than the higher wage 
earners, namely the professional wage earners whose per 
capita income decreased in real terms; (see table 3.15) . In 
fact, it is this that made wage income more equally 
distributed in 197 9.
d) Although the per capita income of the employer's 
household group - the highest income receivers - witnessed a 
higher increase than that of other socio-economic groups in 
non-agricultural activities, it did not have any effect on
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the overall income disparities because it was over­
compensated by other positive factors operating towards a 
more equal distribution of personal income.
The conclusion is that the improvement in the distribution 
of income in the urban areas during the period in question 
was generated by first the increasing share of wage income - 
the more equally distributed and the main component of 
household income - from 66.1% in 1968 to 80.9% in 1979, and 
second the decreasing share of the non-wage income mainly of 
property income - the less equally distributed component of 
household income - from 24.9 per cent to 19.1 per cent, 
which generated the improvement in the distribution of 
income in urban areas during the period in question. It can 
be stressed that any change in favour of the share of wage 
income in total household income, ceteris paribus, would 
necessarily improve the distribution of income. Not surpri­
singly, it has been the result of the massive increase in 
wage employment in urban areas as discussed in chapter 2.
3.4- Income Distribution in Rural Areas.
The analysis of income distribution in rural areas, as far 
as the availability of data is concerned, can be carried out 
between and within socio-economic groups in general and in 
the agricultural sector in particular.
In examining the trend in the per capita income of various 
socio-economic groups during the 1967/68 - 1979/80 period it 
seems that the high and the middle income groups have been
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able to increase their per capita income at a higher rate 
than the lower income groups, (see table 3.16).
Table 3.16: Evolution of income per head in rural areas (1968 -1979).
Socio-economic 1968 1979 Annual growth
group (by household populat0 income populat0 income nominal real
head 'occupation)- in %, in AD in % in AD rate rate*
Non-wage earners:
- Agricultural farmers 28.6 561 25.1 2500 13.5 5.2
Craftsmen and tradesmen 9.5 919 4.1 2117 7.2 -1.1
Employers SL1 1640 0.2 5512 10.6 2.3
38.2 643 29.4 2467 11.9 3.6
Wage earners:
Permanent agri workers 7.0 623 11.2 1490 7.5 -0.8
Seasonal // // 22.2 304 12.6 896 9.4 1.1
Permanent non-agr // 3.5 742 4.3 2490 10.6 2.3
Seasonal // // 6.6 332 3.5 1080 10.3 2.0
Skilled workers 3.9 775 7.6 2683 10.9 2.6
Employee 1.9 1054 4.7 2680 8.1 -0.2
Middle executive 1.03 1339 1.9 4563 10.8 2.5
Executive & L. profession 0.04 3239 0.3 11730 11.3 3.0
46.17 486 46.1 1901 12.0 3.7
U n o c c u p i e d :
- Inactive 14.0 572
24.5 1222. X J l -0.7
- Unemployed 2.2 270
- 16.2 509 24.5 1222 7.6 -0.7
Total / or average 100.0 598 100.0 2091 11.0 +2.7
* As deflated by the average annual increase in the index of prices
which was 8.3% between 1967/68 and 1979/80, see price index at average
income levels, in table 4.10 (chapter 4) . p. 197 .
Source: Constructed from Disparites des Revenus et Pouvoir d ’Achat en 
Alg&rie 1968 - 1979. I.N.E.A.P. op. cit.
In fact, some of the lower income groups - the inactive and 
the unemployed - have seen their real per capita income
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stagnating or even decreasing during the period in question. 
Table 3.17 summarises such a trend.
Table 3.17: Income Distribution by socio-economic groups in rural areas.
Socio-economic 1968 1979 Annual growth
group (by household 
head occupation)
populat8 
in %
income 
in AD
populat8 
in %
income 
in AD
nominal
rate
real
rate*
Non-wage earners 38 643 29.4 2467 11.8 3.6
Wage earners 46 486 46.1 1901 12.0 3.7
Inactive, unoccupied 16 509 24.5 1222 7.6 -0.7
Total / or average 100 .. 598 100.0 2091 11.0 + 2.7
Source: Constructed from table 3.16.
As a result, inequality in the distribution of income did 
increase during the same period. The Gini coefficient 
increased from 0.21 in 1967/68 to 0.23 in 1979/80. With such 
an increase in income inequality, it is important to examine 
the distribution of income between and within the different 
socio-economic groups in order to gauge the main forces 
behind the increase in income inequalities in the rural 
areas.
3.4.1- Income Distribution in the Agricultural Sector.
Before the launching of the ’Agrarian Revolution1 programme 
in 1971/72, the agricultural sector in Algeria comprised two 
sub-sectors, the self-managed (the socialist sector), and 
the traditional private sector. The first offered improving 
living conditions to about one million people; it contrasted
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. clearly with the impoverished 6 million people of the tradi­
tional private sector. Average per capita income for the 
traditional sector was AD250 (£25) against AD550 (£55) for
the socialist sector, with a ratio of 1 : 2.2 respectively.27 
Inequality prevailed also within these sub-sectors, as will 
be shown in what follows.
3.4.1.1- Income Disparities Within the Public 
Agricultural Sector.
After the implementation of the so-called ’Agrarian 
Revolution', the public'agricultural sector came to comprise 
two sub-sectors, the Agrarian Revolution sector, i.e. the 
cooperative sector, and the self-management sector. Income 
disparities, per household and per person between and within 
these two sub-sectors could be examined in four main 
agricultural regions, following the type of agriculture by 
region - as shown in table 3.18. Income levels, whether per 
household or per person in the "Agrarian Revolution" sector 
are lower than those of the self-managed sector in each 
agricultural region. It seems, however, that income dispa­
rity between the two sub-sectors within the same region 
reaches a ratio of 1 to 2.6, as in mixed farming;28 (see 
table 3.18). This type of income disparity between the two 
sub-sectors within the same region is the outcome of the 
lack of a global policy concerning the public agricultural 
sector. Income disparities within each sub-sector among the 
four agricultural regions are revealed in table 3.18. 
Further indication of within income disparities in the
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public agricultural sector is given for the agrarian 
revolution sector, as there existed some information.
Table 3.18: Income distribution in public agriculture by region in 1977.
Type of income 
sector in AD
cereal
region
mixed
farming
intensive
culture
steppe
region
average
1-A.Revolution per household 5,040 4,160 6,790 5,160 5,380
per person 716 580 920 686 736
2- S. Managed per household 7,340 9, 930 9,020 9,000
per person 876 1,496 1,546 — 1,372
per head income ratio 2/1 1.2 2.6 1.7 — 1.9
Source: Disparlt6s des Revenus et Pouvoir d'Achat en Algerie 1968 - 
1979. I.N.E.A.P. Algiers 1981.
According to the agrarian revolution ordinance, the minimum 
yearly income in 1977 was AD5, 000, but the bulk of the 
beneficiaries (about 62 per cent) had an income below that 
level; whereas 9.6 per cent of the beneficiaries received 
more than twice such a minimum income level, with a share of 
19.7 per cent of total beneficiary incomes; (see table 
3.19).
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Table 3.19: Distribution of household income in the Agrarian Revolu­
tion sector, in 1977.
Income brackets in AD population in % income in %
1000 2000 0.7 0.2
2000 3000 30.0 19.8
3000 4000 11.4 10.2
4000 5000 18.5 8.8
5000 6000 12.9 17.4
6000 7000 4.2 5.6
7000 8000 3.7 5.2
8000 9000 4.2 4.6
9000 - 10000 4.8 8.5
10,000 and over 19.7
- 100.0 100.0
with an average income of AD5,380.
Source: Disparit6s des Revenus et Pouvoir d ’Achat en AlgSrie 1968 - 
1979, I.N.E.A.P. F^vrier 1981.
3 . 4 .1. 2- Income Drsparr-fei.es in the Private 
Agricultural sector.
Despite the low-income in the traditional sector, inequa­
lities in income distribution prevailed. Such inequalities 
could be revealed and explained to some extent by the 
inequality in land ownership. Excluding the half million 
landless peasants, the degree of inequality of land owner­
ship, as reflected by a Gini coefficient, was 0.61 in 
1964/65, (table 3.20); (it would had been 0.75 if the 
landless peasants were included).
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Table 3.20: Private land distribution in 1964/65.
Range of 
Farm size
average
farm
Landowners 
in Numbers in %
Land 
in Numbers
Area 
in %
less than 1 ha 0.44 134,780 22.9 59,180 1.0
1 ha 5 ha 4.37 174,215 29.7 456,080 7.8
5 ha 10 ha 7.03 114,275 19.5 802,865 13.8
10 ha 50 ha 20.18 147,043 25.1 2,967,545 50.8
50 ha 100 ha 64.52 11,865 2.0 765,585 13.1
over 100 ha 169.05 4,655 0.8 786,905 13.5
Total/ or average 9.95 586,843 100.0- 5,838,160 100.0
Source: Constructed from Statistlque Agricole, N B 5r Juin 1968; and 
from l ’AIgerie en Quelques Chiffres 1972. S.E.P. p. 3.
There was a much greater inequality in the ownership of 
other means of production such as machinery, animals, ferti­
lizers, irrigation equipment, etc. Mechanical traction, for 
instance, was used only on 2 6 per cent of private land, that 
of large private farms of more than 50 hectares. Commercial 
agricultural production may itself be considered as an 
indicator of inequality in income. In 1968, 25% of private 
farm units could be classified as commercial; i.e. selling 
more than 70% of their output on the market. Another 31% of 
private farms were selling between 30 and 70% of their 
output; and the rest, i.e. 44% were almost in subsistence, 
selling less than 30% of their output.29 This shows not only 
the commercially-oriented character of some private farms, 
but also their disproportionately large share of total 
output. This may provide a picture of the unequal revenues 
resulting from the concentration of land and other means of 
production.
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In 1973, on the eve of the implementation of the Agrarian 
Revolution regulations on private landholdings, the private 
land distribution pattern was much more skewed than it was 
in 1964/65. Land concentration index increased to more than
0.62 in 1973. In fact, such a deterioration in land distri­
bution is also revealed by the trend in the average farm 
size and in the corresponding number of landowners. The 
number of small landowners of farm size of less than 10 
hectares increased in absolute and in relative terms; it 
increased by about 37% during 1965 - 73 period. Consequently 
their average farm size decreased from 3.1 to 2.8 hectares 
during the same period. While the number of farms of size 50 
- 100 hectares and the number of over 100 hectares decreased 
by 16 per cent and 26% respectively, their corresponding 
average farm size increased slightly for farm size of 50 - 
100 hectares, and significantly for farms over 100 hectares,
1.e. increasing from 169 to 183 hectares in the latter; (see 
tables 3.20 and 3.21). One would also expect that the number 
of landless peasants and inequality in the distribution of 
other means of production increased as well.
Table 3.21: Private land distribution in 1973.
Range of 
Farm size
average
farm
Landowners 
in Numbers in %
Land 
in Numbers
Area 
in %
less than 10 ha 2.8 578,888 79.2 1,640,870 29.6
10 ha 50 ha 18.9 138,528 18.9 2,619,503 47.3
50 ha 100 ha 65.4 10,007 1.4 654,794 11.8
over 100 ha 182.9 3, 439 0.5 628,978 11.3
Total/ or average 
Gini coefficient
7.6
0.62*
730,862 100.0 5,544,145 100.0
*) Calculated by the author.
Source: Tableaux de 1 ’Economie Alg6rienne 1975.
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However, as the source of household income in the private 
agricultural sector was diversified, it is interesting to 
examine the household income in this sector, not only from 
farm land, but from non-agricultural activities as well. 
This would gauge the changes in the trends of the 
distribution of total income within the private agricultural 
sector.29 Examining the household income from operational 
land (farm income) in this sector, it seems that 57 per cent 
of households (the lower strata) got about 11% of total farm 
income, while the top decile got about 55 per cent. This 
created high inequality in the distribution of farm income, 
as reflected by a Gini coefficient of 0.63; (table 3.22).
Table 3.22: Distribution of household income (in AD) by source in 1977.
average households farm % farm wages & Total income share of overall
farm (ha) in % income income incidentals of households wages income{%)
2.1 57 1884 11.1 8289 10173 82.0 34.2
5.5 18 6728 12.5 7116 13844 51.4 14.7
10.0 11 12415 14.2 6144 18559 33.0 12.1
13.6 04 18285 07.6 ' 5572 23857 23.0 05.6
35.3 10 52685 54.6 3854 56539 09.0 33.4
Total/average 100 09650 100.0 7290 16940 43.0 100.0
Gini coefficient of household income from farm land 0. 63*
Gini coefficient of total household income 0.32*
*) Calculated by the author.
Source: Constructed from: Disparit6s des Revenus et pouvoir d'Achat 
en Alg6rie. 1968 - 1979. I.N.E.A.P. F6vrier 1981.
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A significant part of private farm household income was 
supplemented, as noted earlier, by a quite large proportion 
of income from non-farm activities, mainly from wages and 
salaries. The proportion of farm income in total private 
farm household income decreased on average from 64 per cent 
in 1968 to 57 per cent in 1977, while the share of wages 
increased from 7 per cent to 43 per cent during the same 
period. (See table 3.23).
Table 3.23: Structure of income 
1977 in percentages.
in the private agricultural sector,
Source of income 1968 1977
Income from agricultural farming 64 57
Income from wages 7 43
Public transfers 5
Private transfers 11
Others 13 —
Total 100 100
Source: Compiled from: DisparitSs des Revenus et Pouvoir d'Achat en 
Alg6rie 1968 - 1979. I.N.E.A.P. F6vrier 1981.
However, the importance of the share of wage income to 
households depends upon farm size. For the tiny landholders 
- those with an average farm size of 2 hectares, and who 
formed 57 per cent of private cultivators - wage income 
represented 82 per cent of their total earnings. For the 
large landowners* - the top decile (those with an average 
farm size of 35 hectares)- wage income accounted only 9 per 
cent of their total income; (see table 3.22). In other 
words, the lower the average farm size, and the resultant
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lower farm income, the bigger the proportion of additional 
income from other sources, mainly from wages. In fact, such 
a situation has been the case in many developing countries, 
as the tiny farm landowners are forced to supplement their 
meagre income in order to subsist.
Moreover, it shows that wage employment was very important, 
mainly for the marginal farmers, i.e. families with an 
average holding of 2 hectares. The income from farming 
(ADI,884) in this case was far below what was sufficient to 
provide a subsistence income of about AD4,500 for an average 
household of 6.9 members.30 These peasant households could 
subsist only by supplementing their farm income by other 
sources, mainly by selling their labour power.
In this respect, it can be said that this supplementary 
income, mainly from wages, compensated for the adverse 
effect of inequalities of income generated from farming, 
making the overall income distribution among households of 
the private agricultural sector more equally distributed. 
This is confirmed by the lower value of the Gini coefficient 
of 0.32, see table 3.22. Such a situation, one would 
presume, will continue as long as employment is maintained 
mainly for the tiny and small farm size31 households. 
Meanwhile, it has to be noted that with a rapidly growing 
population, marginal farmers would be forced off the land, 
and have to compete with landless labourers for employment 
opportunities elsewhere. Thus, when employment opportunities 
are very limited, it is the 'semi-proletariat' peasants -
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the tiny landholders - who are going to be much more 
affected. This would generate an increase in income 
inequality because it is only at the bottom of the scale, as 
far as peasants are concerned, that wage income assumes a 
dominant influence on income levels. Accordingly, in the 
absence of appropriate policies to maintain and increase job 
opportunities income inequalities would increase among the 
rural populations.
A further indication of an increase in income inequality 
among the agricultural populations is seen in the distribu­
tion of income among the private landowners and seasonal 
agricultural workers, as Gini coefficient increased from 
0.50 in 1968 to 0.54 in 1979. Such'an increase in income 
inequality can also be portrayed by the trend in the income 
shares of the bottom and upper decile of this population. 
While the income share of the lowest decile decreased from 
one per cent in 1968 to 0.6 per cent in 1979, the income 
share of the top decile increased from 42.5 per cent to 4 6 
per cent during the same period. The income disparity ratio 
between the bottom decile and the upper decile increased 
from 1:43 to 1:77. (See table 3.24).
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Table 3.24: Distribution of Income among private land owners and
seasonal agricultural workers.
population in % Income share in %
1968 1979
10 1.0 0.6
20 5.0 2.8
20 8.5 8.5
40 43.0 42.1
10 42.5 46.0
100 100.0 100.0
Gini coefficient 0.50 0.54
Source: Constructed from: Disparit6s des Revenus et Pouvoir d'Achat
eh Algerie .1968-1979. I.N.E.A.P. february 1981. p. 90.
Meanwhile, the question that may arise is how income inequa­
lity increased in the rural sector, which provided living 
for more than 58 per cent of the population, while it 
decreased significantly at the national level during the 
same period. The explanation for such a dichotomy will be 
given through the decomposability analysis of income inequa­
lity which permits us to determine the components of the 
overall income inequality; i.e. the intra-sectoral and 
inter-sectoral effects. Accordingly, such a decomposability 
analysis would enable us to identify the component effects 
which contributed to the apparent decrease in the overall 
income inequality between 1967/68 and 197 9/80.
3.5- DECOMPOSITION OF THE OVERALL INCOME INEQUALITY.
According to economic literature, overall inequality in the
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size,, distribution of income or ‘ consumption expenditure, 
depends on disparities within (intra) sectors or groups, and 
between (inter) sectors or groups. Not all income inequality 
measures can be decomposable. So far, it is only the 
variance of logs, the Theil index, and the coefficient of 
variation which fulfill the properties of decomposability in 
income inequalities.33 Wouter Van Ginneken decomposed the 
Theil index in a two sector model for a number of developing 
countries. While Subramanian Swamy34 decomposed the coeffi­
cient of variation in the two sectors - rural and urban, the 
decomposition was extended to (n) sectors by Ranis, Fei and 
Kuo.35 However, using a two sector model, agricultural and 
non-agricultural,36 the square of the coefficient of varia­
tion can be decomposed as follows:37
3.1 Cj = wa (na/^)2 ca2 + wu(nu/nn)2cu2 + wa [ (Ha-Hn) /|in]2 +
W u t ( ^ u ^ n )  /fin 3
where: Wa and Wu are respectively the proportion of
recipient units in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors; 
where Wa + Wu = 1. '*
Cn, Ca and Cu are respectively coefficients of variation in 
the national economy, in agriculture, and in non-agricul­
tural sector. |Xa, jlu and (ln are respectively the mean income 
in agriculture, non-agriculture, arid overall economy.
3.1.1 [<fla-fln>/M2= [l-(Ha/fln) ]2 = d-Oa)2; where \la/\ln = 0a
3.1.1 [<Hu-Hn)/|ln]2= [I- <Hu/|ln> I2 = U-Ou)2'- where Hu/Hn = Ou
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Then substituting these definitions in equation 3.1 gives:
3.2: Cn2 = Wa 0a2 Ca2 + Wu 0U2 Cu2 + Wa(l- CJa)2 + Wu(l- 0U)2
The first two terms on the right hand side of the above 
equation are called within sector components of inequality 
or intra-sector effects. The second two terms constitute the 
between sector component of inequality or inter-sectoral 
effects. They constitute the variance of all income reci­
pients, both in agriculture and non-agriculture, when each 
recipient receives the mean income of the sector (agricul­
ture or non-agriculture) . In a word, each of the agricul­
tural and non-agricultural incomes is assumed to be redis­
tributed in such a way that every individual (within the 
sector) receives the average income of the sector.38 In 
fact, the inter-sectoral effects are composed of recipient
weight effects (or population effects), i.e. Wa and Wu; and
2 2of income disparity effects, i.e. (1 -Ca) and (1- (Ju) .39 In 
other words, the inter-sectoral effects are caused by 
changes in the proportion of the recipient units in the i-th 
sector, and by changes in the sectoral mean income; whereas, 
the intra-sectoral effects are caused by changes in the 
inequality of income within each sector.40 It follows that 
the changes in the overall inequality depend on the sum of 
these effects (inter- and intra-sectoral effects), and 
cannot be explained by any single one. Moreover, the overall 
inequality would generally be larger than each of the intra­
sectoral inequalities because it comprises intra-sector and 
inter-sector inequalities. However, such a decomposition of 
inequality by economic sectors (agriculture vs non­
agriculture) would permit to understand the structure of
s
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inequality and inequality changes over time. As a conse­
quence, it would permit to identify the sector which contri­
buted most to the reduction (or increase) in the overall 
income inequality.
The decomposition analysis of income inequalities shows that 
there was a decrease in both "within” and "between" income 
inequalities. While the within inequalities decreased from a 
squared index coefficient of variation of 0.331 in 1967/68 
to 0.308 in 1979/80, the between inequalities decreased from
0.159 in 1967/68 to 0.125 in 1979/80. As a consequence, the 
overall squared coefficient of variation decreased from 
0 .490 to 0 .433 during the same period. In a word, the 
overall coefficient of variation decreased from 0.701 to
0.658; (see table 3.25).
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Table 3.25: Decomposition analysis of inequality by sector.
1967/68 1979/80
Sector's coefficient:
Agricultural coefficient = Ca 0.344 0.459
Non-agricultural coefficient = Cu 0.600 0.544
Sector's population weights:
Agricultural = Wa 0.680 0.581
Non-agricultural = Wu 0.320 0.419
Sector's income disparity:
M-aAJ-n = CTa 0.726 0.700
Hu/Hn “ °u 1.583 1.416
Non-agricultural/Agricultural = mj/|la 2.18 2.02
Sector's coefficient weights:
wa (M-a^ Mn) ^  = ^a ^u^ 0.075 0.090
0.340 0.173
[l-<Ha/Hn)]2 = (1 - <Ta)2 0.358 0.285
[1-tHu/Hn) ]2 = (1 - <JU) 2 0.8020 0.840
Inequality components:
within inequalities 0.331 0.308
between inequalities 0.159 0.125
overall squared coefficient of variation. 0.491 0.433
overall coefficient of variation (Cn ) 0.701 0.658
Source: calculated from tables 3.15 and 3.16 above.
In this respect, the question which ought to be asked is how 
much of the overall decrease in income inequality was attri­
buted to a decrease in inequality within sectors, and how 
much was attributed to a decrease in inequality between 
sectors (agriculture and non-agriculture). A partial diffe­
rentiation of the transformed decomposability equation 
(3.2)41 shows that the apparent improvement in the overall 
income distribution was almost brought about by the within
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component sectors which contributed up to 82 per cent of the 
overall decrease in income inequalities between 1967/68 and 
1979/80. Therefore the decrease in total income inequality 
attributable to the between (inter) sectors components was 
only 18 per cent; (see table 3.26) .
Table 3.26: Determinants of the changes in the overall income inequality.
Sector's
Component
intra-sectors
effects
Inter-sectors effects 
population effect income disparity effect
Agricultural + 0.0232 + 0.0504 -0.0128
Non-agricultural - 0.0395 - 0.0184 -0.0227
Total - 0.0163 +0.0320 -0.0355
- 0.0198 
in 100% =
(-0.0163)
82.3
+ (-0.0035) 
+ 17.7
Source : Calculated from table 3.25 above.
It has to be noted that the negative values in the table
3.2 6 represent the effects which contributed to the decrease 
in the overall income inequality, whereas the positive 
values (the adverse effects) represent the effects which 
contributed to the increase in income inequality. This being 
the case, it can be inferred that most of the inequality in 
the Algerian society was due to substantial intra sectoral 
inequalities both within the agriculture and the non- 
agricultural sectors.
The above results, meanwhile, are not different from other 
studies carried out for various developing countries. They
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indicate without exception that variations within sectors or 
regions are far more important in accounting for inequality 
than variations between sectors. Within inequalities account 
for 80 to 90 per cent of overall inequality,42 indicating 
that the role or the effect of inter-sectors (between 
agriculture/non-agriculture or rural/urban) income inequa­
lities are not decisive.43
The decrease, however, in the intersectoral inequalities in 
Algeria was due to a decrease in agriculture/non- 
agricultural income disparity effects which over-compensated 
for the population effects. Average per capita income in the 
agricultural sector increased in real terms during 1967/68 - 
1979/80 period by a higher rate (3% per annum) than the one 
in the urban populations (2.3% per annum);44 (see tables 
3.15 and 3.16) . Such a decrease was mainly due to the 
closing gap between the statutory minimum wage rate in the 
agricultural sector (S.M.A.G.) and in the non-agricultural 
sector (S.M.I.G.). While the former increased in real terms by 
4.6 per cent per annum between 1967/68 and January 1980,45 
the latter increased only by 2.3 per cent per annum during 
the same period,46 (see table 3.27).
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Table 3.27: Minimum daily wages in current & in constant AD. 1967 - 1980.
Period
daily wages current AD daily wages constant AD price indices (c)
S.M.I.G S.M.A.G S.M.I.G S.M.A.G Urban Rural
1967/1968 10.88-9.04 7.54 10.88-9.04 7.54 100.0 100.0
June 1972 13.84 9.80 10.75 7.54 128.7 130.0
Jan 1974 16.64 12.25 11.89 8.68 139.9 141.1
Jan 1976 19.20 15.30 11.44 9.16 167.8 167.1
Oct 1977 25.28 20.00 12.96 10.22 195.1 195.8
May 1978 29.52 24.00 13.13 10.56 224.9 227.3
Nov 1978 33.66 28.00 14.97 12.32 224.9 227.3
Jan 1980 33.68 33.00 12.82 12.55 262.8 263.0
Annual growth rate 10.69 13.0 2.3 4.6 8.4 8.4
Source: Constructed from: L'AlgSrie en Quelques Chiffres 1982. M.P.A.T. 
p. 19; and Indice du Cout de la Vie en AlgSrie 1966 - 76.
However, it has to be noted that with economic growth and 
population migration, the weight of the rural sector 
declines in favour of the urban sector. This process, known 
as the migration factor, and denoted by the population 
effects in table 3.26, had an adverse effect on the overall 
income distribution; i.e. creating greater inequality, 
which is consistent with Kuznets*' findings. Meanwhile, when 
it comes to its effects on sectoral income inequalities, it 
had dual effects. It had positive effects (a decrease) in 
income inequality in the non-agricultural sector, and 
adverse effects (an increase) in income inequality in the 
agricultural sector.47 In fact, such dual effects are 
clearly seen in table 3.26.
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3 . 6- Summary.
The decrease in the overall inequality between 1967/68 and 
1979/80 was attributed mainly to within components. The 
within components (intra-sectoral effects) are in their turn 
mainly brought about by the non-agricultural sector. The 
consequences of changes in the non-agricultural sector over­
compensated for the adverse effect of the increase in income 
inequality in the agricultural sector. Accordingly, the 
decrease of income inequality in the non-agricultural sector 
has been the main determinant of the apparent decrease in 
the overall income inequalities.48 Such a decrease has been 
due to:
a) The increasing share of the labour income - the main 
source and more equally distributed component of household 
income during the same period.
b) The income of the lower income groups did increase, in 
general faster than that of the upper income groups.
All these did over-compensate for the adverse effects 
observed in the agricultural sector, and of the population 
effects (the migration factor). Such adverse effects of the 
agricultural sector can be said to be due to:
a) The increase in income disparities between different 
socio-economic groups. The income of the upper income groups 
in this sector increased faster than that of the lower 
income groups.
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b) The prevalence of unequal distribution of landownership, 
•which still characterises rural Algeria, resulted in a 
highly unequal distribution of farm income among private 
landowners, and between the latter and the agricultural 
workers.
The population effects, known in the literature by the 
migration factor, did generate adverse effects on the 
overall distribution of income, which is consistent with 
Kuznets1 findings in its cross-country analysis, but such 
adverse effects were overcome by the decrease in the income 
disparity effects - the other component of the intra­
sectoral effects.
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Notes to chapter 3.
1. Such a decomposition is very interesting because it 
provides both within group and between group income 
inequality. Unfortunately due to lack of data, decompo­
sition has been attempted only for within and between 
rural and urban areas.
2. On the basis of Friedman's permanent income theory, 
consumption is usually made a function of permanent (not 
current) real income.
3. I.N.E.A.P. was ex-11 Association Algerienne pour la 
Recherche Demografique, Economic & Social, (A.A.R.D.E.S.) 
- prior to changing its title in the late 1970s to
I.N.E.A.P., which itself has changed again in 1984 to 
CE.N.E.A.P. Centre National des Etudes et d'Analyses 
pour la Planification.
4. The 15% rate of under-estimation for the wage income 
earners provides a rate of saving of 5-7%, which was 
said to be the most likely situation. As far as non-wage 
earners are concerned, matters were less clear; it seems 
that the 30% under-reporting of income was not 
consistent with what the I.N.E.A.P advanced. On the one 
hand, it advanced that under-estimation of income of the 
non-wage earner group may vary between 20 and 80%; on 
the other hand, it pointed out that this situation 
concerns only large and very large business, trade and 
industry. It seems to me that as it differentiates 
between the large and the very large of the non-wage 
earners on the one hand and the rest, i.e. the medium 
and the small ones on the other, it could accordingly 
have adopted two different rates, rather than just one
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single rate for this socio-economic group (the non­
salaried group).
5. See Disparities des Revenus et Pouvoir d*Achat en 
Algerie. 1968 - 1979. I.N.E.A.P. p. 9.
6. Moreover, favourable terms of access to credit. The 
private sector, in general, borrows money at a rate of 6 
per cent per annum, whereas the rate of inflation (the 
official one) was 12 per cent.
7. The farmer usually under-estimates his produce in order 
to avoid himself being a reference as a higher producer.
8. See Disparites des Revenus et Pouvoir d ’Achat en 
Algerie 1968- 1979, op cit. p. 10.
9. The primary income distribution is the distribution of 
gross earnings and property income. The secondary income 
distribution is the primary income distribution 
corrected for taxes and transfer payments. The 'tertiary 
income distribution1 is the 'secondary income distri­
bution' corrected for income in kind from the state (for 
example subsidised housing and free medical care, 
holidays...etc). See Michael Ellman in: Collectivasationr 
Convergence and Capitalism; Political Economy in a 
divided world. Academic Press - London 1974. p. 110.
10. See Depence de Consommation des Menages Algeriens. 
Premiers Resultats et Analyse Glohale, issue de 
l'Enquete menee aupres des Menages Mars 1979 - Mars 1980. 
M.P.A.T., Office National des Statistiques. Juillet 
1983. p. ■ .
11. Probably arbitrary assumptions were used.
12. See Depence de Consommation des Menages Algeriens. Mars 
1979 - Mars 1980. op cit. p. 14.
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13. Errors arising in the process of interviewing, response... 
etc, which are usually not significant.
14. Using 3C = £ (0 - E)2/E where (0) represents the observed 
data from the sampling distribution (table 3.1), and (E) 
represents the expected data from the sampling distri­
bution (table 3.5).
15. Ibid. p. 13. Furthermore, no estimates of standard 
errors were presented.
16. Ibid. p. 14.
17. In a word, when the sample is not fully representative, 
any estimates or generalisation based upon it should be 
handled with great caution. These estimates may be very 
inaccurate and cast doubt upon the validity of the 
conclusion as a whole.
18. The average economic growth rate was about 6,3% during 
1970-73, 5.5% during 1974-77, and 10% during 1978 - 
1979/80.
19. Inequalities in the distribution of income are expected 
to be higher than this level. In other words, inequali­
ties in the distribution of income are usually higher 
than the inequalities in the consumption expenditure 
because inequalities in the distribution of savings are 
much higher than the inequalities in consumption expen­
diture. See for instance, Subramanian Swamy, in: "Struc­
tural Changes and the distribution of income by size, 
the case of India." Review of Income and Wealth. N2 13 
- 1967.
20. For instance, Van Ginneken's study of Mexico concluded 
that the trend in income inequality "does not follow the 
pattern which is predicted by the Kuznets hypothesis".
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See Van Ginneken: Socio-Economic Groups and Income
Distribution in Mexico. Croom Helm, 1980. p. 146.
21. See M.P.A.T. Rapport General du Deuxieme Plan Quiquennal 
(1985-89). January 1985. p. 27.
22. See for'instance, Subramanian Swamy, in: Economic Growth 
and Income Distribution in a developing nation. Un­
published Ph. D. Harvard University.’Jan 1965.
23. Their share in total population, meanwhile, decreased 
from 15.8% in 1968 to 13.6% in 1979. (See table 3.16).
24. Its decline can be partly attributed to the development 
of small scale industries and also could be attributed 
in part, to the movement of some craftsmen to the wage 
earning sector.
25. Of course, this suggest that the rate of growth of 
employment has not been fast enough to absorb all the 
pool of surplus labour.
26. It is only in January 1980 that the minimum wage rate in 
agriculture was aligned with that of non-agricultural 
activities. See Decree N2 79 - 302 of Dec 31st; or see 
Annuaire Statistique de l'Algerie 1981. p. 347.
27. It was, in fact, this inequality that made having a job 
in the socialist sector a privilege.
28. This kind of serious inequality of income within the 
same agricultural region was a source of divisiveness 
and grievance among the workers of the public agricul­
tural sector. See Keith Sutton, in Algeria's Socialist 
Villages - A Reassessment, op cit. p. 21.
29* see Pfeifer Ann Karen: Agrarian Reform and the Develop­
ment of Capitalist Agriculture in Algeria. Ph.D. 
Thesis, 1981. The American University. U.S.A. p. 61.
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30. Regional Analysis for the private Agricultural Sector 
cannot be carried out owing to the lack of information.
31. Calculated on the basis of the poverty line in 1977, see 
the poverty line in rural areas chapter 4.
32. Tiny and small farm size households are respectively 
those having on average a farm size of 2 hectares and of 
about 5.5 hectares, and whose wage employment accounts 
respectively 82% and 51% of their total income. See 
table 3.22 above. It may be noted that the bulk of 
income of the tiny land cultivators is subject to a 
considerable instability and insecurity, as it is 
derived from wages which may be brought through seasonal 
and part time work, whereas the bulk of income for the 
upper group is derived from a more secure source of’ 
income, (from land).
33. See S.M. Ravi Kanbur: "The Measurement and Decompo­
sability of Inequality and Poverty.", in Mathematical
Methods in Economics, (ed) : F. van der Ploeg. John
Wiley and Sons, New York, 1984. pp. 419 - 420.
34. See Wouter Van Ginneken: Rural and Urban Income 
Inequalities in Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Tanzania 
and Tunisia. W.E.P. Study, I.L.O. Geneva 1976.
35. See Ranis, Fei and Kuo: Growth with Equity: The Taiwan 
Case. op cit.
36. As a proxy for rural and urban areas.
37. See S.M. Ravi Kanbur: The Measurement and Decomposabi­
lity... op cit. p. 420; and for further elaboration on the 
decomposition equation, see for instance, Ranis, Fei and 
Kuo: Growth with Equity... op cit.
38. While in reality, there exist large differences within
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each group or sector.
39. When the differences between M^-th anc* M-n ^n:
2 2
[ (M*a'u^n)/H*n] = ^~"aa,u) in absolute value increases,
ceteris paribus, inter-sector's inequality will widen, 
mainly through the higher weight of the sector whose 
income (consumer expenditure) is the highest. Hence, 
when the difference is null, i.e., |ia, u = p,n , inter­
sector's inequality will be null.
, , 2 2
40. One has to notice that the weights of Ca and Cu do
2not sum to one; and m  fact, the weight of Cu (of the 
non agriculture) is greater than the one of the 
agriculture, owing , to the fact that (Jlu/^ n) greater 
than unity, whereas (M-a/M-n) is less than unity; as the 
mean income (consumer expenditure) in non-agricultural 
sector is higher than in the agricultural one.
41. See the partial differentiation of equation 3.2 in 
appendix 3. pp. 266 - 271.
42. See G.S. Fields, in: Poverty, Inequality and Develop­
ment. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. London. 
New York, 1980. pp. 114 - 121.
43. For instance,- in Puerto Rico, it was found that the 
inter-sectoral inequalities were not at all significant 
contributors to total inequality, see "Within and 
Between Set Income inequalities in a Developing 
Country." F.M. Andie and A.J. Mann, in: International 
Journal of Social Economics, vol 5 N2 1 - 1978; and also 
in Taiwan, it was found that the intrasectoral effects 
were the most decisive element in the decrease in the 
overall income inequalities, despite the adverse effect 
of the inter-sectoral effects; the magnitude of these 
adverse effects (of inter-sectoral), expressed as a per­
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centage of the absolute value of the total change was 
18.1%. See Ranis, Fei and Kuo, Growth with Equity... op cit.
44. This does not by any means indicate that all socio­
economic groups witnessed a real rate of increase; for 
instance about 36 percent of rural population - the 
lower income groups had their per capita income 
decreased in real terms, see table 3.4.
45. In fact, the subsequent rise in the S.M.A.G. is due to 
the decision of its alignment with the S.M.I.G. in 
January 1980; since then, there has been a uniform 
national wage rate called S.N.M.G.
46. In fact, the SMIG was under wage freeze during November 
1978 - December 1980 period, see table 3.27.
47. This happened mainly as people moved from rural areas 
where income inequality increased to urban areas where 
income inequality decreased.
48. Inter-sectoral effects are mainly brought about by the 
income disparity effects, which offset the negative 
population weight effects, see table 3.26.
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Chapter IV
Income Distribution, Consumption pattern and absolute
Poverty.
We have seen in the previous chapter that an important 
proportion of population falls in the lowest income bracket. 
Clearly, one has to find out whether these people have 
enough to live on or not. As a matter of fact, relative 
income inequality by itself does not say much about the 
incidence of poverty. The latter depends on the level of 
income - a level below which subsistence needs of a person 
cannot be procured. Yet the role of relative income cannot 
be easily ignored. With a highly skewed income distribution 
where the major proportion of income is appropriated by a 
small section of the community, it is almost inevitable that 
large sections of the community may not have enough for 
their minimum subsistence. Similarly, a more egalitarian 
society is more likely to have a lower incidence of absolute 
poverty, except of course if the society is so poor that an 
egalitarian distribution of income may leave every one below 
subsistence. It may also be emphasised that the ’absolute1 
and 'relative1 incomes may not necessarily move in the same 
direction. Relative inequality can be substantially reduced 
with a redistribution of income among the middle and upper 
income groups while leaving the poor unaffected. On the 
other hand, absolute poverty can be drastically reduced by
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state subsidised welfare measures with small or no impact on 
richer sections of the population.
Absolute poverty is concerned with finding out whether or 
not all the social strata of the population are securing at 
least a minimum income to obtain a certain minimum level of 
living. This minimum level of income then becomes the cut­
off point, known as the 'poverty line' income. Anyone not 
having this minimum income is considered to be suffering 
from absolute poverty. In countries committed to elimination 
or reduction of poverty, the estimates of the incidence of 
poverty has become very important. A quantitative estimate 
of the incidence of poverty and the characteristics of the 
poor enables the planners and the policy-makers to formulate 
and implement appropriate policies and monitor their 
progress over times. It must, however, be stressed that 
measurement of poverty is not as easy as it is often assumed 
Some of the problems confronted in this connection are 
discussed below.
4.1- The Notion of Poverty.
Rowntree1 one of the leading pioneers in the field, in 
attempting to establish an absolute poverty line, defined 
'primary poverty' as "earnings,... insufficient to obtain the 
minimum necessities for the maintenance of merely physical 
efficiency"; while 'secondary poverty' was the case when 
people had a more than adequate income but did not spend it 
on satisfying their basic biological necessities'.2 This 
definition, as we can see, is clearly based on nutritional
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standards which themselves raise many conceptual and data 
problems.
Individuals vary in their nutritional needs both on a day to 
day basis and over longer periods of time. Furthermore, 
there is an adaptation of biological needs to food availa­
bility. In other words, if the intake is either above or 
below the requirement, a change in body energy stores is to 
be expected unless energy expenditure is correspondingly 
altered. This means that energy store will increase when the 
intake exceeds requirement, and decrease when it is below 
requirement. Accordingly when energy intake is less., than the 
requirement the body wastes less; thus using the intake with 
greater efficiency; and when the intake increases, wastage 
also increases. This suggests that energy is used with 
decreased efficiency.3 This represents one of the characte­
ristics of human metabolism to adapt and survive in appa­
rently difficult conditions. It must be borne in mind that 
such a survival may be accompanied with some consequences 
regarding working efficiency, and of physical and mental 
development particularly for children. On the other hand, 
nutritional levels can be met by different combinations of 
available foods. Therefore the estimation of a balanced diet 
on a national average level invariably ignores the problem 
of interpersonal difference arising from difference in body- 
weight or in activity rates. In fact, even for the same 
person, the nutritional requirement may vary significantly 
between the peak and the slack seasons because of varying 
degrees of the intensity of work, and the available
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employment particularly in the case of agricultural 
activities.
Defining a poverty line, in terms of nutritional adequacy 
alone, may not be sufficient because, at very low levels of 
income, people tend to subsist on rootcrops or ’inferior1 
cereals such as maize and millets. Meanwhile, with an 
increase in income people’s food habits . change. They now 
prefer 'superior' grains such as wheat or rice and subse­
quently meat, fish, and other livestock food. Therefore to 
estimate the poverty level income, a subjective decision is 
made to choose foods of the ’inferior’ type.
The non-food expenditures which constitute the remaining 
part of the minimum standard of living also pose a number of 
conceptual issues, some of which have not yet been satisfac­
torily resolved,4 and some of them may even be difficult to 
quantify. For instance, what is a minimum acceptable 
standard for housing, sanitation, health, education... etc? 
Most conventional definitions of 'basic needs' and essential 
minimum standards indicate that the very poor lack adequate 
housing, sanitation, nourishment, medical care and others.5 
These forms of deprivation reduce working capacity and 
lifespan; thus helping to perpetuate poverty and income 
inequality, and to create a vicious circle.
However, the poverty line is used as a criterion in the 
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable qualities of 
life. This led others to argue that poverty is essentially a
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relative, phenomenon, defined on the basis of what indivi­
duals have as compared to a socially acceptable minimum or 
average. Relative poverty exists if people feel deprived of 
items they regard as necessary for a proper and acceptable 
life in their communities. Thus defining a poverty line 
helps to depict not only absolute poverty at a point in 
time, but it portrays relative deprivation as well. 
Therefore it changes as the characteristics of the society 
concerned change.6 In this respect, the poor are those who 
feel deprived of what are enjoyed by ordinary people in the 
society which they consider themselves to be a part of.
Meanwhile, it is the degree of poverty and its resultant 
deprivation that other economists have paid attention to. A 
major contribution, in this respect, is by Sen who advanced 
the idea of combining 'absolute1 and relative factors in 
establishing a poverty indicator which has come to be known 
as Sen's Index of Poverty. This index measures the extent of 
the shortfall of income of the poor from the poverty line, 
and is sensitive to the pattern of the distribution of 
income among the poor.7 In fact, Sen's index, by taking into 
account inequality among the poor, tries to distinguish 
between the degree of relative deprivation of various 
poverty groups from obtaining (in Rowntree's terms) the 
minimum necessities in the consumption of goods and 
services. This means that the bigger the shortfall from the 
poverty line, the greater should be the weight per unit of 
that shortfall from the poverty measure.8 In other words, 
the estimation of absolute deprivation vis a vis the
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poverty line also involves implicitly some considerations of 
relative deprivation. In this respect, although poverty has 
an 'absolute' core, the sense of deprivation among the poor 
would be more acute in cases where there were big diffe­
rences in their incomes. Clearly, Sen's measure represents a 
better index of poverty, but it is more subjective because 
it is based on the idea of assigning different weights to 
different groups of the poor. While the Rowntree's type of 
absolute poverty' has a physiological base and therefore 
more measurable, Sen's weights are difficult to assess.
Nevertheless, there is no generally accepted definition of 
poverty. Definitions of poverty are just as value-based as 
definitions of development or underdevelopment. Being value 
based means that no one definition of poverty commands 
universal support. An O.E.C.D. report concluded that "there 
cannot be any definition of poverty which is free from value 
judgements."9 All that can be said is that the definition of 
poverty reflects social perspectives and targets, and it is 
at least partly relative, although absolute considerations 
may influence the recommended levels chosen. At best, what 
one can hope for is a working definition. Based on this kind 
of a working definition an attempt is made below to estimate 
the poverty incidence in Algeria.
4.2- Consumption patterns.
Under any working definition of poverty line one has to 
start with estimating the minimum cost of a consumption 
basket which in its turn starts with costing the food
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consumption basket. As Engel's law indicates, the proportion 
of total expenditure allocated to food may be as high as 80 
per cent for the lower income groups. Therefore concen­
tration on food expenditure in the estimation of 'poverty 
line' is perfectly justifiable. Among the food items, 
cereals in Algeria are the most important items in food 
intakes, as will be shown below.
A F.A.O. study on nutritional analysis was conducted in 1967 
- 68 although not published until 1978. This was based on 
the national household budget and consumption survey in 
Algeria.10 The distribution of household per capita consump­
tion was given for 18 socio-economic groups, each has its 
own diet with its equivalent in calorie intake. From these 
diets of the different socio-economic groups, one can notice 
the difference in daily per caput supply of calories and 
proteins between the different socio-economic groups; (see 
table 4.1).
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Table 4.1: Per capita consumption expenditure and energy supply*
1967/68.
Socio-economic group population per capita# Calorie Proteins
in % expenditure intake intake
Unemployed 2.3 311 2,116 64.3
Unskilled workers temp, employed 7.1 371 2,330 68.7
Seasonal Agri workers 16.8 373 3,054 93.8
Unskilled employed in petty jobs 0.7 392 2,466 73.1
Independent farmers 20.0 415 3,288 ■103.6
Retired. 13.0 632 2, 958 86.9
Permanent Agricultural workers 6.7 633 2, 840 81.7
Craftsmen & crafts workers 4.1 645 2,593 77.0
Unskilled workers Perm, employed 4.7 732 2,589 76.0
Unskilled workers in services 3.8 823 2,287 65.0
Retail traders. 7.2 877 2,371 68.0
Rentiers 0.4 927 2,503 73.3
Qualified workers. 6.3 947 2,516 73.0
Clerks. 3.3 1,191 2,426 65.4
Law & security workers. 1.2 1,360 2, 659 74.1
Middle executive 1.7 1, 400 2,725 77.6
Employers, wholesale traders 0.3 1,663 2,727 78.3
Top Executive & Lib. Professionals 0.2 3,182 2,584 69.6
Total / Average 100.0 630 2,817 84.2
Nutritional requirement — — 2, 400 60.0
*) All Algeria excluding Greater Algiers.
#) in Algerian Dinars.
Source: Constructed from Analyse Nutritionelle. U.N.P.D./FAO. op cit. 
(from pp.96, 99 and 129).
The F.A.O. study did not specify the requirement levels for 
each of the given socio-economic groups. It gave a single 
overall average nutritional requirement level, i.e. a 
national average requirement level of 2400k calories appli­
cable to all groups and areas. Therefore one cannot clearly 
see the shortfalls of each group's diet from its nutritional
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requirement. It is inadequate to define the calorie gap as 
the difference between actual intake and some average requi­
rement of the population as a whole, making no distinction 
whatever between the different requirements of different 
people; and thus giving, to some extent, an unrealistic 
assessment of the extent of calorie shortfall and of under­
nourishment of the various socio-economic groups. Different 
socio-economic groups, however, have different energy requi­
rements because of the differences in the nature of the 
activity (e.g. a hard manual job versus a desk job), body- 
weight, age, sex, etc. As a matter of fact, the problem of 
investigating the number of persons who lack adequate food 
(in energy equivalent) has been a matter of debate for many 
years partly because energy requirement is a dynamic concept 
which varies from day to day, and it is not the same for 
every one.11
In fact, there is a wide inter and intra-individual 
variation in daily calorie intake as it differs, for 
instance, from working days (hours) to days off (hours).12 
Therefore information is needed not only about the magnitude 
of variability between individuals but also about the 
variability of requirement in the same individuals at diffe­
rent points in time. This variability is of great importance 
for the practical application of requirement estimates. As a 
number of studies in industrialised countries suggest, the 
coefficient of variation of daily energy intake in the same 
individual is about 25 per cent of the mean.13 Therefore 
inferences cannot be made about the situations of indivi­
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duals, from the knowledge of intake and requirement at the 
national average level. In fact, determining the average 
requirement level for each socio-economic group - for 
estimating nutrition deficiency (of the incidence of under­
nutrition) 14, involves important conceptual and information 
problems.15 Moreover, it has now been established that the 
choice of any figure as a cut-off will involve errors of 
misclassification. People whose intakes are less than the 
cut-off point may be wrongly classified as nutritionally 
deficient, since their individual requirements may be even 
less than their intakes, thus leading to a risk of over­
estimation.. On the other 'hand, others whose intakes are 
greater than the cut off point will be wrongly classified in 
the adequate category although their own requirements may be 
larger than their intakes, thus implying a risk of under­
estimation.16
Nevertheless, due to the absence of the required availabi­
lity of information concerning the adequate energy require­
ment for every socio-economic group, the use of 2400K 
calories as;a cut-off point was retained in this study as a 
rough estimate of requirement level across the different 
socio-economic groups in order to have a broad global 
estimate of the numbers afflicted by calorie deficits.17 As 
a broad approximation, the people whose energy intake was 
apparently below the cut-off point, belong to four socio­
economic groups: the unemployed - the unskilled workers
temporary employed, the unskilled workers in services, and 
the retail tradesmen. These socio-economic groups, including
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their families, form 20.4 per cent of the Algerian popula­
tion; (see table 4.1) . We have to bear in mind that some 
people in each socio-economic group may have an intake more 
than 2400K calories, while some of them may have less, as it 
is implied in an aggregate average. In this respect, some 
people in two other socio-economic groups, i.e. the clerks 
and the unskilled self-employed in petty jobs, had 
respectively an energy supply of 2426 and 24 66 calories;18 
many of them might have had below the requirement level.19 
As mentioned earlier, the requirements vary according to 
individuals, nature of work, body-weight etc. Therefore a 
standard requirement of 2,400K calories is not enough to 
reach a conclusive judgement.
However, it is interesting to note that not all the above 
four socio-economic groups whose energy supply was below the 
requirement level belonged to the lower income categories. 
In fact, it was only the first two groups, i.e. the unemp­
loyed and the unskilled workers temporarily employed, that 
were the poorest of all. The remaining two groups, i.e. the 
unskilled workers in services and the retail tradesmen 
belonged somehow to the middle income groups as their 
consumption expenditures accounted for 2.6 - 2.8 times the one 
of the inactive socio-economic group, and represented 31 - 
39 per cent higher than the national average of consumption 
expenditures; (see table 4.1). They may fall into what 
Rowntree20 may call 'secondary poverty1 where people have 
more than adequate income, but do not spend it on satisfying 
the minimum physiological needs.21 Therefore, it cannot be
claimed that people with calorie deficiency are only the 
lowest income groups, other groups can be as well/22 and the 
explanation can be sought in the structure of their consump­
tion pattern. For instance, they consume less cereals which 
contain high energy and protein intakes.
Meanwhile, the lower income groups tend to consume much more 
on cereals, owing to its low cost per calorie, which is a 
rational behaviour, and which is the more likely situation 
in other developing countries. Studies in India and Tunisia, 
for instance, found that even among the poorest income 
groups, some households can satisfy their dietary energy 
better than others by reconciling food preferences with 
income through the purchase of cheaper food.23 In this case, 
differences are mainly due to the differences in diet 
intake.24 However, as consumption patterns differ from one 
region to another (mainly between urban and rural areas 
which is the main focus here) , it is important to examine 
such patterns in order to highlight the corresponding urban 
and rural minimum consumption diets on which the poverty 
line will be based.
4.2.1- Consumption diet per Region.
The average daily diet per capita in different regions of 
Algeria, as shown in table 4.2, varies significantly from 
one region to another. In fact, each region had its own 
pattern of food intakes. The pattern of food intake in Greater 
Algiers was characterised on one hand by the lowest cereal
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Table 4.2 Average daily diet per Region, Kg/person/year, 1966 - 68.
Product G.
North Algeria Southern
Algeria
Algeria 
excluding 
G. Algiers
All
AlgeriaAlgiers Urban* peri­
urban
Rural
Areas
cereals 110 160.6 233 252 127.7 217.7 208
potatoes 41 30 19.9 16.8 15.7 20.3 22
Pulses 16.6 8 7.1 6.0 4.9 6.5 7.2
Vegetables 66.1 45.3 30.0 21.6 53.5 30.9 33.6
Sugar 15 14.2 12.8 13.6 15.3 13.9 14.0
Fruits 53.7 29.5 27.5 20.8 56.0 26.6 28.8
Meat, eggs 15.9 12.9 9.6 9.1 12.1 10.2 10.7
Milk 71.6 33.0 25.9 24.9 18.7 34.0 34.0
Fish 3.3 2.9 1.2 0.6 0.2 1.2 1.3
Fat 13.1 11.4 9.5 9.4 9.9 9.9 10.2
Sub- total# 92.9 60.2 46.2 43.0 40.9 55.3 56.2
#) sub-total of Animal and fats.
*) Urban areas excluding Greater Algiers.
Source: Constructed from Analyse Nutritionelle. U.N.P.D./ FAO. op. cit.
intake (110kg), and on the other hand by the highest 
intake for the so-called "superior" foods: meat (72kg), 
vegetables (66kg), fruits (54kg), milk (72kg), potatoes 
(41kg), fish (3,3kg), and fats (13kg). The pattern of food 
intake in the urban region had the same characteristics as 
the one of Greater Algiers; i.e. with lower cereal intake, 
and higher intake for the "superior" foods (meat, vegeta­
bles, fruits, milk, and fats). The pattern of food intake in 
Southern Algeria was based on a relatively low cereal intake 
with the lowest intake concerning potatoes (16kg), milk 
(5kg), and fish (0.2kg), but with the highest intake for 
fruits (56kg) mainly of dried fruits (dates), and for sugar 
(15.3kg). In the rural region, food intake was characterised
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on one hand by the highest cereal intake (252kg), and on the 
other hand by the lowest intake for "superior" foods: meat 
(9kg, fruits (21kg), and fats (9kg). From the calorie and 
protein equivalents of these diets, it appears that the 
rural region, with the highest consumption of cereals 
coupled with the lowest consumption expenditure, had the 
highest average calorie and protein intakes. (See table 
4.3) . This suggests that low income people spend more on
Table 4.3: Structure of energy and nutrients supply by region 1966 - 68.
Energy and North_________________ Algeria southern Algeria All
Nutrients G. Algiers Urban* peri- Rural Algeria excluding Algeria
Supply. Areas urban Areas G. Algiers
Total calories 2, 015 2,311 2,782 3,104 2,190 2,817 2,756
Vegetable // 1,767 2,117 2, 636 2,943 2,022 2, 649 2,581
Vegetable // % 86.6 91.6 94.7 94.8 92.3 94.0 93.6
Cereal calories 1,067 1,570 2106 2,479 1,211 2,131 2,048
Cereal // in % 52.9 67.9 75.6 79.9 55.2 75.6 74.0
Total Proteins 56.2 65.7 84.3 95.7 55.4 84.2 82.1
Animal // (g) 14.8 9.1 6.9 6.4 7.5 7.2 7.8
Animal // (%) 26.6 13.9 8.1 6.7 13.5 8.6 9.2
Vegetable //(g) 41.3 56.6 77.4 89.3 47.9 77.0 74.0
Vegetable //(%) 73.4 86.1 91.9 93.3 86.5 91.4 90.8
Calcium (500)* n.a 38.3 414 376 400 377 n . a
Lipid (40.6)* 54.5 44.8 41.5 41.8 38.3 42.1 43.1
Iron (12.20)* n.a 10.4 14.1 13.1 11.6 12.3 n.a
Expenditure# 1, 629 920 n.a 503 n.a 630 708.1
*) average requirement; whereas average protein requirement is 60 g.
#) per capita consumption expenditure in AD.
Source: Constructed from: Analyse Nutritlonelle. op.cit.
cereals in trying to meet their energy requirements than on 
any other food items. This was so because of the relatively 
low and stable prices of cereals which have been the main
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subsidised food products. Consequently, the rural areas with 
the lowest average income had the highest calorie intakes,25 
mainly of cereal origin. This suggests that the poor people 
are going to be found among the socio-economic groups whose 
diet is based mainly on cereals. In short, figure 4. A 
captures the "calorie gap" which is based on the differences 
between the requirement and the intake. It appears that the 
rural households are clustered above the range of 
requirement, whereas urban households are below it.
Figure 4 A
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G.AIgiers Urban per-urban Rural S.AIgeria Algeria
As far as animal proteins are concerned, whether in relative 
or absolute terms, it can be noticed that the higher the 
average consumer expenditure of the region the higher the 
animal protein intake. In rural areas, animal protein 
intakes were the lowest with 6.4 g, representing about 7 per 
cent of total proteins. In urban areas, animal protein 
intakes were 9g, contributing 14 per cent to total protein 
intakes. In Greater Algiers, animal proteins were the 
highest with about 15g, representing 27 per cent of total
Requirement
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protein intakes. Intthe Southern region, the proportions of 
animal proteins were situated between those of the rural 
areas and those of the urban areas; (table 4.3). Again this 
is not a conclusive judgement because in the case of self- 
produced foods, particularly slaughtering of animals and 
birds at home prevents an accurate estimation.
Certainly the level of income determines to some extent the 
structure of food intakes. As income increases, the propor­
tion of cereal calories in total calorie intakes decreases, 
while the proportion of animal calories as well as of animal 
proteins, increases. This was the case whether in urban or in 
rural areas, but the trend was much steeper in the urban 
than in the rural areas; see tables 4.4 and 4.5. The food
Table 4.4: Structure of calorie & protein intakes by income level (in 
AD) in urban areas, 1968.
0-200 201-400 401-800 801-1800 1801-3000 3000 + Averac
Total calories 2,169 2,161 2,219 2, 417 2,678 3,162 2,300
Cereal calories (%) 81 74 70 62 52 41 67
Animal calories (%) 4 5 6 10 14 27 8
Total Proteins (g) 66 63 63 69 75 96 67
Cereal // (%) 89 84 81 71 59 42 67
Animal // (%) 5 7 9 17 25 46 14
Source: Constructed from: Analyse Nutritionelle. op.cit.
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Table 4.5: Structure of calorie & protein intakes by income level (in
AD) in rural areas, 1968..
0--200 201-400 401-800 801-1800 1801-3000 3000 + Average
Total calories 2,882 3,040 3,418 3,570 3,828 4,244 3,100
Cereal calories (%) 84 81 75 72 67 67 79
Animal calories (%) 4 4 5 7 7 8 5
Total Proteins (g) 91 95 100 109 124 129 96
Cereal // (%) 90 89 86 81 70 77 88
Animal // (%) 5 5 7 11 14 16 6
Source: Constructed from: Analyse Nutritional. U.N.P.D./FAO. op.cit.
intake of the lowest income groups was based mainly on 
cereal intakes which constituted more than 80% of total 
calories, and about 90% of total proteins. Such a diet was 
poor in terms of non-cereal intakes, particularly in animal 
products which contributed only 4% to total calorie intakes, 
and 5% to total protein intakes; (this was whether in urban 
or in rural areas). On the other hand, the food intake of 
the upper income groups was based less on cereals 
(contributing only with 41% in total calorie intakes, and 
with 42% in total protein intakes), but more on non-cereal 
products, particularly on animal products which had a share 
of 27 per cent in total calorie intakes, and 4 6 per cent in 
total protein intakes. This was the case in the urban areas. 
The proportions, meanwhile, were much less in the rural 
areas, but portraying the same trend as in the urban areas. 
See tables 4.4 and 4.5. It goes without saying that the food 
diet of the upper income groups was more varied and 
balanced, particularly in terms of vitamins and amino-acids;
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see tables A4.3 - 7 in Appendix 4. It has also to be noted 
that a high calorie and protein intake does not exclude the 
fact that the diet might be unbalanced, in the sense that it 
lacks some necessary nutrients and vitamins (mainly among 
the lower income groups); (see tables A4.3, A4.4, A4.5, A4.6 
and A4.7 in appendix 4). All these may suggest that there is 
a higher frequency of nutritional deficiencies (under26 and 
malnutrition) within and between the various socio-economic 
group. In this respect, it has to be borne in mind that a 
diet with insufficient calories to meet energy needed may 
lead to a deficiency in proteins because some of the protein 
intake would be used as a source of energy. As a consequence 
the diet may be deficient in both energy and protein 
requirements.
It should be emphasised that calorie intake while ensuring 
the renewal of a person’s energy does not compensate for a 
certain minimum of protein intake which is necessary as a 
preventive nutrient without which the body may be vulnerable 
to diseases and/or other drawbacks. For instance, a dietary 
intake may be sufficient to cover energy requirements but, 
on a qualitative basis, may lack, as stated earlier, some 
necessary nutrients and vitamins (which is the case mainly 
among the lower income groups). This, I suppose, has to be 
taken into consideration in the estimation of the minimum 
consumption diet within a region.
Energy supply and its structure for the same economic group 
differs considerably from one area to another; tables in 
appendix 4 reveal the nutritional vulnerability among the 18
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socio-economic groups. They show that while the bulk of the 
socio-economic groups in the rural and in the peri-rural 
areas had energy supply in excess of the requirement,27 
whereas in the urban areas and in the southern region only a 
few of the socio-economic groups were above the requirement, 
all those remaining' were below it. It follows that the lower 
income consumer group in rural areas would not be as poor, 
in nutritional terms, as the urban ones. This would be the 
case because the low income (consumer expenditure) groups in 
urban areas have less access to food produced in the house­
hold for direct consumption than is the case for the rural 
ones. Furthermore, food consumption in urban areas is much 
more unequally distributed than in rural areas - the respec­
tive Gini coefficient28 was 0.16 and 0.13. Thus, in the 
absence of regular and adequate income needed to purchase 
sufficient food, lower income groups in general and those of 
urban areas in particular are more vulnerable to malnutri­
tion.29 Such outcomes are partly due to the fact that food 
prices are usually higher in urban areas than in rural 
areas, and they increase faster than the ones of non-food 
products, see below.
The extent of rural dependence on self-produced food can be 
observed from the A.A.R.D.E.S. and M.A.R.A. studies which 
indicated that part of the calorie supply is derived from 
home-produced food. The proportion of self-consumption in 
1967/68 represented 25 to 70 per cent for cereals and meat, 
25 per cent for potatoes, less than 20 per cent for vege­
tables, 72 per cent for eggs, 85 per cent for milk, 80 per
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..cent for butter and; 50 per cent for olive oil. In 1976/77, 
home-produced represented 11 per cent for cereals, 8 per 
cent for fruits, 4 per cent for vegetables and milk, 14 per 
cent for olive oil, and nil for other goods.30 It had 
decreased substantially, following the substantial decrease 
in the share of agriculture in GDP, as seen in chapter 2.
4.3- Trend in consumption expenditure 1967/68-1979/80.
Between 1967/78 and 1979/80 there was a change in the food 
intake in Algeria. The consumption of cereals (the main 
source of calorie supply) decreased,31 while the consumption 
of non-cereal products increased. The structure of the 
average food consumption is revealing, as shown in table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Evolution of national average consumption (Kg/person/year).
food products 1967/68 1979/80 changes 1967/68 - 79/80 
(in kg/person/year).
Cereals 250 200 - 50.0
Dry vegetables 3.4 6.1 + 2.7
Fresh vegetables 55.6 57.8 + 2.2
Dry fruits - 9.1 + 9.0
Fresh fruits 28.8 44.4 + 15.6
Olive oil + veg. oil - 0.35 + 0.35
Sugar 14.3 23.3 + 9.0
Fats 10.2 15.1 + 4.9
Meat 10.2 12.2 + 2.0
Eggs 0.17 2.0 + 1.8
Milk 34.0 52.0 + 18.0
Honey - 0.12 + 0.12
Source: Constructed from: Sliman Badrani: "La Dependence sur les Plans
Alimentaire Agricole: Le Cas de l'Alg^rie", in: 1 ’Evolution de la
Consommation Alimentaire en Afrique: Le Cas de l'Alg6rie. I.I.E.S. 
Geneva 1982. p. 83.
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It appears clearly that the diet in Algeria improved quanti­
tatively and qualitatively, particularly among the "superior” 
foods. Such an improvement was as a result of the real 
increase in the national average per capita income, as 
reflected in the increase of the average per capita 
consumption expenditure of more than 4.6 per cent per annum 
(in real terms) during 1967/68-1979/80 period. Meanwhile, 
the highest increase was noticed in the rural areas;' (see 
table 4.7) .
Table 4.7: Structure of per capita expenditure in constant prices.
Urban areas 
Product 1967/8 1979/80 rate* 
(a) (b)
Rural areas National 
1967/8 1979/80 rate*1967/8 1979/80 rate* 
(a) (b) (b)
Food. 503.45 
Non-food570.06
705.45
876.96
2.86
3.65
286.71
216.29
532.1
446.6
5.29 376.0 
6.23 332.1
610.6 4.1
605.7 5.1
Total 1100.51 1582.92 3.07 503.00 978.7 5.7 708.1 1216.3 4.6
(a) comprises only areas of Northern Algeria which accounts more than 
92 per cent of total population.
(b): deflated by the corresponding consumer price index (table 4.10 below).
*) per annum real rate of increase.
Source: constructed from: A.A.R.D.E.S. Enqu§te sur la Consommation et 
les Budgets Famlliaux 1967/68; and DSpence de la Consommation des 
Manages Algerlens Premies Resultats et Analyse Globale Issue de 
l'Enquete men6e aupr6s des Manages. Mars 1979 - Mars 1980. M.P.A.T. 
July 1983.
Accordingly, the trends in the structure of household 
consumption expenditure confirm Engel's law. As average per 
capita income and consumption increased, the share of food 
consumption in overall consumption expenditure declined in
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all areas. For instance, at the national level, it declined 
in real terms from 53.1% in 1967/68 to 50.2 per cent in 
1979/80; (see table 4.8).
Table 4.8: Evolution of expenditure structure (in real terms).
Urban Rural National
product 1967/68 1979/80 1967/68 1979/80 1967/68 1979/80
Food 45.8 44.6 57 54.4 53.1 50.2
Services 54.2 55.4 43 45.6 46.9 49.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: constructed from table 4.7.
In fact, the changes in the Algerian diet pattern (as shown 
in table 4.6) suggest that the consumption pattern is moving 
towards the so-called European (or Western) diet which is 
characterised by the predominance of animal products32 and 
less cereals. Such a pattern was overtaking the traditional 
one which was mainly based on plant products in general, and 
on cereals in particular, (as shown above). Such changes in 
food habits were mainly met through imports of foodstuffs,33 
as mentioned in chapter 2.
The above improvement in the average consumption expenditure 
does not by any means indicates that all socio-economic 
groups have had their diet ameliorated. As was noted 
earlier, the consumption pattern of the lowest income groups 
did not change in any significant way between 1967/1968 and 
1976.34 It was possibly due to the fact that their real per 
capita income did not increase substantially enough during
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the period in question, (see tables 3.17 and 3.18 above pp. 
147 - 149) . Expenditure on food accounts for about 68 per 
cent of total expenditure for the bottom decile consumer 
expenditure groups, compared with 45 per cent for the upper 
decile consumer expenditure groups. The average for the 
population as a whole was about 56 per cent; (see table 
4.9).
Table 4.9: Distribution of consumption expenditure by brackets in % 
1979/80.
Expenditure Food Clothes Housing Furrii- Health Transport Education others Total 
brackets heating ture & comm. Sleisure
less > 800 67.7 11.3 3.5 4.1 2.1 2.1 1.7 7.5 100
800 -1000 68.2 9.5 3.6 4.9 4.0 2.0 2.0 5.8 100
1000-1200 67.4 10.3 3.4 5.0 2.7 2.2 2.3 6.7 100
1200-1500 66.3 11.4 3.5 4.0 3.2 2.9 2.1 5.8 100
1500-2000 63.1 10.3 4.2 5.1 3.2 3.8 2.8 7.5 100
2000-2500 60.2 10.0 5.0 6.0 3.3 4.4 2.7 8.4 100
2500-3000 61.0 9.9 5.0 5.5 2.9 3.8 3.3 8.6 100
3000-3500 59.6 9.7 4.9 6.6 3.1 4.8 3.6 7.8 100
3500-4000 59.6 9.3 4.5 6.0 3.4 5.7 3.3 8.2 100
4000-4500 55.5 9.1 5.8 6.9 3.3 7.3 3.1 9.0 100
4500-5000 53.6 9.4 6.1 7.4 3.2 5.9 3.9 9.9 100
5000-5500 53.3 8.1 6.6 6.0 3.2 7.8 4.0 f 10.2 100
5500-6000 50.5 8.7 7.2 7.4 3.7 9.3 3.6 19.0 100
6000-6500 47.6 9.9 6.0 7.0 3.1 7.3 3.2 15.9 100
6500-7000 45.6 8.1 6.5 7.4 2.8 12.0 4.6 13.0 100
7000-7500 50.3 7.8 5.6 6.0 2.6 9.9 5.4 12.4 100
7500 & over 40.3 6.6 7.0 7.8 2.3 13.2 4.1 18.7 100
Source: D6pence de Consommation des M6nages AlgSriens. Premies
R6sultats et Analyse Globale issue de 1 'Enquete men6e aupres des 
Manages. Mars 1979 - Mars 1880. M.P.A.T. July 1983. Algiers, p. 54.
The increase in food prices was the highest of all 
consumption items. In 197 9/80 the consumption price indices
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of food and non-food products were respectively 305.3 per 
cent and 202.1 per cent in urban areas and 270.1 per cent 
and 247.6 per cent in rural areas (1967/68 = 100)34 (see 
table 4.10). This, in fact, tends to be the general phenome­
non which usually accompanies economic growth in developing 
countries, with manufacturing goods or non-food products 
becoming relatively cheaper in comparison with food items 
particularly in urban areas.
Table 4.10: Price indices at average income levels in 197 9/80,
(1967/68 =100)
Consumption 
items we
Urban Rural National Annual rate of increase
iight prices weight prices weight prices urban rural national
Food
Non-food
54.9
45.1
305.3
202.1
56.5
43.5
270.1
247.6
55.7
44.3
284.8 9.75 
228.5 6.04
8.63
7.85
9.10
7.13
T/average 100 258.7 100 260.3 100 259.8 8.2 8.30 8.3
Source: Weights were constructed from D&pence de Consommation des
Manages Algeriens... op. cit p. 48. Prices were constructed from: (a)
1 ’Indice du CoQt de la Vie, chez les Divers Groupes Sociaux en 
AlgSrie 1966 - 1976 M.P.A.T. October, 1981; (b) 1 ’Indice des Prix a
la Consommation 1977. M.P.A.T. April, 1979; (c) L'AlgSrie en Quelques
Chiffres 1979-1980.
However, from the apparent trends in the consumer price 
indices of the lower and upper income groups, it can clearly 
be seen that there is a relatively higher general consumer 
price index for the lower income groups in comparison with 
the one for the upper income groups, respectively, 258.5 per 
cent against 247.2 per cent in urban areas, and 261.8 per 
cent against 258.3 per cent in rural areas; see tables 4.11
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and 4.12.
Table 4.11: Price indices at low income level* 1979/80 (1967/68=100).
Consumption Urban Areas Rural Areas Annual rate
items Weight6 prices WeightG prices Urban Rural
Food 55.1 305.3 63.3 270.1 9.75 8.63
Non-food 44.9 201.1 36.7 247.6 6.04 7.85
Total/Average 100.0 258.5 100.0 261.8 8.2 8.3
*) at the poverty line.
0) weight is at the poverty line level (see below). 
Source: Compiled from table 4.10 above, p. 197.
Table 4.12: Price indices at high income levels 1979/80 (1967/68 = 100).
Consumption Urban Areas Rural Areas Annual rate
items weight* prices weight# prices Urban Rural
Food 43.7 305.3 47.5 270.1 9.8 8.6
Non-food 56.3 202.1 52.5 247.6 6.1 7.9
Total/average 100.0 247.2 100.0 258.3 7.7 8.2
*) taken from the consumption pattern of the upper 4.7 per cent of the
urban population, from table A4.1 in Appendix 4.
#) taken from the consumption pattern of the upper ordinal 10.3 per 
cent of the rural population, from table A4.2 in Appendix 4.
Source: Compiled from table 4.10 above, p. 197.
As prices have moved against lower income groups,35 
inequality in the size distribution of income or consumption 
expenditure is greater than what has been revealed by 
current price data. In other words, the distribution of 
income or consumption expenditure among groups is more equal 
than the distribution of their levels of living, because
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general consumer prices are higher at low levels of income 
or expenditure. Inflation, which has been regressive in its 
distributional effects, can be taken as one of the factors 
limiting the narrowing trend in inequality. It would act, 
ceteris paribus, as an inequitable rationing device in 
depressing further the relative position of the lower income 
groups with regard to the other ordinal groups.
With the increase in food prices, higher than in non-food 
products, the lower income groups may find themselves in a 
position unable to meet their needs, not only of non-food 
items but also to reduce the consumption of non-crop food 
products, especially meat, vegetables and fruits - to what 
are called "superior" foods. The prices of such "superior" 
foods have recorded the highest increase of all food 
components. For instance, between 1967/68 and 1976, prices 
in urban areas rose by 24 9 per cent for fresh vegetables 
prices, 221 per cent for meat, 195 per cent for fresh and 
dried fruits; (the average for all food products in urban 
areas was about 100%). The same trend was noticed in the 
rural areas during the same period. Prices for fresh 
vegetables rose by 274 per cent, 230 per cent for meat, 208 
per cent for fresh and dried fruits; (the average increase 
for all food products in rural areas was about 77%),36 These 
price increases would not only have a negative effect on 
inequality37 but would also limit or deprive the economi­
cally weaker sections, as mentioned earlier, from the access 
to what it is called "superior" foods. This is what leads 
the poor trying to satisfy their nutritional requirements
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through the consumption of crop foods (of "inferior" foods), 
those of cheaper cost per calorie.
In fact, what is more important is the situation where the 
lower income groups lack enough resources to meet a certain 
minimum level of living, as represented by a poverty line. 
Accordingly, an attempt is made to examine the extent of the 
shortfall of income of some groups from an estimated poverty 
line, and to see whether or not there has been some amelio­
ration of the conditions of the poor during the recent deve­
lopment efforts. This would show the extent to which the 
poor have (or have not), shared in the fruits of development. 
It goes without saying, that both for methodological as well 
as for data limitations, estimates of poverty line, and of 
people or households below such a line, have to be a broad 
approximation. This also means that some of the conclusions 
reached in this context will also remain speculative.
4.4- Profile of Absolute Poverty.
An important way to assess economic development in a country 
during a certain period of time is to see what has happened 
to poverty during that period. Such an assessment requires 
us first to determine who is considered to be poor. However, 
it was suggested, as noted earlier, that anyone whose income 
is below a certain "poverty line" level is considered to be 
suffering from poverty. It was also noted that there were 
some methodological and definitional difficulties in deter­
mining what a "poverty line" should consist of. Owing to 
this, an accurate estimation of the magnitude of poverty is
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difficult to obtain. The limited data and information in 
Algeria are another constraint for such an estimation. Thus 
broad estimations are attempted here in this study. Such 
broad estimations start with determining the cost of a 
relevant consumption basket (a cut-off diet) based on the 
F.A.O. recommendations of 2400K calories per person; and to 
this, is added the costs of non-food items. In this respect, 
the observed consumption patterns of various socio-economic 
groups, as presented by the F.A.O. study, constitute the 
basis upon which the cut-off diet as well as its cost, and 
the costs of non-food items are determined. This, by no 
means, suggests that this method has no drawbacks. In fact, 
determining the cut-off diet from the consumption patterns 
of the 18 socio-economic groups still raises certain limita­
tions. A cut-off diet which, generates 2400k calories can 
always be brought about by the consumption of various combi­
nation of different food items. As pointed out earlier, some 
poor people may meet their energy requirements better than 
others by reconciling food preferences with income through 
the purchase of cheaper food. This means that some poor 
people may manage to meet their energy requirements with the 
consumption of "inferior" foods, those of low cost per 
calorie. This represents, as emphasised above one of the 
limitations which make the setting-up of a "poverty line" a 
difficult matter.
However, from examining the food consumption structure of 
the 18 socio-economic groups, and in the absence of a 
vigorous standard, the consumption pattern of the retired
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socio-economic group has been taken as the cut-off diet in 
urban areas, as their calorie intake is 2376K calories, just 
below the requirement level of 2400K calories. This cut-off 
diet, represents clearly a poor man's diet with cereals 
contributing more than 72 per cent of total energy intake, 
and animal proteins, at only 6.6g, accounting for only 9.6 per 
cent of total proteins, which is far below the required 
level of 15g.38
As far as the rural population is concerned, the 
identification of the socio-economic group whose energy 
consumption can be said to represent the cut-off diet turned 
out to be more difficult because, as stated in the first 
section of this chapter, most of the socio-economic groups 
were able to meet their energy requirements, even at low 
levels of food consumption expenditures. So how are we to 
determine the cut-off diet in the rural areas?
The examination, however, of the structure of the diets and 
the corresponding food expenditures of the different socio­
economic groups can highlight the poor diet from the 
adequate one. It shows, for instance, that while the food 
consumption expenditure of the clerk socio-economic group 
(AD434) was far above the average rural food consumption 
expenditure (AD285) ,. its energy consumption (2469K calories) 
represented just over the requirement level. On the other 
hand, the food consumption expenditure of the 'unskilled 
self-employed in petty jobs' socio-economic group (the 
unskilled group henceforth) (AD2 65), despite being less than
202
the overall average, and representing only 61 per cent of 
that of the clerk group, had a higher energy consumption 
than of the clerk socio-economic group. Meanwhile, the diet 
of the clerk group contains more of qualitative nutrients of 
animal proteins and vitamins (vit A and vit C) than the one 
of the unskilled group; see tables A4.6 and A4.7 in Appendix
4. In taking into account these considerations, the diet of 
the clerk group cannot be taken as the cut-off diet. It is 
rather the diet of the unskilled group, which can be taken 
as the plausible cut-off diet for the rural populations. 
Such a diet can be said to represent a poor man’s diet. It 
portrays the predominance of food consumption expenditure 
which represented more than 63 per cent of total consumption 
expenditure,39 with cereals contributing to 84 per cent of 
total calorie intakes, and with only 3. 8g of animal 
proteins, (representing just 4 per cent of total protein 
intakes).40
The costs of the cut-off diet can be taken correspondingly 
from the observed structure of consumption expenditure of 
the socio-economic group - representing the cut-off diets. 
These costs, in 1967/68, were AD336.5 in urban areas and 
AD2 65.4 in rural areas; (see tables A4.1 and A4.2 in 
Appendix 4). In taking the costs of non-food expenditures of 
the socio-economic group that represents the cut-off point, 
the poverty line income in 1967/68 is estimated at AD610.5 
per person in urban areas and AD419.5 in rural areas; (see 
table 4.13).
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Table 4.13: Estimates of poverty line in urban & rural areas, in AD.
goods Urban Areas Rural Areas
and 1967/68 1979/80 1967/68 1979/80
service Income weight Income Weight Income Weight Income Weight
Food 336.5 55.1 1,028 65.1 265.4 63.3 717.5 65.2
Non-food 274.0 44.9 552 34.9 154.1 36.7 382.5 34.8
Total 610.5 100.0 1,580 100.0 419.5 100.0 1,100.0 100.0
Source: Constructed from (a) l ’Enquete de la Consommation des MSnages 
19 67/68, A.A.R.D.E.S.; Tableaux de l ’Economie Alg6rienne, 1973; 
Secretariat d'Etat au Plan, Direction des Statistiques. pp. 241-46. 
(b) Consumer price indices from table 4.10 above, p. 197.
With the aim of seeing the effects of economic growth on 
absolute poverty between at least two points in time, 
allowance has to be made for the changes in the composition 
of the reference consumption basket, and in its nominal 
prices. In fact, the composition of the consumption basket 
of the poor has remained, as stated above, more or less 
unchanged over the 1967/68 - 1979/80 period. In 197*9/80, 
consumer price indices were about 259 per cent in urban 
areas, and about 262 per cent in the rural areas; (1967/68 = 
100); see table 4.11 above. Thus, once such price allowances 
were made, the poverty income level per person in 197 9/80 
would be estimated at ADI, 580 in the urban areas, and at 
ADI,100 in the rural areas, (see table 4.13) .
However, concerning the incidence of absolute poverty in 
urban and in rural areas, it seems that substantial progress 
towards the alleviation of absolute poverty did occur 
between 1967/68 and 1979/80, as its percentage (head count
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method) decreased considerably between the two periods from 
11.6 per cent to 4 per cent, in the urban areas, and from 31 
per cent to 19.5 per cent in the rural areas.
These estimates clearly show that big changes were noticed 
in urban as well as in rural poverty. During a period of 12 
years, poverty decreased by 60 per cent in urban areas, and 
by 36 per cent in rural areas. As the most significant 
decline was noticed in urban areas, the proportion of the 
rural poor in the overall Algerian poor increased from 85 
per cent in 1967/68 to more than 87 per cent in 1979/80; the 
summary in table 4.14 is revealing.
Table 4.14: Structure of population in absolute poverty (1967/68 - 1979/80).
Urban poor in % Rural Poor in % Overall Poor in %
Period urban pop T. poor rural pop T. poor Algerian populat53
1967/68 11.6 15.0 31.0 85.0 24.8
1979/80 4.0 12.9 19.5 87.1 13.0
Source: Constructed from table 4.15; and from population structure.
Poverty can be said to be a disproportionately rural 
phenomenon; its incidence in rural areas was almost five 
times higher than in urban areas. One can plausibly argue 
that this outcome was the result of the Algerian development 
strategy which, as stated above, has been urban-biased.
Moreover, the characteristics of the rural poor did not 
apparently change between 1967/68 and 1979/80, the change 
was rather in their total numbers in relative and in
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absolute terms. The incidence of poverty in rural areas was 
predominantly confined to: seasonal workers in agricultural 
and in non-agricultural activities, and to the unemployed 
people; (see table 4.15).
Table 4.15: Socio-economic groups in poverty 1967/68 - 1979/80.
1967/68 1979/80
Socio-economic group per capita population per capita population
Poverty line (Rural Areas) 419.50a 31.0 1,100 19.5
-seasonal agr. workers 304.0 (22.2) 896 (12.6)
-seasonal non-agri // 332.0 (6.6) 1, 080 (3.4)
-unemployed 270.2 (2.3) 686.2 (3.5)
Poverty line (Urban Areas) 610.5a 11.6 1,580 4
-agricultural workers 474.0 (9.7) 2,480 n.c*
-unemployed 510.0 (1.9) 905 (4)
a) poverty line income level.
*) not concerned.
Source: Constructed from tables: 4.13, 3.15, and 3.16.
Meanwhile, in 1979/80 the poor seasonal workers in the 
agricultural sector formed the largest proportion of the 
total rural poor, numbering about 65 per cent, and represen­
ting more than 5 6 per cent of all the country's poor. This 
means that the highest incidence of poverty in the country 
is found in the rural areas in general and in the agricul­
tural sector in particular. This, however, comes as no 
surprise as it tends to be the general prevailing situation 
in developing countries.41 However, for the rural poor, the 
poverty gap index, i.e. the amount by which the income of 
these poor populations falls short of the specified poverty
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line, amounted to AD131.1 per head per year in 1967/68, and 
AD332.7 in 197 9/80, representing respectively 31.3 per cent, 
and 30.2 per cent of the rural poverty line.
In the urban areas, the range in the status of the poor 
narrowed significantly between the two periods. While in 
1967/68, the poor consisted of the agricultural workers, and 
of the unemployed; in 1979/80, only those who fell within 
the socio-economic group of the unemployed category were 
poor; (see table 4.15). The average poverty gap was AD130.6 
per head in 1967/68, i.e. representing 21.4 per cent of the 
poverty line; and AD676 in 1979/80, i.e. 42.8 per cent of 
the poverty line.
Sen's Poverty index, which permits determination of the 
poverty gap as a fraction of the total rural income needed 
to bring up every one of the rural poor to the poverty 
level, decreased from 10 per cent in 1967/68 to 6.8 per cent 
in 1979/80; (see table 4.16). This means that in 1979/80, 
only 6.8 per cent of rural income42 was needed to close the 
poverty gap. On the other hand it has to be noted that while 
poverty decreased in relative and in absolute terms, its 
degree among the poor in 1979/80 increased, as income 
inequality among the rural poor increased from a Gini 
coefficient of 0.012 in 1967/68 to 0.065 in 1979/80); (see 
table 4.16).
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Table 4.16: Estimates of poverty index in rural Algeria 1967/68 - 1979/80.
Period
Head account 
index
poverty gap 
index
Gini coefficient 
among the poor Sen1s index
1967/68 0.310 0.313 0.012 0.100
1979/80 0.195 0.302 0.065 0.068
Source: constructed from table 4.14, and from the above findings.
For the urban poor, the poverty gap (according to Sen's 
poverty index), as a function of the total urban income 
needed to bring every one up to the poverty line level, 
decreased from 2.7 per cent in 1967/68 to 2.5 per cent in 
1979/80; (see table 4.17).
Table 4.17: Estimates of poverty index in urban Algeria 1967/68 - 1979/80.
Period
Head count 
index
poverty gap 
index
Gini coefficient 
among the poor* Sen's index
1967/68 0.116 0.214 0.017 0.027
1979/80 0.040 0.428 0.328 0.025
*) Calculated from the consumption expenditure data.
Source: constructed from table 4.14, and from the above findings.
Notwithstanding all the data and methodological limitations, 
it is plausible to argue that the incidence of poverty in 
Algeria stands at 4 per cent in urban areas, and 19.5 per 
cent in rural areas. This would suggest that 13 per cent of 
the Algerian population remained in absolute poverty in 
1979/80; (see table 4.18).
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Table 4.18: Estimates of population in poverty 1967/68-1979/80 in %.
Year urban areas rural areas national
1967/68 11.6 31.0 24.8
1979/80 4.0 19.5 13.0
Source: for income data: compiled from table 4.14.
4.5- Summary.
This chapter began with pointing out that there are metho­
dological limitations in estimating poverty lines, then it 
was followed by a broad estimation of the poverty line in 
Algeria both for the urban and the rural populations. 
Subsequently, estimates were made of the number of the poor 
in Algeria over two periods 1967/68 and 1979/80. This 
suggests that there was a decrease in the incidence of 
poverty in Algeria, both in urban and in rural areas, but 
the former witnessed the higher decrease. In consequence, 
poverty remained almost a rural phenomenon in general and in 
the agricultural sector in particular. In other words, the 
growth process seemed to have benefited the urban groups 
disproportionately. By the end of the period (in 1979/80), 
out of the total poor 87 per cent were found in rural areas. 
This has been the case for most LDCs, where the majority of 
the poor are to be found in rural areas. These results must 
be of particular interest to planners and to policy makers 
in formulating appropriate measures to combat poverty. 
However, before some substantive policy measures are 
suggested, it may be useful to have a look at some of the 
main determinants of poverty and income distribution in the 
Algerian economy.
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Notes to chapter 4.
1. See B.S. Rowntree in: Poverty, a Study of Town Life. 
Macmillan. London. 1908. pp 86 - 87.
2. That is, income was sufficient but it was not allocated 
in such a way to attain poverty line consumption levels.
3. See P.V. Sukhatme in: "Newer Concepts", in: Nutrition 
and their Implications for Policy, (ed) P.V. Sukhatme. 
Maharastra Association for the cultivation of Science 
Research Institute; Pune 411 004 (India) 1982.
4. See for instance, Gary S. Fields (1980), op cit..
5. Equally important is the disadvantageous situation of 
the poor within the labour market: they tend to obtain 
the least remunerative and most precarious job 
opportunities, and tend to combine low average income 
with considerable instability and insecurity of 
employment.
6. See for instance, P. Townsend: "Measures and Explana­
tions of Poverty in Higher Income Countries: The
Problems of Operationalizing the Concepts of Develop­
ment, Class and Poverty." in P. Townsend: The Concept
of Poverty. London, Heinemann, 1970; and see also: 
"Poverty as Relative Deprivation: Resources and Style of 
living" in: D. Weddenburn: Poverty, Inequality and
Class Structure. Cambridge University Press. 1974.
7. See A. Sen: "Poverty: An Ordinal approach to measu­
rement." Econometrics, vol 44 NQ 2 March 1976. pp. 219 
- 231; and see also A. K. Sen: Three Notes on the
Concept of Poverty. ILO, Geneva 1978.
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8. It is in relation to these characteristics that Sen's 
index can be seen as a more appropriate poverty index, 
owing to the fact that at any particular time, it provi­
des a measure of poverty in terms of the income needed 
to support all the population at the poverty line level. 
In other words, it enables us, not only to assess the 
progress towards the alleviation of poverty, but also 
remind us of the resources needed for its alleviation. 
For these characteristics, this index is used whenever 
it is possible.
9. See Public Expenditure on Income Maintenance Program­
mes. O.E.C.D. 1976. Paris, p. 62.
10. See Analyse Nutritionelle de l ’Enquete Nationale sur la 
Consommation et les Budgets des Manages. Algerie. 
Evaluation de la Situation Alimentaire. U.N.P.D. / FAO. 
Rome 1978.
11. When energy intake is less than the requirement, the 
body wastes less, thus using the intake with greater 
efficiency. See "Newer Concepts", in: Nutrition and 
their Implications for policy (ed) P.V. Sukhatme. op 
cit. p. 38.
12. The energy needed varies, as stated earlier according to 
age, sex, body weight and nature of activity or occu­
pation. Since, however, the observed intakes vary among 
.individuals, it is accepted that requirements can also 
vary even among apparently identical individuals 
(depending on the nature of their activity). See: the 
Fifth World Food Survey. FAO. Rome 1985. p. 98.
13. See for instance, Edholm et al: "Food Intake and Energy 
Expenditure of Army Recruits." British journal of 
Nutrition N2 24. 1970.
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14. See the Fifth World Food Survey. FAO, Rome 1985. p. 18.
15. Undernutrition, according to the Fifth World Food 
Survey, is defined as describing the extent to which 
people have dietary energy intakes below certain minimum 
requirement levels. See the Fifth World Food Survey, op 
cit. p. 18.
16. The problems involved, however, in estimating require­
ments have been recognised mainly in developing 
countries - where the necessary information are not only 
lacking but what is available, is of a doubtful 
accuracy.
17. In this respect the symmetry assumptions in the distri­
bution of requirements, that these two types of risks 
will be equal and the errors will largely cancel each 
other out, does not stand, because the distribution of 
requirements is not normally distributed.
18. See table 4.1 above.
19. This is, meanwhile, why it was argued earlier that one 
should go beyond these averages.
20. See, B.S. Rowntree in: Poverty, Study of Town Life. 
Macmillan. London 1908.
21. Or the shortfall in calorie intakes may be explained by 
the groups preference for "superior goods", such as meat 
and fruit, which are lower in calorie content but higher 
in other nutrients, particularly in terms of vitamins 
and amino-acids.
22. In fact, in regressing per capita consumption expen­
diture with calorie intake, it seems there is no corre­
lation at all between the two.
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23. See Shah C.H. , "Food Preferences and Malnutrition, a 
Perspective on Poverty in Less Developed Countries", in; 
Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics 35, (1980)1; 
and see Perisse J. and Kamoun, A: 'The Price of Society. 
A Study of Household Consumption and Budget in Tunisia", 
Food and Nutrition, 7 (2) (1981) : 3 as stated in the Fifth 
World Food Survey. FAO. Rome 1985. p. 34.
24. In this respect, it can be said that estimating the 
poverty line income on the basis of the relationship 
between income and calorie intake is not sufficient as 
well.
25. It has to be borne in mind that this may not be the case in 
other developing countries.
26. Undernutrition refers, meanwhile, to low intake itself. 
The implication of energy deficiency would appear as 
stated above in its potential effect on the physical and 
the mental development of the individual - mainly among 
and within the lower income groups.
27. Even in these groups where the average intake was above
requirement, some may, as discussed above, have intakes 
lower than the requirement.
28. Calculated from tables A4.1 and A4.2 in Apendix 4.
29. This is somehow seen from the apparent differences in
calorie intake between the rural and urban populations.
30. See Analyse Nutritionelle... U.N.D.P./FAO. op cit. p. 39.
31. It decreased to an average consumption of 200kg/person/ 
year which still can generate on its own a calorie 
supply of about 2050k calories.
32. That is, milk, eggs, fish, meat and offal, are important
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items of staple food mainly in developed countries where 
they contributed about one-third of per caput calorie 
supplies, and more than half those of proteins. See 
Forth World Food Survey. FAO. Rome. p. 20.
33. See l fEvolution de la Consommation Alimentaire en 
Afrique: Le Cas de 1 'Algdrie. op cit. p. 75.
34. Food prices were increasing faster in urban areas than 
in rural areas, while those of non-food items were 
increasing even faster in rural than in urban areas.
35. Involving a much greater reduction in their real incomes 
than for other income groups.
36. See 1 11ndice du Coftt de la Vie chez les Divers Groups 
Sociaux en Algerie. 1966 - 1976. A.A.R.D.E.S. 1977. p. 21.
37. Because those who are going to benefit from these rising 
prices are the large and the relatively large 
landowners.
38. See Analyse Nutritionelle... FAO. op cit.
39. In fact, the consumption pattern of the poor in Algeria 
is typical of many third world countries with food 
accounting for over 63 per cent of total expenditure.
40. See Analyse Nutritionelle... FAO. op cit.
41. Such a general prevailing situation is supported by the 
available information on profiles of poverty in LDCs as 
presented by Gary S. Fields in: Poverty, Inequality and 
Development. op cit.
42. In other words, only 1.7 per cent of GNP, in 1979/80 was 
needed to close the poverty gap.
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Chapter V
Determinants of the Pattern of Income Distribution 
and Poverty, and its likely trends in the 1980s.
In this chapter, an attempt is being made to determine the 
nature of forces which operated in Algeria after its inde­
pendence in shaping the nature and incidence of poverty as 
well as of income inequality. It has already been conceded 
in chapter one that such an analysis is often based upon a 
macro-model which requires large and detailed data. Not only 
the lack of adequate data impedes the use; of such 
econometric modelling, but also the methodological limita­
tions stemming from dealing with a complex issue cast doubts 
about its findings. It was decided to have a more eclectic 
approach to the understanding of such forces in Algeria, 
after a brief review of literature. Some of the forces 
having a major impact on poverty and income distribution are 
often the same in most developing countries going through 
the process of economic development and structural change. 
Yet many of these forces can be moderated by social and 
political institutions and policy mixes. Hence it is 
important to analyse the role of these forces in a 
particular country. In this respect, every country 
represents a unique case for such an issue.
The review of literature in chapter one had broadly indica­
ted that the development strategy of a country and the rela­
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ting nature and pace of growth has a very important bearing 
on poverty and income distribution. Therefore, this chapter 
starts with an examination of the official documents under­
lying the Algerian- development strategy vis & vis the 
distribution of income and the alleviation of poverty in 
order to see how they were perceived and how they were 
carried out. Such an examination would throw light on the 
forces that were the main determinants of the current nature 
and magnitude of poverty and income inequality but also 
provide insights for future policy making.
5.1- The distribution of income, alleviation of
poverty and the Algerian development strategy
The planning in independent Algeria started with the 
explicit aim of creating an equitable and just society with 
a minimum of poverty and deprivation. In fact, the search 
for a 'just society' comes as a reaction to impoverishment 
of the people during the colonisation period. That concern 
was born during the long struggle for independence through 
which a permanent contact was created between the leadership 
and the masses. Such a struggle has had its effects on the 
overall ideological foundation spelled out in the Algerian 
official documents. In a word, the Algerian struggle for 
independence helped to account for much of the attention 
paid to equity with the view that the French exploited 
Algeria, impoverished its people and created inequality. 
Under the heading of the realisation of the social aspira­
tion of the masses, the Tripoli programme saw the progres-
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sive improvement in the living conditions of the masses and 
the eradication of unemployment as the main vehicle for 
stimulating the creative urge of the people and attaining 
rapid progress.1 However, the Tripoli programme did not have 
a clear idea of how to translate this into reality. The 
Algiers charter which came later, was more explicit than the 
Tripoli programme. It stressed the need and the urgency for 
bringing about a more equal income distribution:
"the party cannot accept, without cutting itself off 
from the masses, the disparity of incomes... The success 
of this struggle is linked with the elimination of the 
privileged strata from the front of the stage and, 
instead, the exercise of political responsibility and 
control by the toiling masses themselves."2
Thus the Algiers charter felt the need for some form of 
people's participation in the development process and the 
elimination of the privileged strata of the Algerian 
society. It aimed at:
"the suppression of economic exploitation, the 
expropriation of dominant foreign capital, the agra­
rian revolution, the socialisation of the means of ' 
production, will all allow us to end economic anarchy 
and make it possible to plan effectively and harmo­
niously in the real interests of the community."3
The national charter in 197 6, in its turn, also emphasised 
the aim of benefitting the whole population from the fruits 
of development, and establishing a better income distri­
bution.4 The same line of thought is found in the develop­
ment plan documents. For instance, it was stressed in the 
general report of the first four year plan (1970-73) that:
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"The economic policy, in particular, would take care 
of the equitable distribution of income, to guarantee 
the poorest strata of the population an improved 
condition of living, allowing both, to increase their 
level of living, and to decrease the gap that 
separates them with those who have the chance to 
benefit from the most favorable economic conditions."5
The five year plan (1980 - 1984) was much more explicit in 
emphasising the concern about the satisfaction of social 
needs of the population and about closing the gap between 
social strata.
"The whole of [the plan] axes are geared to the 
adequate satisfaction of social needs by the 1990's... 
this means, in social terms, the adjustment of develop­
ment actions and their concentration on priority social 
requirement, a continuous control of growing inflation, 
shortages of goods and the widening- gap between social 
strata"6 (emphasis added).
By now it was becoming clear that things had not gone the 
way visualised by the earlier plans and, it was conceded 
that the gap between social classes was growing wider, 
although no statistical evidence was provided to support 
that statement. However, the recognition that something had 
gone wrong with plan priorities and implementation can be 
taken as a major step forward in official thinking. The 1980 
- 84 plan was said to come to offset this trend of "the 
widening gap between social strata". Yet again whether this 
concern did materialise or not will be examined later in 
this chapter. Nevertheless, as the Algerian government has 
been the main investor and the leading agent in development, 
any government decision to use a particular policy affects 
the pattern of income distribution and poverty. In this
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regard,, examining some variables and government policies 
would throw light not only on the most important factors 
responsible for the existing pattern of income distribution 
and poverty, but also lead to an identification of the most 
effective policies for restructuring such a pattern. Of 
these policies, sectoral resource allocation, land reform, 
employment, wages, food subsidies, taxation, health and edu­
cation have had the greatest effects on income distribution 
and poverty.
5.2- Sectoral Resource Allocation.
We have seen in chapter two that the bulk of national 
investment was devoted to heavy industries of a capital 
intensive nature. Such an investment was not only limited in 
generating employment opportunities but also required mainly 
skilled labour which had been in short supply. So the 
strategy had not seriously taken into account the problem of 
employment absorption in a country with a high surplus of 
labour. It has to be borne in mind that the alleviation and 
eradication of the surplus labour condition is a sine qua 
non for the generation of a sustainable improvement in the 
distribution of income and in the alleviation of poverty. In 
this respect, it was emphasised that "the only sure method 
of achieving a sustained improvement in equity lies in... the 
end of labour'surplus condition."7 In view of the limited 
employment creation, one would expect the Algerian develop­
ment strategy to worsen the distribution of income within 
and between the different sectors of the economy. However,
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this did not happen during the 1967 - 1980 period. So one 
might ask why? The answer to such a question is dealt with 
in the discussion of the employment policy below.
However, one of the detrimental effects of such sectoral 
resource allocation was the insufficiency of resources 
allocated to some sectors, affecting the growth of these 
sectors. For instance, agriculture which received only 11 
per cent of total public investments, was stagnating both in 
terms of production and of employment. Such a stagnation, 
with a rapid increase in population, was responsible for the 
increase in income inequality in the rural areas, (as seen 
in chapter 3). Moreover, such an increase in income inequa­
lity occurred despite the implementation of a land reform 
programme - the so-called "Agrarian Revolution", which is 
worth examining as far as income distribution and poverty in 
rural areas are concerned.
5.3- Land Reform Policy.
In spite of the high hopes of the land reform programme, 
both the conceptualisation and implementation fell far short 
of expectations. For instance, according to the 'Agrarian 
Revolution1 regulation, a private landowner was allowed to 
possess as much land as that which will yield him and his 
family (with two dependent children or more) a yearly net 
income up to an amount of AD13,500. Such an amount could be 
earned from a farm unit of an average size of about 45 
hectares. Such an amount was set up on the basis that 10
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hectares yield at least a yearly income of AD3,000 which is 
the minimum income set up by the agrarian revolution 
ordinance. Furthermore, the private landowner was allowed to 
have as much income from non-farm income, i.e. an additional 
income of AD13,500 per year. Therefore, on the whole, the 
private farm family income was allowed to reach the amount 
of AD27,000 per year, which is 6,5 times the household 
income in mixed farming (AD4,160) of the agrarian revolution 
sector, or more than 5 times the average household income of 
the "Agrarian Revolution" sector (AD5,380); (see tables 3.19 
and 3.20 in chapter 3 pp. 150 - 151).
This shows clearly that from the very outset, the conti­
nuance of substantial income disparities is permitted by the 
'agrarian revolution1 regulations. Moreover, this can be 
taken only as the theoretical permitted income disparities. 
In practice, the apparent income disparities were even 
larger, as the private landowners' income (of the top 
decile) averages AD56,539 (see table 3.22), i.e. 13.6 times 
that of the mixed farming, or more than 10.5 times that of 
the average agrarian revolution sector.
Meanwhile, during the implementation of the agrarian reform, 
private proprietors, mainly the large ones, who knew expro­
priation was to happen, either took advantage of the system 
of non divided family land to register lands in the names of 
their extended family members and relatives, and/or made 
donations to the 'agrarian revolution' fund, often with the 
less fertile land, as they were allowed to choose which land 
to give away. In so doing, large land owners were able to
221
preserve their land and escape the agrarian revolution land 
expropriation and/or to keep the best land for themselves.
By 1911, however, only a total of 450,000 to 500,000 
hectares had been expropriated from 21,826 private land­
owners. The bulk of these landowners, i.e. 15,271 were 
absentee, with an average expropriated land size not 
exceeding 10 hectares. Only 5,205 farmers were large land­
owners who on average lost about 60 hectares through expro­
priation. These large landowners, meanwhile, represented 
only 38 per cent of the total number of large landowners 
with a farm size of more than 50 hectares, (see table 3.21 
in chapter 3. p. 152). Therefore, the majority of large 
landowners, i.e. 62 per cent of them, escaped expropriation 
in one way or another. This was also the case for the 
absentee landowners.
Moreover, the agrarian reform had by-passed in large measure 
the scattered subsistence farmers who form the bulk of the 
private landowners; i.e. 57% of all landowners still have on 
average an operational farm size of about 2 hectares, and 
account for only 16 per cent of total private arable land. 
In fact, 30 per cent of total operational landowners have on 
average a farm size of less than one hectare, i.e. about 0.8 
hectares on average; representing a total area just slightly 
over 3 per cent of total private operational land. Without 
non-farm income, these petty peasants would have been in 
poverty.8 In contrast, the upper decile of landowners had on 
average a farm size of more than 35 hectares, and controlled 
more than 48 per cent of total private operational land;
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implying land differentials of the order of 1 to 44, (see 
table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Distribution of Private Operational Holdings in 1977.
Average farm size in ha Landowners in % Land area in %
0.8 30 3.3
3.5 27 12.9
5.5 18 13.4
10. o' 11 14.9
13.6 4 7.4
35.3 10 48.1
7.34 100 100.0
Gini coefficient 0.58
Source: constructed from table 3.22 above, p. 153, which was compiled 
from: Disparity des Revenus et Pouvoir d ’Achat en Alg&rie, I.N.E.A.P. 
op. cit.; and from: A. Bouzidi "Ou en est 1 'Agriculture Algeri^nne", 
op cit. p. 41.
With such a situation of land distribution, the 'agrarian 
revolution' policy has not been able to address effectively 
the unequal distribution of land. It had no major effects 
upon the concentration of private land ownership. The Gini 
coefficient of land concentration decreased from 0.62 in 
1973, (see table 3.21, chapter 3 p. 152) to 0.58 in 1977; 
(i.e. a mere decrease of 6%).9 Land reform in Taiwan, for 
instance, generated a larger reduction in land concentration 
ownership; the Gini coefficient of land concentration fell 
from 0.62 in 1952 to 0.46 in I960;10 (i.e. a decrease of 26%).
However, land, i n e q u a l i t y  in Algeria is one of the 
underlying causes of income inequality, mainly in the
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agricultural sector. To show how such a distribution of land 
ownership generated such an income inequality, a regression 
of the logarithms of income from operational land against 
the logarithms of the operational land by farm size is 
carried out, using the observations from table 3.22. The 
fitted equation is as follows:
Log Y = 2, 927 + 1, 171 Log X , where (Y) represents income 
from operational land, (X) is the size of operational land; 
(r) coefficient of correlation = 0.998; R.S.D (residual 
standard deviation) =0.026.
The above equation shows that the income elasticity with 
respect to the size of operational land is greater than 
unity, which means that as the average area of land owned 
increases, income from this land rises more than 
proportionally. This may be so, because of higher income per 
unit of land, which also resulted from the use of other 
productive inputs. The relatively high value of (r) which, 
is statistically highly significant at the 1 per cent 
confidence level, indicates that variations in the size of 
operational land could explain 99.8 per cent of the total 
variation of incomes from assets owned.
Generally speaking, the unequal distribution of operational 
land is accompanied by an unequal access to research infor­
mation, purchased inputs, unequal use of socially scarce 
resources such as capital and market facilities, machinery, 
and so on.11 It is invariably the case that inequality in 
the ownership of land is also accompanied by inequalities in
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other means of production among private cultivators. Table 
5.2 shows, for instance, that 53 per cent of landowners hold
Table 5.2: Distribution of Tractors in the Private Agricultural Sector.
Average farm size in ha landowners in % owned tractors in %
less than 5 53 6
5 - 2 0 35 28
over 20 12 66
Gini coefficient 0.67*
100 100
*) Calculated by the author.
Source: constructed from: A. Benachenhou, in: L'exode rural en
Algerie. En. Ap. Algiers, February 1979.
6 per cent of total tractors, while the upper 12 per cent 
of total landowners hold 66 per cent of total tractors. 
This may suggest a Gini coefficient of 0.67. It is also 
believed that large landowners tend to benefit more from 
investment and incentives provided by government than 
smaller cultivators. The large landowners are better placed, 
both by virtue of their superior command over resources and 
their political power, to adopt improved techniques, and 
they get a disproportionately large share of the benefits of 
public investment and supporting services (credits, market 
facilities and so on). For instance the import price of a 
tractor was AD65,000 but sold to the farmer at AD28,000 i.e. 
at less than its half imported price. The difference is also 
large for other equipment and inputs: half the cost of
production for fertilizer, and one-third less for petrol.12
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In a-similar fashion, the banking system encourages large 
private landowners, i.e. inequalities among farms are by no 
means redressed through the allocation of credit, on the 
contrary, they are reinforced. Farms which are better 
endowed to start with, and can demonstrate to the national 
bank either a history or a promise of profitability, have a 
better chance to receive credits and thus to improve their 
capital endowments further, and to become more profitable. 
The bank rate for lending, controlled by the government, was 
6 per cent whereas the private money lenders were charging 
over 15 per cent; (this latter was mainly related to borro­
wing for consumption purposes). Therefore, the emphasis on 
profitability as a criterion of credit worthiness contri­
buted further to inequality in the agricultural sector. All 
these are likely to increase the income of the landowners 
who are capable of effecting and undergoing transformation 
from traditional crops to the more profitable products like 
fruit and vegetables. It is more likely that it is mainly 
the larger landowners who underwent such a transformation as 
a response to the rapid increase in the relative price of 
these types of crops, as shown in chapter 4. It is also 
believed that such a transformation is the case in most 
countries. This, for instance, was the case in the colonial 
Algerian agriculture, where it was mainly the colon who 
were involved in cash-crops cultivation. It goes without 
saying that such a transformation would increase the income 
gap between large and small landowners.13 Although, no data 
are available on the types of crops grown on different sizes 
of holdings, nonetheless one can convey an impression of
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such changes from the overall data concerning the increase 
in the cultivated area of some vegetables and fruit, while 
the total arable land remained much the same. For instance, 
the cultivated area in dry vegetables (for example, beans 
and lentils) increased from 63,000 hectares in 1966/67 to 
157,000 hectares in 1983 - 85. The area for market gardening 
increased from 83,000 hectares in 1966/67 to 249,000 
hectares in 1984/85.14
Meanwhile, the household income in the private agricultural 
sector, as stated in chapter 3, is a combination of income 
from farm land (assets) and income from wages. In fact, on 
average, a relatively high proportion (43%) of total house­
hold income comes from wages. Furthermore, over half (57%) 
of total households of the private agricultural sector 
derive 82 per cent of their total income from non-farm 
income. They operate a very small size of land averaging 2 
hectares, providing only 18 per cent of their total 
household income. Thus, the wage income for these household 
groups is an important component of their income and subsis­
tence. Owing to their meagre income from land, their 
position is, to some extent, similar to that of landless 
wage labourers, selling their labour power in order to 
subsist. The overall effect of non-farm earnings has been to 
reduce the aggregate inequality resulting from farm income. 
The Gini coefficient for farm income was 0.63 compared to
0.32 with the addition of non-farm income. The failure to 
secure such a source of income, particularly for the small 
landowners, would have serious consequences not only on the
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distribution of income but also on the incidence of poverty 
as well. Admittedly, asset redistribution would have consi­
derably improved the distribution of income in Algeria by 
providing a sustainable income and a secured source of 
income. Since the implementation of land reform programme 
did not make a material difference for the rural poor, wage 
income has continued to remain important both for the inci­
dence of poverty and for income inequality.
In a limited sense, the ’agrarian1 programme did augment 
wage employment for the rural poor. The agrarian programme 
offered employment to about 100,000 people, most of them 
were already working in agriculture or elsewhere. The people 
who were supposed to be the main beneficiaries (the un­
employed and the sharecropper) were less affected. In fact, 
according to a socio-economic study on the beneficiaries of 
the 'Agrarian Revolution1, the distribution of the benefi­
ciaries by their previous occupations shows clearly the low 
percentage of those who should have been targeted by the 
programme; (i.e. the sharecropper and the unemployed). This 
group of people formed only 6.1% of all beneficiaries, while 
'other activities' category which comprises non-agricultural 
occupations such as government functionaries, commercial and 
services workers formed somewhat a higher proportion of more 
than 8%; (see table 5.3).
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Table 5.3: Distribution of beneficiaries by their previous occupations.
Type of occupation beneficiaries in %
Renters of land 26.5
Permanent wage workers 26.1
small peasants 17.2
temporary wage workers 15.8
Other activities 8.2
unemployed 5.1
Share croppers 1.1
total* 100.0
*) The total, meanwhile, may not be 100 because of the rounding. 
Source: Etude Socio-Economique sur les Attrlbutaire de la Premiere 
Phase de la Revolution Agraire. A.A.R.D.E.S. Algiers, 1975.
It may also be noted that a substantial proportion of the 
rural poor comprises seasonal workers in agriculture and in 
non-agricultural activities - own account and worker in the 
informal sector. For most of these poor, it is the lack of 
permanent employment opportunities and the unequal distri­
bution of assets which are the primary cause of their 
poverty. The situation can only be effectively viewed as 
part of a 'total system' which still generates and repro­
duces such a situation for some of the population.15
In fact, the involvement of the peasants was ruled out 
throughout the process of the agrarian reform programme. The 
'Agrarian Revolution' became bureaucratised, as it was the 
local government officials and executives who were charged 
to carry its implementation, and execution was the sole role 
assigned to peasants. As one economist commented, Algeria 
launched a peasant revolution in the absence of peasants.
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Such a lack of effective participation on the part of the 
concerned people (the peasants) depicts their absence from 
an effective mass participation in the political process 
that safeguard their interests. These may explain, partly 
why some of the policies which were introduced with the 
explicit or implicit objectives of generating a more 
equitable distribution of income have not achieved their 
objectives for which they were primarily introduced. The 
"Agrarian Revolution" policy is a case in point.
All in all, it can be concluded that both in terms.of the 
distribution of land and employment, the 'Agrarian Revolu­
tion’ has neither substantially affected the structure of 
land-ownership, nor created employment opportunities for the 
targeted groups (mainly the unemployed and the share­
cropper) . As a consequence, it had only a marginal impact on 
the rural poor. It had also no major effects on agricultural 
production; stagnation has rather been the main feature, as 
mentioned in chapter 2. As such, the ’Agrarian Revolution', 
using Keith Sutton's words, "was revolutionary in name 
only".16 In fact, since the fundamental forces at work, 
(i.e. concentration of land and lack of employment opportu­
nities), are still prevailing, income inequality and poverty 
are still present. It is more likely that further impove­
rishment and marginalisation of some strata of the popula­
tion will continue. Therefore, it may possibly be argued 
that rural poverty and income inequality, which to some 
extent stem from structural factors, cannot be influenced by 
policy intervention alone without altering the prevailing
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structure of land ownership. There is some scope for redis­
tributing assets (mainly land) in the Algerian agricultural 
sector, as portrayed by the concentration of land ownership.
Of course, the question of whether such a redistribution is 
politically feasible or not, is always there for any 
country. It is usually not easy to curb the entrenched power 
of the rural elite and their allies in government. The 
problem of poverty and its consequences needs radical 
solutions relating not only to the redistribution of land- 
ownership, but also to socio-political changes in power 
structure. As Kay rightly put it, "that land reform has to 
be analysed in the context of the class struggle for 
power."17 When such a struggle for power is not pressed for 
from below, it is only the political will and determination 
from the part of the government that will make such a redis­
tribution feasible, mainly if ther is genuine concern to 
improve the lot of the poor really matters.18
5.4- Employment Policies:
We have seen earlier that employment, as a source of income, 
is very important even for the small landowners to subsist. 
In view of this, employment policy in the Algerian economy 
constitutes one of the main factors in determining the 
distribution of income and alleviation of poverty.
However, as wage income is related to employment, the exami­
nation of its importance in household income, and its 
distribution among wage earners enable us to see how the
231
rapid increase in employment as well as the policy of 
narrowing the gap between wage rates of different occupa­
tions did generate a more equal distribution of income and a 
reduction of poverty.
5.4.1- Trend and Structure of Household Incomes.
Examining the structure of household incomes between 1968 
and 197 9, it appears that the main source of household 
incomes was wages and salaries. Such a source of household 
income had seen its share in total household income increa­
sing from 59.4 per cent .in- 1968 to a far greater proportion 
of 68.4 per cent in 197 9; i.e. an increase of over 15 per 
cent during 1968 - 1979 period. Income from property, which 
constituted the second largest source of household income, 
remained almost unchanged,19 whereas other sources, i.e. 
family benefits, public and private transfers had seen their 
share decreasing significantly from 16.8 per cent to 7.1 per 
cent, during the same period; (see table 5.4) .
Table 5.4: Structure of household income 1968 - 1979 (in %).
Source of household income 1968 1979 Changes in %
Wage and salaries 59.4 68.4 + 15.2
Property income 23.8 24.5 + 2.9
Family benefits 7.1 4.5 - 36.6
Pension 4.1 0.1 - 97.6
Money orders 2.6
2.5 - 55.4
Other incomes 3.0
Total 100.0 100.0 —
Source: Disparity des Revenus et Pouvoir d ’Achat en Alg6rie, 1968 - 
1979. (I.N.E.A.P), Algiers. February 1981. p. 101.
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Therefore, examining how this main source of household 
income (wages and salaries) was distributed among different 
socio-economic groups of wage earners may shed light on the 
main determinants conditioning the improvement of income 
distribution in the Algerian economy during 1968 - 197 9 
period. It would also throw light on how wage policies were 
used as a means of improving the distribution of income. 
Such findings can be explored through the distribution of 
wage income.
5.4.2.- DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE INCOME.
The investigation of wage income disparities between wage 
earners, which is an important element in explaining the 
trend in the overall income inequalities, can be better 
examined through the trend in the 'vertical1 and 
'horizontal' wage income20 disparities between occupations. 
’Vertical' wage disparities are meant to explore wage diffe­
rentials among various categories of occupations. 'Hori­
zontal' wage disparities are meant to explore wage differen­
tials within categories of occupations among different 
enterprises, i.e. differentials for similar occupational or 
grade categories. It should be borne in mind that the wage 
data considered here have been drawn from the larger scale 
of organised sectors. Information is not available regarding, 
wages and earnings in the so-called urban informal sector. The 
analysis explores the hypothesis that it is the policy of 
providing more jobs with more uniform wage rate across 
occupations, which has been mainly responsible for the 
improvement in the overall distribution of income. In this
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respect, it is interesting to see whether or not the 
apparent overall decrease in income inequalities, brought 
about by the increase in employment opportunities, was, in 
fact, enhanced by a more equal distribution of wage income 
among wage earners.
5.4.2.1- TRENDS IN VERTICAL WAGE DISPARITIES.
The wage data are presented in the form of averages of six 
different occupational categories. These indicate that the
gap between the higher remuneration grades and the lower
/■
grades decreased significantly between 1969 and 1980. The 
skilled21/unskilled ratio in non-agricultural activities 
decreased from 3.5 in 1969 to 2.6 in 1980. In fact, the 
decrease in the vertical wage disparities is manifested in 
the decreasing dispersion between wage grades1 remuneration 
which can be clearly seen from, (in an ascending order from 
the top of the scale), the differences in their average 
annual rates of growth.22 In other words, the lower the wage 
is the higher is the average annual rate of its growth, 
enabling then the gap between wage grades to narrow between 
1969 and 1980; (see table 5.5).
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Table 5.5: Evolution of monthly wages of different occupations (in 
Algerian Dinars)
Occupation /or grade 1969 1980 Annual growth rate
1- unskilled workers 498 1,184 8.2
2- personal help 614 1,347 8.2
3- qualified workers 783 1,543 6.4
4- Floor head&technical agents 935 1,800 6.2
5- Technician & middle executive 1,238 2,336 5.9
6- Top Executive & high technicians 1,765 3,061 5.1
Average 787 1,590 6.6
Source: Constructed from: A nnuaires Statistlques de 1 ’AlgSrie, 1977 - 
1981. M.P.A.T. Algiers.
Furthermore, the narrowing gap between wage grades can be 
seen as well in the evolution of wage rate (wage per hour) 
of different occupations. For instance, while it increased 
from AD3.51 in 1969 to AD9.30 in 1981 (increasing by 165%) 
for executives, it increased from ADI.82 to AD5.8 0 (increa­
sing by 219%) for unskilled workers during the same 
period.23 Meanwhile, this decrease in vertical wage dispa­
rities wholly occurred in the public sector, whereas in the 
private sector, vertical wage disparities have increased 
during 1970-1980 period; (table 5.6).
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Table 5.6: Sectoral evolution of monthly wages in AD.
Occupations
or
Grades*
public sector private sector
1970 1980 growth rate 1970 1980 growth rate
1-unskilled 501 1,206 9.2 598 1,117 6.4
2- personal help 582 1,374 9.0 825 1,267 4.4
3- qualified 785 1,552 7.1 1,093 1,515 3.3
4- floor head &T. Agent n.a n.a n.a n.a n . a n.a
5-TechniQ & M. Execut 1,104 2,214 7.2 1,462 2,702 6.3
6-Top Execut. & H.Tech 1,871 2,770 4.0 2,064 3,935 6.7
Average 788 1, 650 7.7 1,131 1, 404 2.2
* Occupations and grades are as stated in table 3.47.
Source: For 1970: S.E.P., Direction des Statistiques. La Situation de 
l ’Emploi et des Salaires, D6cembre 1970. pp. 34-35. For 1980, 
Annuaire Statistique de I'AlgSrie 1981. M.P.A.T. p. 351.
The net overall decrease in vertical wage disparities, 
nonetheless, has been brought about by the public sector as 
a result of two principal factors:
1- The proportion of the public sector in total wage earners 
increased from 66% in 197024 to 75 per cent in 1980.25
2- The decrease in vertical wage disparities in the public 
sector, as measured by the skilled/unskilled ratio, was 
substantial. It decreased from 3.7 in 1970 to 2.3 in 1980,
i.e. decreasing by about 38 per cent during the whole 
period. This was much higher than the slight increase in 
private sector vertical wage disparities, which moved from 
3.4 in 1970 to 3.5 in 1980;26 i.e. increasing by less than 3 
per cent during the whole period. In other words, the 
decrease in vertical wage disparities that occurred in the
236
public sector was more than enough to compensate for the 
adverse effect occurring in the private sector.
5.4.2.2- TRENDS IN HORIZONTAL WAGE DISPARITIES
The trends in wage disparities in the remuneration of same 
category of job among different non-agricultural activities 
- i.e. horizontal wage disparities - are clearly seen from 
tables A5.1 and A5.4 in Appendix 5. These tables show that 
the substantial gap in horizontal wage disparities noticed 
in 1970 decreased significantly in 1980. The ratio between 
the higher remuneration and the lower one for the same 
occupation (grade) in different industries decreased from an 
average of 2.4 in 1970 to 1.3 in 1980 .27 This decrease 
which, was noticed in both the public and the private 
sector, was higher in the former than in the latter; see 
tables A5.2, A5.3, A5.5, and A5.6 in Appendix 5.
By and large, despite the apparent decrease, there are still 
substantial horizontal wage disparities, as they were seen 
in 1980, mainly within high occupation categories whether in 
the public or in the private sector. In the public sector, 
remuneration for the same.occupation varies considerably 
from one enterprise to another, mainly between productive 
industries such as hydrocarbons, chemical, and steel indus­
tries on the one hand, administration, and financial insti­
tutions such as banks and insurance, on the other hand. 
Higher remuneration is found in the former while the lower 
remuneration is found in the latter. For instance, an 
executive employee in banks and insurance earns only about
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57 per cent of what he would have earned in petroleum 
construction enterprise, (see table A5.5 in Appendix 5.). In 
the private sector, higher remuneration is found in 
commerce, divers industries, building & public construction, 
and steel industry, while the lower remuneration is in 
services, and in leather and shoe industries.28
In fact, the presence of such disparities implies a high 
movement of workers between industrial activities and 
services. For instance, in steel industry, labour turnover 
was estimated to have been 25%; i.e. a complete renewal of 
personnel every 4 years..29 Such a movement of workers had 
certainly, as mentioned above, some negative effects on the 
efficiency of the economy.30 This, in fact, can be said to 
be due to the absence of a national wage policy, and to a 
labour market characterised by scarce skilled labour, engen­
dering high turnover with its likely negative effects.
All in all, it can be concluded that the apparent signi­
ficant decrease in vertical and horizontal wage disparities 
between 1970 and 1980 contributed, to some extent, to the 
observed decline in income inequalities during the same 
period. In other words, the improvement in income distribu­
tion was not only associated with the increasing share of 
wage income in households income, but it has also been 
enhanced by the fact that this wage income has become more 
equally shared among its earners, as reflected by the 
declining gap in the vertical and horizontal wage dispa­
rities. This means that between 1970 and 1980 wage rates
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became relatively more uniform across all occupations. Then, 
it seems sound from this analysis to conclude that a deve­
lopment strategy enhancing employment, leading to the resul­
tant increase in labour’s income share and rendering it more 
equally distributed,31 would potentially be more effective 
in making personal income distribution more equitable.32 
This trend, meanwhile, was also noticed in other coun­
tries.33 For instance, in Egypt when the share of wages 
(mainly through the increase of wage employment) increased 
steadily in GDP from 44.8 per cent in 1959/60.to 49.6 per 
cent in 1970/71 - 1974, the distribution of household 
consumption improved from a Gini coefficient of 0.42 in 
1958/59 to 0.38 in 1974/75.34
5.5- Tax Policy.
Generally the use of tax is influenced by considerations 
both of economic growth (as a source of income) , and of 
equity (as a means to reduce the disparities in the 
distribution of income). From the evolution of the Algerian 
tax structure between 1969 and 1980, one can clearly notice 
the increasing importance of petroleum taxes of which the 
share in total tax revenues increased from 28 per cent in 
1969 to 65 per cent in 1980. This necessarily meant a 
decreasing share of other sources of taxes - turn-over and 
capital taxes, custom duties, tax on consumption, tax on 
wages, and other miscellaneous taxes; (see table 5.7).
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Table 5.7: Structure of fiscal revenues 1969 - 1980, in %.
1969 1980 annual changes 1969 - 1980
Direct taxes 19.6 8.3 - 8.1
of which wages (6.0) (4.5) - 2.6
Petroleum 27.9 64.9 + 8.0
I.R.V.M. 0.3 - -
Turn-over/Capital 24.5 14.6 - 4.8
Consumption 17.6 7.1 - 8 . 6
Customs duties 10.1 5.1 - 6.4
Total 100.0 100.0 -
Source: Constructed from Statistiques, Revue of O.N.S. N Q 15 April - 
June 1987, Algiers, p. 58.
With the limited availability of data, the examination of 
how taxation affects various income classes cannot be 
depicted. An approximate idea can be sought in the trend of 
taxes on wages, turn-over and capital, and consumption. Such 
a trend shows that the share of taxes on wages - 
representing labour income - decreased less rapidly than the 
one of taxes on turn-over and capital - representing 
property income. The respective annual rate of decrease was
2.6 and 4.8 per cent. Such discrepancies in the rates of the 
decrease can be partly explained on one hand by the increa­
sing importance of wage income in household income, and on 
the other hand by the relative stagnation in the share of 
capital income in total household income. However, it is 
also believed that the difference was also due to tax 
evasion and avoidance mainly from the part of personal 
businesses, commercial and non-commercial professions, and 
property owners. In fact, it has been reported that fraud
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and tax evasion have become acute in Algeria.35 This may 
virtually be the case because evasion and avoidance of tax 
in respect of capital is well known, whereas such evasion 
and avoidance cannot be the case for wages because taxes are 
deducted at source. This may suggest that tax incidence 
moved relatively toward wages vis cl vis taxes on turn-over 
and capital. In a word, the disproportionate direct tax is 
borne mainly by wage earners, as taxes are deducted at 
source.
Concerning taxes on consumption - as indirect taxes - their 
share decreased even more rapidly than those of wages, and 
turn-over and capital, (table 5.7). Data on which goods 
these taxes are levied are not available, which do not 
permit to see the incidence of these type of taxes on 
different income brackets. In view of this, one may just 
accept the general vipw that indirect taxes are regressive, 
tending to be more on the lower income strata of the 
population than the other strata.
However, although taxes on wages are progressive, the 
avoidance and evasion on the part of property earners, and 
the regressivity of indirect taxes may compensate for that 
of wage tax. This is mainly why the distribution of income 
before and after taxes is believed to be approximately the 
same in most developing countries. For instance, in 
Colombia, Berry and Urritia36 found that the Gini 
coefficient of concentration decreases only from 0.58 to 
0.57 when we pass from pre-tax to post-tax income.37 In
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fact, with the lack of efficient administrative institutions 
and the deficiencies in developing countries, "it is diffi­
cult to bring about a major shift in tax burden on income 
distribution. The primary emphasis in any such effort must 
lie on the expenditure side of budget policy and on the 
overall strategy of development planning.1,38 Therefore, it 
is important to examine the impact of public expenditures, 
such as food subsidies, education, and health on the 
distribution of income and poverty.
5.6- Food Subsidies.
The improvement in poverty alleviation during 1968 - 1980 
period was also induced by the policy of subsidising the 
prices of some necessary goods of large consumption such as 
cereals, semolina, sugar, oil cooking, milk, coffee and dry 
vegetables. The amount of such subsidies increased form 
AD280 million in 1969 to AD3,800 million in 1982 (in current 
prices). In constant prices (after noticing a decrease in 
1976-80),39 they increased from AD832 million to AD2990 
million; (see table 5.8) .
Table 5.8: Food Subsidies in millions of dinars, 1969 - 1982.
Year 1969 1974 1976 1980 1981 1982
Current prices 
Constant prices*
280 2,301 
832 5,096
2,188
3,789
1, 920 
1, 920
2,280 
1, 927
3, 800 
2, 990
*) In 1980 prices, as deflated by food consumer price index (Revue 
Statistique, O.N.S., N° 15 April/June 1987, p. 15.
Source: Constructed from Journal Officiel de la R6publique Algdrienne 
D6mocratique et Populaire, of different years.
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In 1979/80, the benefits received from the subsidised 
cereals, semolina and its by-products, as a share of total 
food expenditure was 37.5 per cent for the lowest decile 
group and 12.6 per cent for the upper decile group.40 
However, in absolute terms, the proportion of such subsidies 
accounted only 6.7 per cent for the lowest decile group, 
while it accounted for 14.1 per cent for the upper decile 
group. On per capita basis, this means that while the lowest 
decile group received a subsidy of ADI, the upper decile 
group received AD2.10.41 These findings, however, are 
similar to what has happened in other developing countries. 
For instance, in Colombia, Urritia Montoya and Sandoval 
found that the effective benefit as a share of income was
57.6 per cent for the lowest income class families while it 
was 4.5 per cent for the highest income class. In reality, 
however, the rich group of families on average was estimated 
to receive col$910 in benefits, while the poor group 
received only col$302.42 In this case, it can be said that 
such subsidies contribute to the alleviation poverty as they 
have allowed the lower income groups to get access to such 
food items which form a major share in their food basket, 
and which constitute a large share in their total consump­
tion expenditures. However, such benefits from subsidies are 
not believed to have contributed to the generation of a more 
equal distribution of income. For the latter aim, the subsi­
dies have to be targeted to the poor rather than dispersed 
across the entire population. Meanwhile, targeting food 
subsidies is costly and often administratively difficult to 
run.
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5.7- Education and Health.
It must be admitted as well that significant progress was 
made in terms of social indicators such as education and 
health. The main feature of Algerian education is its rapid 
extension to a greater number of people since 1962. Adult 
literacy rate increased from 10 per cent in 1960 to 35 per 
cent in 1980. Enrolment at every educational level has been 
increasing at a faster rate than has the growth of 
population; (see table 5.9) .
Table 5.9: Evolution of public education 1962/63 - 1986/87, (in 1,000).
1962/63 1979/80 1986/87 Annual rate of growth 
1962/63 - 1986/87
Primary 778 3,061 3, 635 6.6
Secondary* 50.3 849.2 1,975 16.5
Higher# 2.8 53.8 143.3 17.8
*) Including mid-elementary.
#) Only within Algeria.
Source: Constructed from Statistiques, Revue of O.N.S. N s 15, April - 
June 1987, op cit. p. £0.
The percentage of age group (6 - 13) enrolled in education 
increased for primary education from 45.4 per cent in 
1965/66 to 77.3 per cent in 1980, and to 83.4 per cent in 
198 6/87.43 The number of people enrolled in secondary school 
as percentage of age group increased from 7 per cent in 1965 
to 33 per cent in 1980, and to 51 per cent in 1985. The 
percentage of age group 20-24 enrolled in higher education 
increased from one per cent in 1965 to 5 per cent in 197 9,
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and to 6 per cent in 1985.44 Although there is no published 
data concerning the evolution of education by socio-economic 
groups, it is believed that the expansion of education has 
also touched the groups at the lower end of the distribution 
of income. This might be the case owing to the fact that 
many children of the poor were receiving free meals in 
primary schools, full board in secondary schools, and 
scholarship - financed higher education accompanied with 
subsidies at the campus (meals, transport, and accommo­
dation) . Covering such costs and subsidising others may have 
encouraged the children of the lower income groups to remain 
at educational institutions and have access later on to the 
better-paid jobs. As pointed out, if the supply of educated
labour could be increased at the expense of uneducated
45labour, income inequalities would be reduced* This suggests 
that the spread of education is an important factor in 
reducing inequality in the personal distribution of income, 
because concentration patterns of human skills are as 
important a source of income inequality as the concentration 
of physical assets.
Moreover, education enhances the ability of the poor to 
perceive their own interests and to pursue them more 
effectively. The success of land reform, for instance, in 
Taiwan, Japan and Korea was associated with a peasantry 
possessed of a relatively high level of education.46 In 
fact, the pertinent role of population quality in the whole 
development process has been stressed by many economists. 
For instance T. Schultz pointed out that "while agricultural 
development is of paramount importance, the decisive factors
245
of production in improving the welfare of the poor people 
are not space, energy and crop land; the decisive factor is 
the improvement in population quality."47
However, it must be admitted that the improvement in 
education in Algeria was accompanied by a reduction in wage 
differentials (as noted earlier), mainly as a result of 
government wage policies favoring the lower paid grades. 
With such a policy, it can be -argued that education was an 
equalising factor, as portrayed by the decline in income 
differentials among levels of education - (represented by 
the different grades in table 5.5). The wage gap between no 
or low education (grade 1) and higher education (grade 6) 
decreased from a ratio of 1 : 3.5 in 1969 to 1 : 2.6 in
1980; (table 5.5) . The decrease was even larger in the 
public sector, decreasing from a ratio of 1 : 3.7 in 1970 to 
1 : 2.3 in 1980, (see table 5.6). This was contrary to what 
happened in some developing countries. For instance, in 
Brazil ' income differentials by educational groups had 
widened sharply during the sixties. The average monthly 
income differentials between no school and college increased 
from a ratio of 1 : 12.4 in 1960 to 1 : 15.6 in 1970.48
Health also improved in Algeria during the period in 
question. A partial free health service has been introduced 
since early 1974. Population per physician decreased from 
5, 530 in 1960 to 2, 630 in 1981. Infant mortality rate 
decreased from 165 in 1960 to 114 in 1981. Child death rate 
decreased from 39 in 1960 to 18 in 1981. Death rate per
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.1, 000 population decreased from 18 in 1965 to 9 in 1986. 
Life expectancy at birth increased from 47 years in 1960 to 
56 in 1981' and 62 in 198 6.49 Such improvements can be said 
to be as a result of some amenities being distributed rather 
more equitably. However, this is not always the case; for 
instance, in Brazil expectation of life is relatively high 
in spite of various inequities.
5.8- Trend in Income Distribution & Poverty in the 1980.
We have seen in the above section how some determinants had 
exercised their effects in shaping the pattern of income 
distribution and poverty during the 1968 - 1979/80 period. 
It is important to analyse how such determinants are likely 
to have affected the level and trend in poverty and income 
distribution in the 1980s. This would give insights to 
planners and policy-makers in formulating policies for a 
more equal distribution of income and for reducing poverty. 
Regrettably no data on income distribution have been 
available since 1980, consequently, what has happened to the 
distribution of income and poverty after 1980 cannot be 
directly answered. Therefore, indirect information and indi­
cators can be used in an attempt to gauge the direction of 
change.
However, the improvement of the seventies, as shown above, 
was brought about by the increase in the share of wage 
income - the main source of total household income and the 
more equally distributed. It was also due to the substantial 
increase in the wage rate of the lower wage earners. It
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follows, to a great extent, that what has happened to the 
distribution of income and poverty in the 1980's would 
depend mainly upon what has happened to the share of wage 
income, and to the wage rate of the lower wage earners. It 
may also depend on what has happened to food prices and 
subsidies. These factors are examined in what follows.
5.9- Deterioration in the share of labour income.
The share of wa’ge income - the major household income and the 
more equally distributed - decreased from 60% in 1979 to 54% 
in 1984. This was ultimately as a result of the increase in 
unemployment and the deterioration of the wage rate. The 
share of property income - the less evenly distributed - 
increased from about 27% to about 32%. The share of transfer 
income remained almost unchanged during the same period; see 
table 5.10.
Table 5.10: Evolution of household income (1979 - 84) in billions of AD.
Source of 
income current
1979
constant* constant % current
1984
constant*. constant !
wages 40.5 44.36 60.2 76.6 54.25 54.2
Property 18.0 19.72 26.7 45.0 31.87 31.9
Transfers 8.8 9.64 13.1 19.7 13.95 13.9
Total 67.3 73.72 100.0 141.3 100.07 100.0
*) in 1980 prices. As national income deflator is not 'available, the 
country's consumer price index was used as a proxy for estimating real 
money values.
Source: For 1979: Premier Plan Quinquennal -1980 - 1984. op cit. p. 85; and 
for 1984: Deuxieme Plan Quinquennal 1985 - 1989. op cit. p. 31.
The decreasing trend in the share of wage income, noticed
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during the 1980 - 84 period, is expected to have continued 
during the 1985 - 88 period, owing mainly to the increase in 
unemployment, and to the deterioration of the wage rate 
during the same period; (see below pp. 250-253) . It is also 
due to the increasing share of property income owing mainly 
to the recent encouragement given to the private sector. 
During the past few years, encouragement to increase private
share ownership has been offered on a far greater scale. The
government financial institutions have been subsidising 
capital through credit facilities; the cost of borrowing is 
6 per cent while inflation is officially estimated at an 
average rate of 10 per cent50 during 1985 - 89; (see table 
5.12). Furthermore, tax holidays ranging from one to five 
years have been offered to private companies involved in 
tourism, in an effort to promote a 'neglected sector'.51 With 
such encouragement, private sector investment doubled in 
1984 and increased by a further 50 per cent in 1985;52 and 
more will have taken place in 1986 - 1989.
However, as the share of wage income is related to
employment, it is interesting to examine what has happened 
to the pattern of employment during the 1980s.
5.10- Trends in employment during the eighties.
First, it has to be noted that the sharp increase in
employment has not been accompanied by a similar sharp 
increase in production and productivity. While production 
was increasing very slowly, productivity was declining to
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the extent that in 1979 it was only half of what it was in 
1967. Thus, the rapid increase in employment during 1967 - 
197 9 was not accompanied by substantial increase in output. 
Job creation virtually became job-sharing, particularly 
within the public enterprises. The overstaffing of public 
enterprises- was a deliberate policy; employment expansion in 
itself was considered an indicator of government success. It 
was also a type of populist policy.53 The government 
virtually sacrificed efficiency as a means of reducing 
unemployment, improving income distribution, and reducing 
poverty. Such a policy did help to bring about some equity 
but only at the cost of 'lost efficiency and future growth. 
It imposed a heavy burden upon the public enterprises with 
detrimental effects on their profitability, liquidity and 
ability to finance replacements for wear and tear, 
obsolescence, and ultimately on productive efficiency.54 
This partly led to the sluggish growth in the creation of 
employment opportunities in the eighties. One must also 
admit that some of the sluggishness55 has to be explained in 
terms of the reduction in .investments resulting from the 
fall in the oil prices.
The annual rate of increase in employment has decreased from
5.6 per cent during 1973 - 197 9 to 4.4 per cent during the 
1980 - 84 period to 3 per cent in 1986, 1. 9 per cent in
1987, and to 1.6 per cent in 1988; while the active popula­
tion has been increasing by. an annual rate of more than 4 
per cent. As a matter of fact, since 1984 employment 
creation has been in continuous decline in relative and in 
absolute terms. It decreased from an annual average of about
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150,000 jobs in 1980-84 to 116,000 in 1986 and to 96,140 in 
1987 and to around 65,000 in 1988, (see table 5.11), far below
Table 5.11: Employment indicators in 1,000 and in % during 1985 - 88.
1985 1986 1987 1988
Active population 4, 621 4,794 4,976 5,175
Total employed 3,698 3,814 3,910 3, 975
Job creation 122 116 96 65
Job creation (%) 3.3 3.0 2.9 1.6
Unemployed 923 980 1,066 1,200
Unemployment rate (%) 19.9 20.4 21.4 23.2
Source: Constructed form: for active population (1985-87) and job
creation (1985-86): Comit& Inter-Minist6riel de l ’Emploi (C.I.E.): la 
Situation et les Perspectives de l ’Emploi: Synthese et Recom­
mendations. Unpublished Document, Minist6re du Travail. Mai 1987. pp. 
23-24. For 1987 job creation as reported by ActualitS-Economie,
Monthly Review, N Q 30, Algiers, Sept 1988 . p. 52. For active
population in 198 8 is based on the imformation of annual increase of
4%; and for 1988 job created, as pointed out by the Algerian Prime
Minister on 29th Nov 1988; see El-Moudjahid 30th Nov 1988, p. 5. And 
for unemployment in 1988, from AlgSrie-Actualite N Q 1207 Semaine du 1 
- 7 Dec 1988. p. 17.
the planned objective of 170,000 as envisaged by the second 
five year plan (1985 - 89), and representing only about 32.7 
per cent of the new entrants56 into the labour market, which 
numbered more than 199,000 in 1988. This shows the magnitude 
of the problem Algeria faces in providing increasingly 
productive employment for a rapidly growing number of 
workers. In fact, owing to the rapid increase in the 
proportion of female labour in the total active population 
from 8.1 per cent in 1983 to 15 per cent in 1988, to the 
recent low level of job creation, and to the job losses,
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the unemployment rate increased considerably from its 
lowest official level of 15 per cent in 1983 to about 23.2 
per cent in 1988 - almost the same level as in 1967. Further 
deterioration in the employment situation is expected to 
continue during the years to come. For instance, on the 
basis of creating 90, 000 jobs in 1989,57 as reported by the 
government, unemployment will be estimated at about 24.5 per 
cent by the end of this year. As a matter of fact, one of 
the reasons of the recent social uprising of early October 
1988 was the high level of unemployment.
5.11- Deterioration in the statutory minimum wage rate.
While the data on different wage rates are not available for 
the 1980s, it is worth at least examining during this period 
the evolution of the statutory minimum wage rate (S.N.M.G.) 
- the unified wage rate in both urban and rural areas. 
Furthermore, the S.N.M.G. is the wage rate received by the 
bulk of wage earners (the unskilled labour). In 1981/82, 
unskilled labour accounted for more than 65 per cent of 
total wage earners in non-agricultural'activities and 94 per 
cent in agricultural activities.58 Changes in it would 
certainly affect the distribution of income and the allevia­
tion of poverty during the 1980s.59 However, between 1981 
and 1988, the S.N.M.G. decreased in real terms from AD 4.57 
in 1981 to AD 3.06 in 1988; it depreciated by one-third; 
(see table 5 .12) .
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Table 5.12: Evolution of minimum wage rate (S.N.M.G.) in AD (1979 - 88)
Year current Wage rate Price index constant Wage rate
Jan 1979 4.21 91.2 4.61
Jan 1980 4.21 100.0 4.21
Jan 1981 5.24 114. 6 4.57
Jan 1982 5.24 122.3 4.28
Jan 1983 5.77 131.8 4.38
Jan 1984 5.77 141.2 4.09
Jan 1985 5.77 156.4 3.69
Jan 1986 6.30 173.9 3.62
Jan 1987 6.30 186.9 3.37
Jan 1988 6.30 205.6* 3.06
*) on the basis of an increase in consumer prices of 10% in 1988; see 
African Research Bulletin, vol 25 N° 11, Dec 31st 1988, p. 9355.
Source: constructed from: Consumer price index, see International
Financial Statistics. May 1988 . p. 84; for wage rate: 1979 - 84:
Annuaire Statistiques de l'Algdrie 1983/84. p. 293. For 1985 - 1986: 
African Research Bulletin vol 22, N Q 12 Jan 1986. p. 8038; for 1987 - 
88, there was a wage freeze.
5.12- The deterioration in food prices & subsidies.
The lagged increase in the income of the lower income groups 
vis a vis the increase in the food prices would have 
negative effects on income distribution and poverty 
alleviation. On August 1st 1983, there was a 10 to 30 per 
cent increase in the price of basic foodstuffs (including 
bread, cooking oil and eggs).60 In 1985, the prices of 
cereals - the stable food in Algeria - witnessed two 
increases: the first on March 23rd when the price of bread 
and other cereals increased by more than 11 per cent;61 the 
second on August 1st when the prices of bread and semolina 
were raised by an average rate of 10 per cent. Such 
increases was said to be adopted with "the aim of ensuring
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the.protection of the producer and an improvement in quality 
of products", announced the Algerian press on August 1st 
198 5 . 62 It has to be borne in mind that the statutory 
minimum wage rate depreciated, as noted earlier, by one- 
third between 1981 and 1988; (see table 5.12). In fact, food 
subsidies have been decreasing continuously from AD3,800 
million in 1982 to 1,000 million in 1988, (in current 
prices) . The decline in real terms is even greater. In 
constant prices, it decreased from AD3,800 million in 1982 
to about AD566 million in 1988. This means that in 1988 food 
subsidies in real terms represented only about 15 per cent 
of what they were in 1982; (see table 5.13). On per capita 
basis,' as population has been increasing rapidly, the 
decline is even faster.
Table 5.13: Food Subsidies in millions of dinars, (1982 - 1988).
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Current Prices 
Constant Prices*
3.800
3.800
1, 980 
1,879
2, 000 
1,764
2, 000 
1,570
2, 000 
1,340
1, 000 
623
1,000
566
*) in 1982 prices, as deflated by food consumer price index.
Source: Compiled from: Journal Officiel de la R&publique Alg6rienne 
DSmocratique et Populaire, of different years (of Decembers 1981 - 
1987) .
This may suggest that the lower income groups were further 
impoverished and subject to the incidence of poverty. Not 
only the poor are non-producers of food, depending on the 
market for their living requirements, but also the bulk of 
private landowners - those having on average less that 4
4
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hectares - depend on market purchases for most of their 
consumption needs. In view of this, Sen,63 in the case of 
India, emphasised that a major weapon in combating poverty 
over the long as well as the short run is to keep food 
prices low. But as this would go against incentives to the 
producers, which was not discussed by Sen, agricultural 
production can be encouraged by the inducement of high 
returns to inputs, like irrigation, fertilizers, and other 
cost reducing technology. In this regard, it was pointed out 
by Dantwala that:
"if you cannot provide employment to the unemployed 
poor, or fair remuneration to the larger number of the 
underemployed, give them food at lower prices. And the 
only way to this without adversely affecting the 
incentives to produce, adopt cost reducing technology, 
or subsidise consumption, which the government of 
India has been doing on an increasing scale."64
I do not see why such a policy65 cannot be adopted in 
Algeria.
All these economic variables seen together constitute suffi­
cient, indication that income inequality and the incidence of 
poverty may have increased during the 1980's. The extent of 
the increase in income inequality and poverty is difficult 
to ascertain in the absence of the required data. Never­
theless, the degree of such an increase in inequality and 
poverty may be quite serious because this is being reflected 
in increasing resentment and sense of frustration among the 
poor, which came to be experienced in the recent violent 
riots of early October 1988. Such discontent was over food 
shortages, rising costs of living, and high unemployment.
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The riots left at least 200 dead and hundreds more wounded. 
Many observers, commenting on such events, have pointed out 
that the uprising was the consequence of the previous econo­
mic policies, which "have produced two classes: the ruling 
elite, which strut about in the latest Parisian creations, 
and the other too poor to afford the basic essentials."66 
Such events, in fact, are in themselves a clear indication 
of the extent which the deterioration in income distribution 
and in poverty has reached.
However, a summary of the trend and the likely evolution of 
some economic indicatprs during the last two decades is 
given in table 5.14. It shows that the trend in these 
indicators, which was observed during the 1967/68 - 1979/80 
period, has been completely reversed during the eighties.
Table 5.14: Trend & likely evolution of some indicators, 1967/68 - 1988.
Economic indicator Trend* in 1967/68 -80 Trend* in 1980 - 88
Unemployment +
Share of wage income +
Real wage rate + _
Income inequality — [+]
Incidence of poverty — [+3
*) Where the sign (-) stands for the observed decrease, (+) for the 
observed increase, and [+] for more likely increasing trend.
Source: constructed from the above findings of this section and of 
chapter 5 and from those of chapters 3 and 4.
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5.13- Summary.
In summing up, it can be said that the overall improvement 
in the distribution of income and in poverty alleviation 
which was noticed during the seventies, was generated by 
some policy interventions such as job-sharing, high increase 
in lower wage rates, and public expenditure such as food 
subsidies, education and health, as redistributive welfare 
measures. During the eighties, these policies were halted 
and/or limited in use, i.e. some of these policies were 
hardly in use (such as food subsidies and introduction of 
charges in the national health care system), and others were 
no longer implemented (such as sharing-jobs) . In consequence, 
a deterioration in income distribution and poverty is more 
likely to have taken place, as portrayed by some economic 
indicators. This suggests that the improvement in income 
distribution and poverty alleviation which was noticed 
during the seventies was transient.67 The unsustainable 
nature is mainly attributable - as the literature has 
emphasised - to the nature of growth in general and to the 
limited scope of the particular distributional policies 
which were pursued.
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Notes to chapter 5.
1. See "Le Programme du Tripoli", in: Annuaire de l ’Afrique
du Nord 1962. C.N.R.S., Paris, 1972.
2. See La Charte d'Alger. p. 38.
3. Ibid.
4. See The Algerian National Charter of 1976: Content,
Public reaction and significance. John Nellis. Centre
for Contemporary Arab Studies. George Town University. 
Washington, D.C. June 1980. p. 10.
5. See Plan Quadriennal 1970 - 1973, Rapport General, 
Preambule. S.E.P. 1970. p. 3. Furthermore, it was 
stressed that "the emphasis on the resort of development 
does not leave in the dark the issue of an equitable 
distribution of income in favour of the most unfavorable 
strata of the population." See Plan Quadriennal (1970 - 
1973), op cit. p. 6.
6. See Plan Quinquenal 1980-84, Rapport G&n&ral, 1980. pp. 
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Chapter VI
Conclusion.
On the basis of a review of the literature, as presented in 
the beginning of this study, it can be argued that income 
distribution and poverty are determined by the complex 
interaction of many social, economic and political factors. 
Accordingly, any substantial analysis of a particular case 
has to take into account the particularities of that case 
and not merely treat it as an observation within a secular 
cross country analysis which assumes away the diversities of 
socio-economic and political characteristics of various 
countries. More sophisticated econometric modelling suffers 
from similar limitations. Instead of accepting the socio­
economic forces as evolving in the course of development, 
they are assumed to be constant during the period of 
analysis. Such assumptions are inappropriate to be treated 
as constants in quantitative analysis, mainly when conscious 
efforts are being made to alter the socio-economic and 
political structure of the country. In view of the 
limitations of cross-country analysis as well as econometric 
modelling, it was decided in this study to adopt a socio­
economic approach. Serious inadequacies of appropriate data 
were a further reason for not undertaking a simulation type 
of exercise. Moreover, the period of 20 years of post 
independence Algeria (to which available data relate) has 
been one of rapid changes in domestic as well as the inter-
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national scene. In some ways one could argue that many 
policies did not receive a fair trial. They had to be 
changed because of altered circumstances. Yet the broad 
trends of policies and their implications for poverty and 
income distribution provide some basis however tentative, 
for formulating and implementing policies for creating a 
just society, the aim which the makers of modern Algeria 
eventually believed in.
From the review of the Algerian economy since the colonial 
era with which the study commenced, we can draw the follo­
wing conclusions. First, not only was the Algerian economy 
under French occupation made to serve the metropolitan one, 
but also within Algeria. The Algerians were impoverished 
while the European settlers were enjoying a very high level 
of living. Second, the economy of independent Algeria during 
the last two decades or so has remained beset by a number of 
problems, bottlenecks and performance failures, which have 
not permitted the generation of self-sustainable growth of 
output and of employment. Consequently the pattern of income 
distribution and poverty has been significantly affected.
The analysis of the level and trend of income distribution 
and poverty in post-independence Algeria shows, however, 
that during the 1967/68 - 1979/80 period, the country
experienced a rapid rate of growth as well as a more equal 
distribution of income and an alleviation of poverty (the 
improvement henceforth). Such an improvement was the net 
outcome of both positive and negative effects. A decompo­
sition analysis showed that the positive effects were
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generated at two levels:
1- Much of the improvement came in the non-agricultural 
sector where the bulk of employment creation did take place. 
This meant that the share of the labour income (as opposed 
to property income) - the main source of household income 
and the more equally distributed - increased considerably 
during the period mentioned earlier. Moreover, the income of 
the lower income groups increased in general faster than 
that of the upper income groups, and consequently income 
differentials narrowed between wage earners.
2 - Some improvements took place also because of the 
reduction in inter-sectoral inequalities, as non- 
agricultural/agricultural income differentials narrowed, due 
mainly to the establishment of the same statutory minimum 
wage rate in both agriculture and non-agricultural 
activities.
The adverse effects were noticed in the rural areas in 
general and in the agricultural sector in particular. With 
inequality in land ownership and in access to inputs, the 
resultant distribution of income from farm land among 
private landowners is still significantly unequal. This 
suggests that the so-called 'Agrarian Revolution' policy had 
no major effect on private land distribution or on either of 
the problem of rural poverty and income inequality. In this 
respect, it can be said that the agrarian reform did not 
bring much equity effects as expected. Consequently, the
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income of the upper income groups in this sector increased 
faster than that of the low income groups.
As far as the incidence of poverty is concerned, a decrease 
was noticed, both in non-agricultural and in agricultural 
sectors; but the decrease was much greater in the former. As 
a consequence, poverty became virtually almost a rural 
phenomenon in general and within the agricultural sector in 
particular. Accordingly, this is of particular interest to 
policy makers in advocating the direction of the appropriate 
measures to combat poverty. The alleviation of rural poverty 
might have been far greater if it had been accompanied by a 
more equal distribution of land ownership. Such a land 
ownership is still characterised by high levels of concen­
tration. 1
Examining the nature of the determinants which shaped the 
level and pattern of income distribution and poverty during 
the seventies, it was found that some arise directly from 
policy interventions on the part of the government. These- - 
policies consisted mainly of job-sharing, high increase' in 
low wage rates, and public expenditure on food subsidies, 
for example, education, and health. Some other policies and 
programmes did not have significant contribution to such an 
improvement: agrarian reform and taxation are cases in
point.
To gauge the direction of the trend in income distribution 
and poverty during the eighties, the emphasis was laid on 
how the above policies were operating during that period. In
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view of this, some attempts were made to assess the 
implications . of the drop in oil prices and the fall of 
investments in the economy during the eighties. Both the 
share of wage income and the statutory minimum wage rate 
deteriorated significantly owing to the sharp increase in 
unemployment, and inflation, (mainly food prices were 
increasing considerably). This suggests that the improvement 
in income distribution and in alleviation of poverty during 
the seventies was transient. In other words, it seems more 
likely that the trend which arose during the seventies has 
been reversed, with serious consequences for poverty and 
income distribution.
As a result of the recent collapse in oil prices and the 
rise in interest rates on the world market, the burden of 
the foreign debt (the debt service ratio) increased from
28.6 per cent in 1982, to 51 per cent in 1986' and to over
83 per cent in 1988. Such a burden constitutes an additional 
constraint in the process of capital accumulation. There was 
a sharp decline in investment from 48.6 per cent in 1980 -
84 to 31 per cent in 1986 (i.e. a decline of more than 36%). 
Moreover, reduction of imports of capital and intermediary 
goods, consumer goods and raw materials resulted in a 
growing shortages of food, work stoppages, engendering high 
prices and the resultant loss of income with serious 
consequences for poverty and income inequality. All these 
put a brake on the economic growth and on its long term 
prospects. Economic growth rate slowed down from an average 
of 4.3 per cent per annum in 1980 - 84 to 2.9 per cent in 
1986, and to negative rates of 1.4 per cent in 1987 and 2.7
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per cent in 1988, far below the annual estimated growth rate 
of 6.6 per cent as anticipated by the second five year plan 
(1985 - 1989). Unemployment rate increased from 15 per cent 
in 1983 to more than 23 per cent in 1988, (and is expected 
to increase further this year) . With regard to this 
situation, the Algerian-Prime Minister has recently pointed 
out that "the Algerian economy has not acted with the 
required celerity to the challenge imposed by the decline in 
oil prices, engendering... the anxious and brutal deterio­
ration in employment, lack of housing, low productivity and 
the deterioration in the purchasing power of certain social 
groups."2 This is indicative of the deep-rooted problems 
facing the Algerian economy. Moreover, it indicates that the 
question of income distribution and poverty was not properly 
addressed, and that the reverse trend was inherent in the 
nature of the Algerian development strategy; (ultimately 
suggesting that the strategy was ill-founded, (mainly with 
regard to the distribution of income and the alleviation of 
poverty) . This emphasises the idea that the methods and 
tools used with the aim to accomplish a goal (e.g. improving 
the distribution of income and alleviating poverty) do 
matter. Such a situation can be said to be attributable, as 
emphasised by the literature, to the pattern of growth in 
general and to the limited scope of the pursued distribu­
tional policies in particular.
Thus the improvement in income distribution and poverty 
alleviation which took place during the seventies could not 
be described as the consequence of a well-conceived develop­
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ment strategy as such. It was rather by specific policy 
interventions such as nominally increasing employment 
through sharing-jobs, manipulation of statutory wage rates, 
and food subsidies, which were not a part of an integrated 
development strategy. Most of these policies did not 
continue their course during the eighties. With the recent 
deterioration in the oil market, every thing else seems to 
have deteriorated, because not much has been done to diver­
sify2 the Algerian economy, to reduce the absolute depen­
dence on the exports of hydrocarbons and to mitigate the 
unemployment problem.
The principal conclusion of this study is that Algeria’s 
failure to achieve a sustainable alleviation of poverty and 
reduction in income inequality resulted from the nature of 
the development strategy. By emphasising heavy industries 
which had a limited impact in terms of employment opportu­
nities, the government resorted to the policy of job­
sharing, allowing a considerable increase in the number of 
jobs particularly within the public sector. Such a policy4 
only generated a temporary, short lived improvement in the 
distribution of income and in the alleviation of poverty. It 
was short-lived because of the nature of the created jobs: 
many were not created on any efficiency criteria, they 
virtually amounted to inflating job posts (far beyond what 
was necessary for the functioning of the public sector), 
which could not be sustained when the oil boom was over. 
Such a policy has limited the capacity of the economy5 to 
grow and to generate further employment opportunities during
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the eighties. It is well known that it is only productive 
employment and greater efficiency in resource use which 
provide higher savings for sustaining higher rates of 
economic growth and of employment which is a necessary 
condition for improving the distribution of income and the 
alleviation of poverty. This concern, meanwhile, as a policy 
issue has been emphasised by most development economists and 
international institutions, mainly by the World Employment 
Programme of the ILO. For instance, the ILO stressed that 
"the main instruments for attaining this goal [the 
achievement of a certain minimum standard of living] would 
be increasing the volume and productivity of employment."6 
However, the reverse trend, for the time being, will continue 
its course because some factors, such as the prevalence of 
unequal distribution of assets (specifically land), the 
continuous increase in unemployment, the deterioration of 
the wage rate, and the rising cost of living, are still 
encouraging the persistence of poverty and preventing any 
radical redistribution of income on sustainable grounds.
Nonetheless, the questions that have to be asked are: what 
implications can be drawn from the experience of the recent 
past for the magnitude and character of growth, income 
distribution and poverty that Algeria will confront in the 
coming years? What policy directions should be followed? 
What policy instruments are available or might be fashioned 
to meet the challenges that these problems pose?
However, given the future uncertainties and complexity of
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the subject matter, only some speculative policy recommenda­
tions are possible. As a matter of fact, theoretical and 
policy debates on development and underdevelopment bear a 
very strong resemblance to theories and policies on poverty 
and inequality. All government policies impinge one way or 
another upon individual incomes and income distribution. The 
effect of each policy instrument has not to be seen sepa­
rately, but rather in coordination with other policies 
because the question of poverty and income inequality cannot 
each be tackled by one simple policy instrument.7
By and large, effective policies to reduce absolute poverty 
in a sustainable manner can be seen in a package of 
policies. The redistribution of assets (land, capital, etc) 
and the provision of employment opportunities are among the 
pre-requisite conditions for poverty reduction and more 
equal distribution of income. Meanwhile, land (or assets), 
redistribution would help very much to reduce inequality and 
poverty, but (owing to political factors) is very unlikely 
to be implemented. As poverty reduction lies at the heart of 
the employment problem,8 the development strategy has to 
focus on the creation of more productive employment opportu­
nities which would enlarge the productive capacity of the 
economy, and consequently create more employment opportu­
nities.9 Such employment opportunities are quite important 
even for some .landowners, particularly small landowners, as 
their farm income is not sufficient to cover their requi­
rements. They have to sell their labour power to gain addi­
tional income in order to subsist.10
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All these require a drastic decentralisation and realignment 
of political power with wide popular participation which 
will make it possible to initiate ambitious programmes of 
public investment involving the whole social strata of the 
population. It is often the lack of people’s participation 
which is the major factor limiting the social impact of 
distributional policies (the Algerian land reform is a case 
in point) .11 The importance of such a participation, in 
pursuing development objectives, stems from the idea, empha­
sised earlier, that income distribution and poverty are 
determined by the complex interaction of many social, econo­
mic and political factors.12 Moreover, the decisions with 
regard to the development strategies, investment allocation 
and policies are largely determined by the socio-political 
structure of the society and the interplay of various 
social/political groups. It is within this sphere that any 
distributional policy must operate if it is to be success­
ful. This concern, meanwhile, goes beyond the scope of this 
study, and represents a vast area for further research. 
However, in the absence of such policies and measures, 
income inequality would persist and poverty of many would be 
perpetuated, and the poor would not be able to fulfill their 
needs because of lack of purchasing power, and therefore 
would continue to lack an opportunity to participate in 
development.
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Notes to chapter 6.
1. In this respect, "it is the high concentration of land 
holdings that influences the unequal distribution of 
income" rather than the other way round. See Quan, N.T., 
and Koo, A.Y.C., "Concentration of land holdings: an 
Empirical Exploration of Kuznets’s Conjecture". Journal 
of Development Eonomics, vol 18 N2 1 May - June 1985.
2. See El-Moudjahid 30th November 1988. p. 4.
3. Bearing in mind that we are not talking of a highly 
diversified economy which its realisation may only be 
seen in the long run.
4. Such a policy which, was backed by the oil boom 
revenues, masked the adverse consequences of the capital 
intensive development strategy. This is how the Algerian 
development strategy did manage to combine, for sometime, 
two contradictory features in its industrialisation 
development: capital intensive industries, and employ­
ment promotion.
5. This limited capacity was also due to the shrinkage of 
oil revenues.
6. See Employment; Growth and Basic Needs. ILO. Geneva. 1976. 
p. 7.
7. The operation cannot be complete or successful unless a 
well considered set of policies are put forward.
8. See for instance, Towards Full Employment: A Programme 
for Colombia, Geneva: ILO.. 1970, p. 138.
9. In this respect, employment should be seen both as an 
end and as a means: as an end in generating self-respect 
and a sense of dignity; and as a means in providing a
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stream of earned income needed to cover human wants and 
overcome poverty, and equally important to yield an 
output. In short, employment must be understood in the 
sense of a productive, and a secured full time job, 
which would contribute to a sustainable economic 
progress across the entire population.
10. In this respect, the control of food prices through 
subsidising consumption may have a positive effect not 
only, on the improvement in the distribution of income 
and alleviation of poverty, but on economic growth as 
well. It may enable the poorer sections of the 
population to cover their consumption requirements, and 
which in turn may raise productivity of labour (mainly 
of the poor). There is a good reason to expect as well 
strong increase in labour productivity through better 
management and organisation.
11. The distribution of income, in general, and of assets, 
in particular, is closely determined by the distribution 
of political power (they are interrelated) . In other 
words, redistribution of income and wealth has specific 
implications on power, status, and prestige as well as 
on participation in the decision-making sphere.
12. Accordingly, the overall mechanisms determining the 
distribution of income and incidence of poverty have to 
be assessed in terms of class interests and class 
struggle for power.
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Appendix 1.
Measurement of Income Inequality and Poverty.
A very important aspect in the study of income distribution 
and poverty in the course of development is the distribution 
of the benefits of growth. For such a distribution, a tool 
of measurement is required in order to assess changes over 
time. In this respect, one has to differentiate between 
relative income inequality which deals with one person's, or 
household's income position in relation to others, and 
absolute poverty which deals with the absence of enough 
income to satisfy the consumption of a minimum bundle of 
goods and services, what it is called the "poverty line". 
Accordingly, there are two different measures: relative
income inequality indices and those which deal with absolute 
poverty.
As far as income inequality is concerned, a considerable 
number of measures have been proposed in the literature. 
Comprehensive surveys, for instance, are provided by Sen 
(1973) , Szal and Robinson (1977), Cowell (1977), Yotopoulos 
and Nugent (1976), and Bigsten (1983). Meanwhile, each of 
these measures has its own drawbacks and ambiguities. In 
this respect, Fields pointed out that "whenever relative 
inequality measures are used, researchers are implicitly 
making some value judgements, but it is not clear what these 
judgements are. 1,1 Moreover, Yotopoulos and Nugent concluded 
that "In conclusion, we may say that the measurement of
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income inequality is riddled with ambiguities."2 However, 
despite such limitations economists continued to advance 
measurement of income inequality in their studies of income 
distribution. The question that ought to be asked is: do we 
use any measure? The measurement which can be accepted to 
many,3 as a relevant basis for inequality comparisons, has 
to fulfill certain properties (axioms), as introduced by Sen4 
and others.5 These axioms are:
1- Mean independence: The measure should be independent of 
the level of income, and when all incomes are multiplied by 
a constant factor (k) , the measure of inequality is 
unchanged.
2- Population size independence.: An equal increase or
decrease in the population across all income levels does not 
result in a change in the inequality measure.
3- Piaou-Dalton transfer sensitivity: A transfer from rich 
individual or household to a poorer one that does not change 
the ranking of individual or household should always reduce 
the inequality measure.
As the Gini coefficient fulfills the above three axioms, and 
has widely been used as an indicator of income inequality, 
it is used in this study as well. It has to be borne in mind 
that as an aggregate index, it might be misleading; income 
gains by middle income groups seem to come at the expense of 
both upper and lower groups.6 Moreover, it has to be noted 
that it cannot be decomposed into within group and between
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group inequalities. This means that it is not a particularly 
useful index in a decomposition analysis. For such a decom­
position analysis, the coefficient of variation is a better 
alternative. It fulfills the three above axioms, as well as 
being decomposed into within and between inequality; 
consequently, it is used in this study.
As far as absolute poverty is concerned, yet again its 
measurement is indispensable for quantifying the extent of 
poverty in a country so as to be able at a later time to 
assess progress toward its alleviation and more generally to 
learn how the benefits of economic development are distri­
buted. Furthermore, it may serve as a useful guide to the 
economic position of the poor. Such a measurement, meanwhile, 
involves two distinct problems. The first is how to identify 
the poor as a group, the second is how to determine the 
intensity of poverty (poverty index) suffered by that group. 
Both problems involve choosing some criterion of poverty, 
the most common example of which is a poverty line defined 
in real per capita income terms. Such a poverty line usually 
starts with the identification and costing of a ’balanced 
diet' for an average person, and then an allowance is made 
for non-food expenditures. These, meanwhile, pose some 
problems, as discussed above, mainly of how to deter-mine 
the minimum standard of living. Owing to all these, any 
estimation of a poverty line, and any measure trying to 
portray poverty in a single statistic must contain an 
element of arbitrariness because, it is difficult to capture 
all dimensions and characteristics of poverty; (let alone
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its quantification).7
However, a very common index of the measurement of the 
extent of poverty is the percentage of the population below 
the poverty line - the head count ratio (H). A drawback of 
this measure is that it gives the same weight to someone 
whose income, say is 5% below to one whose income is 90% 
below the poverty line. In other words, the problem with 
this measure is that for any given number of persons below 
the poverty line, its value is insensitive to changes in the 
amount by which their conditions place them below the 
poverty line. This measure (H) takes the poor as a homoge­
neous group, and is also insensitive to transfers of income 
among the group of the poor.
The concept of the poverty gap - the income gap ratio (I) 
has been introduced. It measures the total income needed to 
bring everyone who is below the poverty line up to that 
standard. This measure is, however, insensitive to transfers 
of income within the poor, and to the number of the poor. 
Nevertheless, to avoid the deficiencies of the above poverty 
indicators, Sen8 has developed an index that is superior to 
both the head count ratio and the income gap ratio. It takes 
into account the number of poor and both the extent of group 
shortfall beneath the poverty line and to transfers among 
the poor. It tells us the income needed to support every one 
of the population at poverty line level. Sen’s poverty index 
may be called (P) and can be written:
P = H [ I + ( 1 - I ) G ] . ,  where (H) is the head count
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ratio, i.e. the proportion of the people below the poverty 
line, (I) is the income gap; and (G) is the Gini coefficient 
of income distribution among those people whose income is 
below the poverty line. Sen’s poverty index is used in this 
study.
As a matter of fact, the issues of measurement of income 
inequality and of poverty are subject to several constraints 
such as the definitional problems, the lack of data and 
information in general and of income distribution in parti­
cular. For instance, an interest in the lower income groups 
in general and in the poor in specific, is not always well 
served by aggregate inequality measures. They, for instance, 
do not give any indication of where exactly the inequality 
lies, nor when distribution alters, nor where this change 
has taken place. So, one should not take any decrease in 
aggregate inequality as a good thing regardless who gets 
what from whom. We must seek the implications of changes in 
overall inequality for a specific group - the poor. 
Accordingly, one has to examine how the distribution of 
income changes from period to period in its dynamic approach 
and not in its static framework. Further constraints concern 
the consistency and reliability of the available data, 
particularly lack of representativeness in sample surveys, 
in definitions and classifications. Of course some of these 
constraints differ from one country to another.
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Notes to appendix 1.
1. See Gary S. Fields in: Poverty, Inequality and Deve­
lopment. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge 1980. p. 22.
2. See Yotopoulos and Nugent, Economics of Development: 
Empirical Investigation. Harper & Row, New York, London 
1976. p. 246.
3. For a good survey, see N. Kakwani: Income Inequality and 
Poverty: Methods of Estimator and Policy Applications. 
World Bank. Oxford University Press. 1980.
4. See Sen, A. On Economic Inequality. Clarender Press, 
Oxford. 1973.
5. See for instance G. S. Fields and C.H. Fei: "On 
Inequality Comparisons." Econometrica, March, 1978. pp. 303 
- 16.
6. Thus, one must examine all income groups and their 
interaction to understand the distributional changes which 
are occurring.
7. It has to be noted that an important characteristics of 
these definitions is that they differ across countries and 
time-periods.
8. See A. Sen: Poverty: "An Ordinal Approach to
measurement." in Econometrica vol 44 N5 2. 1976. pp. 219 -31.
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Appendix 2.
Table A2.1: Main export products 1958 - 1961 (in percentages).
1958 1959 1960 1961
Agricultural products 84.4 75.6 59.5 47.2
Energy and Lubriant 1.9 4.7 23.7 37.9
Other Products 17.7 20.7 16.8 14.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100 .0 100.0
Source: Tableaux de l'Economie Algerienne, 1967. S.E.P . p.149.
Table A2.2: Structure of gross agricultural income in millions of Frs
1954 1957 1960
in value oo in value % in value %
Cereals 625 20 667 23.4 624 20.4
Pulses (dried, etc) 33 1 21 0.7 17 0.6
Wine 1,375 44 1,119 39.3 952 31.2
Fruits 244 9 221 7.8 290 9.5
Industrial crops 67 2 48 1.7 70 2.3
Fresh vegetables 203 6.5 212 7.5 352 11.5
Sub Total 2,547 81.5 2,288 80.4 2,305 75.6
Animal products 580 18.5 558 19.4 744 24.4
Total 3,127 100.0 2,846 100.0 3,049 100.0
Source: For 1954 and 1957: Tableaux de l ’Economie Algerienne, 1960. 
pp.133-135. For 1960: 1'Agriculture Algerienne, Numero Special. Le
Developpement Africain, Paris, oct 1961. pp.94-95.
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Table A2.3: Composition & distribution of population in Algeria (1954)
RURAL URBAN TOTAL
Number o.o Number o0 Number O.*o
Algerians 7,052,000 97 1,397,000 68 8,449,000 89.6
E. Settlers 224,031 03 760,000 32 984,031 10.4
TOTAL 7,276,031 100 2,057,000 100 9,433,031 100.0
Source: Ahmed Henni in: La Colonisation Agraire et le Sous Deve-
loppement en Algerie. S.N.E.D.1981. Algiers, pp. 82-84.
Table A 2 .4: Structure of industrial sector in % of output in 1959. 
Industries* % of total output Index inl959 (1954=100)
Food processing 29.6 230
Tobacco, Matches 15.4 126
Textiles 2.5 58
Peper 1.3 142
Printing 5.9 157
Chemicals(including oils & fats 10.5 17 9
Glass 1.8 161
Building materials 12.0 141
Base metals 0.4 15 6
Metal working, Engineering 20.6 137
TOTAL 100.0 150
*) small industries, such as clothing, wood and the like are excluded 
Source: Tableaux de l'Economie Algerienne 1960. p.155.
Table A2.5: Product per head (1880 - 1955) in 1955 Francs.
1880 1910 1920 1930 1955
Agricultural product per
Non-Agri..... / / / /
Overall product per head
head 290 
// 1,850 
530
300 
1, 900 
570
350 
1, 900 
660
390 
1, 900 
720
290 
2,100 
750
Source: S. Amin in: The Maghreb in the modern world, op cit. p. 56.
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Table A2.6: Structure of GDP, in percentage, 1950 - 1960.
Sector 1950 1960
Agriculture 40 23
Industry 24 23
Services 36 54
TOTAL 100 100
Source: Constructed from L.S. Stoleru: Quantitative Model of Growth
of the Algerian Economy. Unpublished Ph.D. Brekerley University 1963. 
pp. 5 - 7 .
Table A2 .7: Breakdown of Constantine plan investment by sector in %.
Agriculture, Water development, Rural programmes 2 9
Industry 9
Infrastructure, Transport, Puplic utilities 18
Education 10
Health 3
Housing, Urban development, etc 25
Public administration 5
Miscellaneous 1
TOTAL 100
Source: Plan de Constantine 1959-63, Rapport General, Republique
Frangaise, Delegation General du Gouvernement en Algerie, Direction du 
Plan et des Etudes Economiques. Imprimerie Officelle. Algiers,, 1960.
Table A2 .8: Structure of working days & effective workers by sector, 
1960.
N Q of workers N Q working days n Q effective workers
Agriculture 1,600,000 170,000,000 850,000*
Industry & services 850,000 225,000,000 750,000®
Unemployed 200,000 ’ __ __
Total 2,650,000 395,000,000 1,600,000
*) calculated on the basis of 200 working days per effective worker.
0) calculated on the basis of 300 working days per effective worker. 
Source: Constructed from L. Stoleru. op cit. p. 15.
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Table A2.9: Balance of trade (in percentages) 1954 - 1961.
Imports 1954 1957 1959 1960 1961
Food, beverages & tobacco 22.27 21.07 22.24 23.32 28.54
Raw materials, fuels, fats oils 12.51 14.05 10.34 10.15 11.45
Manufactured articles 65.22 64.88 67.42 66.53 60.01
-textiles, clothing & footwear 7.62 11.64 9.82 9.68 9.32
-metal & metal products 4. 65 4.91 6.49 7.26 7.22
-machinery & equipments - 8.30 10.53 9.21 8.34
-passenger cars 3.72 3.00 4.15 4.06 2.18
-other transport equipments 6.41 8.90 5.79 5. 91 4.31
Total 100.0 100 .0 100.0 100 .0 100.0
France's share of total imports 73.9 73.3 82.5 79.9 77.5
Exports
Food, beverages & tobacco 70.29 77.83 74.99 55.10 41.30
of which: Wine (40.54) (48.66) (49.57) (37.90) (28.12)
- ctrus fruits (5.48) (9.01) (6.99) (4.44) (4.06)
Raw materials, fuels, fats oils 20.09 14.28 18.73 39 .82 52.94
of which crude petroleum - (0.05) (4.64) (29.13) (45.45)
all others . (20.09) (14.23) (14.10) (10.67) (7.49)
Manufactured articles 9. 62 7.90 6.27 5.08 5.75
of which : phosphates (1.58) (1.18) (1.27) (0.76) (0.49)
-machinery, transport equipments *(1.46) (o.92) (0.77) (0.86) (1.51)
- all others (6.58) (5.79) (4.22) (3.46) (3.76)
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
France's share of total 72.8 79.9 82.3 80.8 78.6
Trade Balance (million current Frs) ■-774.1 -2109 -3822.9 -3495 -1729.1
* mainly re-exports.
Source: La Zone Franc en 1963, Rapport Publie par le Secretariat du
Comite Monetaire de la Zone Franc; Paris 19 63 . pp.267 - 68. .And Year 
Book of International Trade Statistics, United Nations. New York 1957, 
1960, 1964.
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Table A2.10: Employment by sector and by ethnic groups, Oct 31st 1954.
Sectors Men (in
Algerians
1,000)
E. setllers
Women (in 1 
Algerians E.
, 000) 
setllers
A g r i c u l t u r e :
Owners, tenants 1032.3 20.9 970.3 3.2
wage earners 564.0 8.3 2J1
Total 1596.3 29.2 977.3 3.3
N o n - a g r i c u l t u r e :
Employers, self employed 27.5 16.3 2.6 2.6
Small traders 61.5 18.0 0.8 6.3
Other traders, industrialists 5.7 9.4 0.1 0.6
Liberal professions 2.1 9.2 0.1 1.8
Others 20.3 3.0 ILul JLA
Total 117.1 55.9 3.7 12.7
Wage earners:
Top management, professions 1.3 15.1 - 1.6
Technicians, formen etc 7.9 26.6 0.5 13.0
Office workers 9.0 26.3 0.5 13.OS
killed workers 38.3 44.4 1.2 5.3
Specialised workers 58.9 25.2 2.0 2.9
Unskilled workers 139.4 6.5 1.9 0.7
Char women - - 20.3 6.0
Others 43.8 32.6 5.0 12 .1
Total 298.6 176.7 31.4 62.6
Total employed, non-agr 
Employed
Total, non-agri labour force
415.7
130.5
546.2
232.6
12.9
245.5
35.1
2.6
37.7
75.3
1.2
76.5
Total labour force 2,142.5 274.7 1,015.0 79.8
Source: T.E.A 1960 (Imprimerie Baconnier), Alger, 1960. pp. 26-27.
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Table A2.ll: Nummber of annual Working days by size of holdings.
Size of area (ha) < 22 - 55 - 10 10 - 15 15 - 20 20 - 25 25 - 30 40 - 50
Maintenance 299 294 257
Vendaanges &
313 642 1531
Vinifications
Days per ha 356 189 178 90 54 26 15 7
Source: Statistiques Agricole, s6rie Etudes, N Q 32 Nov 1967. pp. 106- 
8, as quoted by A. Henni. op. cit. p. 69.
Table A 2 .12: Gross income and share of wages in the vineyard.
Year Wages in million Gross revenue in Wages/Revenues
of Francs billion of Francs
1956 12,090 56
1958 15,810 105
1960 19,590 130
Source: A. Henni. op cit. p. 69.
Table A2.13: Structure of viticulture, by size of holding and N Q
working days.
Area Working Days
Size of Area in number in% in Number in%
Less than 10 ha 60,700 16.58 22,500,000 82
10 ha - 50 ha 130,600 35.42 4,200,000 16
Over than 50 ha 175,000 48,00 550,000 2
Source: The same source as table 2.16 .p. 79.
21.50%
15.05%
15.07%
134 114 66 55 43
1210 971 605 409 334
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Table A2.14: Agricultural wage earners ( in 1954) .
Algerians European settlers
in numbers in % in numbers in %
Permanent workers 112,800 20.33 3,100 37.35
Daily workers 361,100 65.08 1.600 19.28
Seasonal workers 77,800 14.02 200 2.41
Agents of maitrise 2,300 0.42 2,000 24.10
Stage-manager 800 0.15 1,400 16.86
Total 554,800 100.0 8,300 100.00
Source: Report on 1954 census, as quoted in A. Henni . in: La
Colonisation Agralre et le Sous-Developpement en Algerie. S .N.E.D.,
Algir, 1981. p. 75.
Table A2.15: Daily wages in Francs.
Algerians European settlers
Daily labourer 6 10
Market gardener 7 12
Vintage 8 12
Cellarmen 8 15
Source: Ahmed Henni. op cit. p. 76.
Table A2.16: Distribution of employment by sector in %, 1967 - 83.
1967 1969 1973 1979 1984
Agriculture 50.0 49.4 40.0 32.1 22.8
Industry 7.0 8.5 11.2 13.3 13.7
C. P & Building 4.1 4.3 8.7 14.5 19.1
Services 21.4 21.0 20.2 21.7 22.2
Administration 17.5 16.8 19.9 20.4 22.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Constructed from Synthase du Bilan Economique et Social de la 
D6cennie 1967 - 1978. op cit. p. 136; and Annuaire Statistiques de 
l'Algdrie of 1981, p. 75; and of 1983/84. p. 40.
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Table A2.17: Structure of Employment by sector 1967 - 84, in
percentages.
Sector 1967 1973 1979 1984*
Agriculture 50 40 32 25.6
Non-agriculture 50 60 68 74.4
Total 100 100 100 100.0
*) from Annuaire Statistique de 1*Algerie 1983/1984.
Source: Constructed from table 2. 43.
Table A2.18: National resources & their uses (billion of current AD) .
1967 1969 1973 1978 1979 1982 rate*
GDP 14.6 18.5 30.5 74.1 113.2 185.5 18.5
Imports 3.6 5.8 10.9 41.9 40.8 59.4 20.5
Total resources 18.2 24.3 41.4 134.9 154.0 2.44.9 18.9
-Final consumption 10.4 12.6 18.7 53.9 62.0 103.1 16.5
-Gross accumulation 3. 9 6.7 13.9 54.8 53.7 79.0 22.2
-Exports 3.9 5.0 8.8 26.2 38.3 62.8 20.3
per capita income* 1326 1558 2340 4810 5822 10330 14.7
*) in units of current AD.
Source: Planification et D^veloppement. tome 1. op cit. p. 151.
Table A2.19: Sectoral Economic indicators 1960 - 1982, in %.
1960 1982
Agriculture Non-agricul Agriculture Non-agricul
1- Gross product 21 79 6 94
2- Share of labour force 67 33 25 75
3- Ratio of 1/2 0 .31 2.4 0.24 1.25
4- Ratio (3) of 1/ to (3) of 2 1 7 5.2
Source: Constructed from World Development Reports of 1979, 1980 and 
1984. World-Bank.
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Table A2.20: GDP Structure & its component growth rates 1967-82, in %.
Sector 1967 1969 1973 1977 1978 1982 rate*
Agriculture 13.7 11.9 8.9 7.2 7.2 6.6 1.3
Industry 14.3 14.7 15.4 11.5 11.6 11.6 5.5
C. & P. Building 8.2 8.7 10.5 10.1 12.0 13.5 9.9
Other material prod. 2.8 4.4 4.9 6.2 6.2 3.3 8.4
Sub- total 39.0 39.7 39.7 35.0 37.0 35.0 6.1
Hydrocarbon 17.8 16.3 21.3 31.8 26.4 35.6 12.6
Transp & communication 4.1 5.4 5.9 5.5 5.2 4.3 7.4
Services 14.4 12.0 8.9 5.9 7 -l 5.4 0.5
Commerce 19.2 20.1 17.4 12.8 15.2 13.6 4.3
Total value added 94.5 93.5 93.1 91.1 90.9 93.9 7.0
Import duties 5.5 6.5 6.9 8.9 9.2 6.1 7.9
G.Domestic Production 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 7.0
*) Average annual growth rates in real terms as deflated by a general 
prices index of 11.5% per year for the period 1967 - 1982.
Source: Constructed from Planification & D^veloppement, tome 1. op cit.
Table A2.21: Balance of trade in billion of dinars 1967 - 1982.
1968 1969 1970 1972 1974 1976 1979 1981 1982
Total Exports 4.4 5.0 5.3 6.2 20.1 22.9 48.6 64.5 62.8
-hydrocarbon 2.9 3.1 3.5 4.8 18.3 21.1 36.0 61.7 59. 6
-other goods 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.1 0.8 1.1 1.4
-services 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.8 1.7 1.8
Total Imports 4.6 5.9 7.0 7.7 19.5 27.4 40.5 59.2 59.4
- goods 4.0 5.0 6.2 6.7 17.8 22.2 32.4 48.8 49.4
-services 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.7 5.2 8.4 10.4 10.0
Sold (1-2) - 0. 2 -0.9 -1.7 -1.5 +0.6 -4.5 -2.2 +5.3 +3.4
Source: Planif ication & D6veloppement, tome 1. op cit. p. 152.
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Table A2.22: Imports-exports structures, in millions of current AD & in %
1967 
in value in%
1973 
in value in%
1979 
in value in%
1982 
in value in%
T. imports 3554 100 10934.4 100 40777.8 100 59387.4 100
-food products 824 23.2 1828.2 16.7 5174.3 12.0 8744.6 14.7
-indus goods 429 12.1 678.1 6.2 1777.9 4.4 3759.5 6.3
-indus approvis 1087 30.6 3495.7 32.0 11394.6 27.9 17587.0 29.6
-capital gooods 814 22.9 3532.7 32.3 14031.0 34.4 19296.3 32.5
-services 400 11.2 1400.0 12.8 8400.0 20.6 10000.0 16.9
T.exports 3872 100 7978.0 100. 38618.0 100 62783.0 100.
hydrocarbons 2605 67.3 6206.0 77.8 35956.0 93.5 9631.0 95.0
food products 647.1 16.7 780.1 9.8 418.4 1.1
other products 319.9 8.3 491.9 6.1 443.6 1.1 1752.0 2.1
services 300 7.7 500.0 6.3 1800.0 4.7 1800.0 2.9
Source: Constructed from Planification & D6veloppement, tome 1. op cit.
Table A2.23: Algerian oil production in million tons (1974 - 1984).
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
47.1 47.5 50.1 53.5 57.2 58.2 52.2 46.3 45.8 42.3 43.2
Source: B.P. Statistical review of World Energy. June 1984. p. 4.
Table A2.24: Evolution of Algeria's Exports & Imports in $ Millions.
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986*
Exports 15623 13296 11476 11162 12120 11930 7056
Imports 10339 11269 10738 10395 10393 9169 6480
*) From Financial Times Survey - Algeria. Dec 10th 1986. p. 2.
Source: African Research Bulletin, Economic Series, vol 23 N° 10 Nov 
1986. p. 8456.
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Table A2.25: Structure & growth of active population 1967-83 (in 1,000).
1967 1969 1973 1978 1980 1982 1983 rate*
Male (of 18-59 years) 1950 2120 2480 3086 3314 3562 3697 4.1
employed (15-17)® 220 218 217 170 167 167 167 -1.7
Employed female 103 118 157 233 267 315 342 7.8
R. Active population# 2273 2458 2854 3490 3748 4045 4206 4.0
*) annual growth rate.
0) Employed male of 15-17 years old and those over 59 years old.
#) Resident active population.
Source: Constructed from Synthase du Bilan Economique et Social de la 
D6cennie 1967 - 1978 . op cit. p. 136; and Annuaire Statistiques de 
1*Algerie of 1981, and of 1983/84.
Table A2.26: Structure of active populationl 1967 - 1983, in %.
1967 1973 1978 1982 1983
Male (of 18-59 years old)
Employed male (15-17) & over 59 Y. old 
Employed female
85.8
9.7
4.5
86.9
7.6
5.5
88.4
4.9
6.7
88.2
4.1
7.8
87.9
4.0
8.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Constructed from table A2.25.
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Table A2.27: Algeria's external debt in us$ millions (1970 - 1988) .
Year Total
Debt
Prinvipal
payments
Interest
payments
Total Debt 
service (TDS)
TDS/
Exports
1970 937 34 10 44 3.9
1971 1,233 52 16 69 n.a
1972 1,488 138 51 189 11.7
1973 2,932 233 67 300 n.a
1974 3,305 491 218 709 12.6
1975 4,477 247 209 456 9.4
1976 5,934 433 340 773 13.0
1977 10,318 639 405 1,044 15.3
1978 15,401 894 594 1, 488 20.4
1979 17,962 1,556 1,234 2,791 25.6
1980 18,686 2,460 1,394 3,854 25.8
1981 17,614 2,524 1,314 3,838 24.6
1982 16,683 2,898 1,371 4,269 28.6
1983 14,902 3,240 1,222 4,462 ' 31.8
1984 13,865 3,274 1,292 4,566 32.8
1985 15,330 3,286 1,296' 4,581 32.5
1986 19,300 3,248 1,433 4,681 51.0
1987 22,881 3,543 1,377 4,920 46.8
1988 n.a 4, 958 1, 485 6, 443 83*
n.a stands for not available.
*) Calculated by the author.
Source: Compiled from World Debt tables of different issues.
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APPENDIX 3.
DECOMPOSITION EQUATION of WITHIN and BETWEEN 
COMPONENTS of INCOME INEQUALITIES.
In order to assess the contribution of within and between 
components in the overall change in income inequalities, a 
partial differentiation of the decomposition of equation:
3.2: Cn2 = Wa Oa2 Ca2 + Wu Ou2 Cu2 + Wa(l- Ca)2+ Wu(l- Cu)2 .
has to be carried out. But owing to Oa = }Xa/(i.n and CTU = 
m/Rn- expressing the mean income in rural and urban as a 
fraction of the overall mean income of the national economy; 
the partial differentiation cannot be properly done because 
the assessment of separate effects on Cn (the overall 
coefficient of variation ) of the variation of the popula­
tion shares (weights, Wa and Wu) , the sector coefficient of 
variation (Ca and Cu), and the population income parities (Ga 
and Gu) , hence it is not convenient to use <7a and Gu, thus 
the population weight (Wa and Wu) would enter into the 
definition of fln where |ln= Wa|la+ WU|IU; where fln is the mean 
income of the national economy. So it would be preferable to 
express Ga and Gu in a different manner.
Then let (3.3) 0Ca= |Ia/f1 and 0CU = |1U/}1, where |1 = (|la+ fXu) /2,
a simple arithmetic mean. Substituting this (3.3) in Ga = 
na/nn and Cu = nu/nn as given above, then:
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oa = na/(in = n cca/( wa(ia+ wu|iu) = aa(na+n„)/ 2 < wa|ia+ wu|iu).
Dividing both numerator and dominator by |i, then:
a a (^/n+^/ii)
<Ta =   but CCa= |ia/|i and Ctu = then:
2 <WaHa/H+ WUHU/H)
3.3: oa = aa(aa+ a u) /2<waaa+wuau)
and with the same steps:
3.4: g u = aa(oca+au) /2(waaa+wuau)
Substituting 3.4 and 3.5 in the decomposition equation 
(3.2), it gives:
2 2
2 _  Ka< + *u > , W u C2u ^ ( « a t « u )2
’ " 4(Waaa + Wu«u)2 + 4(Waaa + Wu«u)2 +
2
[
k '( a + oi ) "I r a ( ce + a ) 1
1 - 3 a + W u 1 _ u a u
2( Waa a+ Wuau) J [_ 2 ( Wa a a + Wu «u) J
And Cn is a function of Ca, Cu, Wa, Wu, 0Ca and 0CU; then for k 
income groups, Cn can ke differentiated with respect to time 
to give:
k k
dcn/dt=s [ (3cn/9cj) (3cj/dt) ]+E [ (3cn/3w.,) (Swj/dt) ] +
_k k
£  [ (3cn/3oCj) (3cCj / dt) ], (note that 2  j=1(3Wj/dt) = 0)
However, the set of information required for the 
decomposition is:
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a) coefficient of variation in jth sector or group (Cj) .
b) proportion of population in jth sector or group (Wj) .
c) ratio of income per people in sector j to average income 
per people of all sectors, which is (Xj = JXj/jx.
To calculate each effect, consider as an example, the intra­
sectoral effect (3ch/0Cj) (3c.j/dt) , where 3cn/0Cj is a partial 
derivative obtained by varying Cj while all other variables 
are held constant, then having Cj tow points in time - at 
the start and end of the time period considered (dt), so:.
where C„(t.) = initial value of C and c(t.+ dt) = value ofn ' i '  n n ' i •
Cn after time dt, obtained from the decomposition equation by 
replacing initial Cj value with Cj value at time (ti+ dt) .
For two sectors, e.g. rural and urban, the total intra­
sectoral effects would be:
(0Cn/0Ca) (0Ca/dt) + (dcn/dcu) (dcu/dt) , representing respecti­
vely within rural effect and within urban effect. And the 
total intersectoral effects would be:
(3cn/3wa) (3wa/dt) + (3cn/3wu) (3w„/dt) + (dc^da^ (3aj/dt) + 
(dcjda.)) (30,/dt) .
That is, respectively population weight effects and income 
disparity effects.
(3 C id C. ) ( d C , /  dt ) =
n J j
[ C ( t j + dt )  -  C d j ) ]  [ C. ( t , . +  d t )  -  C j d j )  ] 
[ Cj ( t ( + d t )  -  Cj ( t ( ) ] [ ( t j + d t )  -  ( t , . )  ] 
[ C ( t, + d t ) -  C ( t , ) Jn i n 1
( d t )
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The total effect, meanwhile, is the sum of the intersectoral 
and intrasectoral effects. And these components can be 
expressed as percentages of the total, i.e. inter-sectoral 
effects as per-centage of total effects, and inter-sectoral 
effects as percentage of total effects.
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Appendix 4.
Table A 4 .1: Structure of per capita expenditure in urban areas
1967/68.
Socio-economic household
size
popula- food 
tion
non­
food
overall food % non­
food %
Independent agri 6.18 3.87 306.01 262.69 568.70 53.81 46.19
Perm, agr workers 6.49 7.05 410.65 269.85 680.50 60.34 39.66
Temp. // // 5.95 5.57 287.26 152.69 439.95 65.29 34.71
Employers 8.77 0.59 674.56 865.86 1540.42 43.79 56.21
Top Execu. & L. prof. 6.74 0.66 1015.04 1801.90 2816.94 36.03 63.97
Wholesale traders 7.27 0.41 844.10 1159.24 2003.35 42.13 57.87
Retail traders 6.86 12.77 478.27 537.31 1015.58 47.09 52.91
Craftsmen 6.22 3.82 449.66 449.83 899.49 49.99 50.01
Crafts workers 5.77 0.39 522.87 584.52 1107.39 47.22 52.78
Middle executive 7.05 3.02 782.50 936.75 1719.25 45.51 54.49
Clerks 6.91 8.28 621.65 637.02 1258.67 49.39 50.61
Qualified-Specia-P.wor 7.4 12.13 516.23 560.64 1076.86 47.22 52.78
// // Temp. // 6.39 1.26 390.78 287.67 678.45 57.60 42.38
Unskilled self-empl.* 6.88 0.92 309.38 215.98 525.36 58.89 41.11
Unskilled perm. empl. 7.14 8.64 429.41 350.76 780.17 55.04 44.06
Unskilled temp. empl. 5.90 7.41 281.51 179.83 461.34 61.02 38.98
Self-empl. in service 
\
7.44 0.96 502.68 564.56 1067.24 47.10 52.90
Perm. temp, employed 6.08 5.37 484.13 453.54 937.67 51.63 48.37
temp. empl. service 4.80 1.61 269.75 188.02 457.77 58.93 41.07
Law & Pub. security 6.36 2.93 775.62 965.51 1741.13 44.55 55.45
Retired 6.39 9.83 336.47 274.17 612.64 54.92 45.08
Rentiers 6.89 1.00 453.75 682.07 1135.82 39.95 60.05
Unemployed 4.68 1.50 240.46 171.36 411.82 58.39 41.61
Total or Average 6.42 100.0 460.03 449.87 909.90 50.56 49.44
*) in petty jobs.
Source: The same source as table A4.2, on the next page.
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Table A 4 .1: Structure of per capita expenditure in rural areas
1967/68.
Socio-economic household popula- food non­ overall food % non­
size tion food food %
Independent farmers 7.33 31.50 223.76 186.78 410.54 54.50 45.50
Perm, agr workers 6.57 7.12 357.77 266.13 623.90 57.34 42.66
Temp. // // 6.04 19.91 246.04 129.85 375.89 65.46 34.54
Employers 12J75 497.94 318.91 816.85 45.76 54.24
Top exec. & L. prof 7.50 0.22 846.49 803.36 1649.85 45.76 54.24
Wholesale traders 8.0 504.29 1928.46 2432.75 20.73 19.27
Retail traders 8.43 6.05 339.86 375.08 714.94 47.54 52.46
Craftsmen 6.55 3.10 323.56 204.56 528.12 61.27 38.73
Crafts workers 8.77 0.31 293.61 141.84 435.45 67.43 32.57
Middle executive 7.93 1.23 525.98 486.81 1012.79 51.93 48.07
Clerks 8.66 1.75 434.0 489.75 923.75 46.98 53.02
Qual.-Spec. Perm, wor 7.45 3.19 403.85 355.43 759.28 53.15 46.85
// // Temp.// 6.53 0.77 291.80 187.06 478.86 60.94 39.06
Unskilled self-empl.* 6.94 0.59 265.34 154.10 419.44 63.26 36.74
Unskilled perm. empl. 7.22 3.10 419.36 317.16 736.52 56.94 43.06
Unskilled temp. empl. 6.09 5.45 212.38 96.86 309.24 68.68 31.32
self-empl. in service 7.33 0.48 370.87 436.48 809.35 45.82 54.18
Perm. temp, employed 6.91 0.87 442.25 309.47 751.72 58.83 41.17
Temp. empl. service 4.0 0.26 196.33 77.07 273.40 71.81 28.19
Law & Public sec. 7.18 0.55 567.61 432.54 1000.15 56.75 43.25
Retired. 5.73 11.85 338.57 213.0 569.57 59.44 40.56
Rentiers 5.92 0.19 294.59 186.26 480.85 61.26 38.74
Unemployed. 4.47 1.51 169.06 116.80 285.86 59.14 50.86
Total or Average 6.66 100.00 285.08 214.90 499.98 57.02 42.98
*) in petty jobs.
Source: Constructed from l'Enquete de la Consommation des Manages
1967/68 . A.A.R.D.E.S. Tableaux de l ’Economie Algerienne 1973. Secre­
tariat d'Etat au Plan. Direction des Statistiques. pp. 241-46.
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Table A4.3: Daily average diet: Composition and nutrient structure in
all Algeria^ 1967/68.
Socio-economic Calories Protein Lipid Calcium Iron Vit A Vit B2 Vit PP Vit C
1-Independent Farmers 3288 103.6 38.4 446 14.5 210 0.85 24.3 37
2-Perm, agr workers 2840 81.7 41.9 349 11.8 250 0.75 18.5 66
3-Temp. // // 3054 93.8 36.4 312 12.7 145 0.71 22.4 30
4-Retail traders 2371 68.0 45.3 362 10.5 331 0.70 15.8 61
5-Craftsmen,Craft work. 2593 77.0 36.4 371 11.4 337 0.70 17.7 52
6-Middle executive 2725 77.6 62.1 501 12.7 553 0.94 18.2 95
7-Clerks 2426 65.4 57.3 434 11.2 471 0.77 14.6- 80
8-Qualified workers 2516 73.0 45.1 400 13.6 420 0.82 17.3 67
9-Unskilled perm.empl. 2589 76.0 41.2 360 10.7 291 0.68 16.7 51
10-Unskilled perm. empl. 2330 68.7 29.5 290 9.6 194 0.58 15.8 33
11-Unskilled self-empl.* 2466 73.1 27.1 319 10.0 206 0.66 17.7 40
12-Law & Public sec. 2659 74.1 58.7 470 12.3 536 0.86 17 .1 93
13-Retired 2958 86.9 55.7 369 12.5 342 0.75 19.5 49
14-Unemployed 2116 64.3 25.6 229 8.8 152 0.45 14.5 26
15-Rentiers 2503 73.3 43.4 433 11.3 502 0.77 17.0 74
16-Emp.& Wholesale trad 2727 78.3 69.8 529 13.5 488 1.05 18.4 75
17-Top exec. & L. prof. 2584 69.6 80.1 674 14.0 730 1.07 15.6 40
18-Pers. in services 2287 65.3 37.8 364 10.2 330 0.65 14.3 57
All Algeria^ 2817 84.2 42.1 377 12.3 273 0.75 20.0 49
Nutritional requirement 2400 60.0 40.6 500 12.2 600 1.35 15.0 30
#) All Algeria excluding Greater Algiers.
*) in petty jobs.
Source: Compiled form Analyse Nutritionelle... op. cit.
303
able A4.4. Daily average diet: Composition & nutrient structure in
urban communes 1967/68.
Socio-economic group Calories Protein Lipid Calcium Iron Vit A Vit B2 Vit PP Vit C
1-Independent Farmers 2743 83.1 38.1 390 11.3 251 0.72 18.8 52
2-Perm. agr. workers 2818 80.3 42.7 361 11.6 227 0.74 18.3 58
3-Temporary agr. // 2571 75.3 35.2 301 10.7 174 0.64 17.6 38
4-Retail traders 2148 60.4 52.9 390 10.2 378 0.72 12.9 68
5-Craftsmen, Craft wor. 2240 64.1 39.7 383 10.2 328 0.65 13.9 63
6-Middle executive 2529 69.7 66.1 563 12.2 566 0.91 15.4 104
7-Clerks 2361 63.3 62.6 481 11.2 497 0.80 13.9 84
8-Qualified perm. & tern 2221 63.2 43.0 375 10.4 381 0.68 13.9 68
9-Unskilled perm. empl. 2102 60.2 38.1 353 9.4 286 0.60 12.8 53
10-Unskilled temp. empl. 2069 60.1 28.6 273 8.4 176 0.51 13.2 37
11-Unskilled self-empl.* 1941 59.2 26.0 288 7.6 204 0.54 12.9 42
12-Law & Public security 2510 69.3 43.7 534 12.2 660 0.90 15.2 98
13-Retired 2376 68.9 40.7 352 10.3 329 0.64 15.1 51
14-Unemployed 2028 59.5 29.8 268 8.6 233 0.48 12.5 36
15-Rentiers 2526 74.0 47.4 423 11.6 575 0.77 16.7 75
16-Emp. & Wholesale trade 2686 83.5 70.6 612 13.8 443 1.20 19.4 88
17-Top exec & L  prof.
18-Personnal in services 2125 58.0 40.5 367 10.4 353 0.63 14.5 59
Ml Algeria# 231 1 65.7 44.8 383 10.4 346 C1.68 14.5 62
Nutritional requirement 2400 60.0 40.6 500 12.2 600 1.35 15.0 30
#) All Algeria excluding Greater Algiers.
*) In petty jobs.
Source: Compiled form Analyse Nutritionelle... op. cit.
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Table A4.5: Daily average diet: Composition and nutrient structure in
peri-urban areas 1967/68.
Socio-economic group Calories Protein Lipid Calcium Iron Vit A Vit B2 Vit PP Vit C
1-Independent Farmers 3520 129.4 42.0 476 16.6 162 1.00 26.7 36
2-Perm. agr. workers 2689 78.8 36.5 320 10.6 186 0.67 17.8 38
3-Tem. agr. // 2735 82.4 32.9 291 11.3 147 0.63 19.5 24
4-Retail tradesmen 2300 67.3 34.3 335 10.3 234 0.62 15.0 56
5-Craftsmen, Craft wor. 3013 92.2 36.7 402 14.6 489 0.78 21.9 64
6-Middle executive
7-Clerks 2427 66.6 52.2 447 11.1 581 0.78 14.2 84
8-Qualified perm.&tem 2630 73.0 54.7 401 11.7 468 0.75 16.6 76
9-Unskilled perm. empl. 2457 71.5 42.1 393 11.6 313 0.73 15.5 59
10-Unskilled temp. empl. 2723 83.8 34.6 314 12.4 244 0.64 19.1 25
11-Unskilled self-empl.* 2559 76.8 36.9 342 11.4 267 0.67 17.2 38
12-Law & Public security
13-Retired 2759 83.4 46.5 370 12.6 395 0.73 18.5 55
14-Unemployed
15-Rentiers
16-Emp. & Wholesale
17-top exec. & L. prof.
18-Personnal in services 2099 62.4 31.5 377 9.8 244 0.61 12.9 58
All Algeria# 2782 84.3 41.5 414 14.1 268 0.76 20.0 47
Nutritional requirement 2400 60.0 40.6 500 12.2 600 1.35 15.0 30
#) All Algeria excluding Greater Algiers.
*) In petty jobs.
Source: Compiled form Analyse Nutritionelle... op. cit.
305
Table A4.6: Daily average diet: Composition & nutrient structure in
rural communes 1967/68.
Socio-economic group Calories Protein Lipid Calciumi Iron Vit A Vit B2 Vit PP Vit C
1-Independent Farmers 3286 105.1 37.9 445 14.3 178 0.83 24.3 30
2-Perm. agr. workers 2821 84.8 43.6 356 12.2 170 0.78 20.7 75
3-Tem. agr. // 3247 101.2 37.8 323 13.6 131 0.74 24.6 28
4-Retail tradesmen 2659 79.7 40.0 353 11.1 254 0.71 18.6 50
5-Craftsmen, Craft wor. 2911 91.1 36.3 359 12.4 257 0.74 21.0 38
6-Middle executive 2935 90.1 60.7 411 12.9 426 0.95 22.1 69
7-Clerks 2469 67.4 49.4 338 10.5 327 0.68 15.7 65
8-Qualified perm. & tern 2812 84.1 41.2 344 11.6 291 0.71 19.7 49
9-Unskilled perm. empl. 3299 100.8 44.2 381 12.8 236 0.78 22.6 45
10-Unskilled perm. empl. 2593 79.2 30.2 297 10.5 160 0.64 18.4 23
11-Unskilled self-empl.* 3091 94.0 32.0 351 12.8 208 0.77 22.4 33
12-Law & Public security 2957 84.8 57.2 386 12.8 342 0.78 20.5 84
13-Retired 3341 97.7 65.3 382 13.6 326 0.80 22.7 45
14-Unemployed 2293 71.2 24.8 211 9.3 110 0.49 16.7 19
15-Rentiers
16-Emp. & Wholesale trade
17-Top exec. & L. prof.
18-Personnel in services 2803 86.7 36.9 36.3 12.0 276 0.73 19.7 45
All Algeria# 3104 95.7 41.8 376 13.1 212 0.77 22.4 39
Nutritional requirement 2400 60.0 40.6 500 12.2 600 1.35 15.0 30
#) Ecluding Greater Algiers.
*) -In petty jobs.
Source: Compiled form Analyse Nutritionelle... op. cit.
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Table A 4 .7: Daily average diet: Composition & nutrient structure,
communes of Southern Algeria 1967/68.
Socio-economic group Calories Protein Lipid Calcium Ironi Vit A Vit B2 Vit PP Vit C
1-Independent Farmers
2-Perm. agr. workers
2330 55.3 33.5 440 10.0 391 0.79 15.2 97
3-Temp. agr. // 1470 42.5 26.7 258 6.7 293 0.50 10.2 58
4-Retail tradesmen 2148 51.7 49.2 381 9.8 544 0.70 12.6 85
5-Craftsmen & Craft wor.
6-Middle executive
1976 46.9 30.9 381 8.6 480 0.64 11.1 72
7-Clerk 2641 70.9 54.0 478 12.5 588 0.86 16.4 96
8-Qualified perm. & temp. 2791 79.7 56.6 682 34.2 892 1.71 24.5 109
9-Unskilled perm. empl. 2230 59.2 42.7 317 9.5 474 0.62 13.8 57
10-Unskilled perm. empl.
11-Unskilled self-empl.*
12-Law & Public sec.
1727 40.5 26.1 289 7.2 274 0.53 10.3 62
13-Retired
14-Unemployed
15-Rentiers
16-Emp.&Whole. trade.
17-Top executive & L. prof.
2136 57.2 38.4 355 9.6 436 0.72 13.6 59
18-Personnel in services 2113 54.0 32.7 367 9.6 501 0.65 12.3 71
All Algeria# 21 90 55.4 38.3 400 11.6 480 0.78 14.1 80
Nutritional requirement 2400 60.0 40.6 500 12.2 600 1.35 15.0 30
#) Excluding Greater Algiers.
*) In petty jobs.
Source: Compiled form Analyse Nutritionelle... op. cit.
Table A4.8: Composition of average daily diet by socio-economic groups
in all Algeria*1967/68.
Codei Animal calories Vegetable caloriesCereal calories Animal proteins Cereal proteins
(a) in K.cal in%of T. in K.cal in%of T.in K.cal in%ofT. in Nr in% of T in Nr in % of T
1 162.6 4.9 3133 95.1 2634 79.9 7.85 7.6 89.9 86.8
2 131.0 4.6 2710 95.4 2141 75.4 5.9 7.2 71.6 87.6
3 095.2 3.1 2959 96.9 2538 83.1 4.4 4.7 86.0 91.8
4 215.4 9.1 2156 90.9 1597 67.4 10.1 14.8 53.0 77.9
5 135.4 5.2 2456 94^8 1959 75.5 6.4 8,3 66.0 85.7
6 361.5 13.2 2364 86.8 1652 60.6 16.6 21.4 54.0 69.5
7 253.5 10.4 2173 89.6 1471 60.0 11.3 17.3 47.0 72.2
8 182.7 7.3 2335 82.7 1723 68.4 8.4 11.5 57.3 78.5
9 146.6 5.7 2442 94.3 1907 73.7 6.7 8.8 64.3 84.6
10 075.0 3.2 2255 96.8 1842 79.1 3.5 5.1 62.0 90.2
1 1 108.7 4.4 2357 95.5 1939 78.6 4.8 6.6 65.5 89.6
12 302.6 11.4 2356 88.6 1630 61.3 13.1 17.7 53.3 71.9
13 240.2 . 8.1 2718 91.9 2180 73.7 6.4 7.4 74.6 85.8
14 067.5 3.9 2049 96.8 1732 81.9 3.2 5.0 58.3 90.7
1 5 184.8 7.9 2318 92.6 1656 66.2 8.9 12.1 56.4 76.9
1 6 450.2 16.6 2277 83.5 1570 57.6 . 18.8 24.0 50.8 64.9
17 500.8 19.4 2083 80.6 2176 45.5 23.2 33.3 35.5 61.0
1 8 156.7 6.9 2130 93.1 1601 70.0 7.7 11.8 52.6 80.6
All* 167.7 6.0 2649 94.0 2131 75.6 7.2 8.6 71.9 85.4
N.R# <66.0 15.0 25 <70.0
a) of different socio-economic groups as stated respectively in tables 
A 4 .3 - 7 above.
*) All Algeria excluding Greater Algiers.
&) Average all strata,of socio-economic groups.
#) Nutritional Requirements.
Source: Compiled form Analyse Nutritionelle... op. cit.
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Table A4.9: Composition of daily diet by socio-economic group in urban
communes* 1967/68.
i
Code Animal calories Vegetable caloriesCereal calories Animal proteins Cereal proteins
(a) in K.cal in%of T. in K.cal in%of T.in K.cal in%ofT. in Nr in% of T in Nr in % of T
1 131.8 4.8 2611 95.2 2127 77.5 6.2 7.5 72.5 87.2
2 117.9 4.2 2700 95.8 2141 76.0 4.0 5.1 70.8 89.4
3 94.1 3.7 2483 96.4 2031 78.8 4.5 6.0 67.4 89.5
4 292.4 13.6 1857 86.5 1287 59.9 14.2 23.5 40.9 67.7
5 177.3 7.9 2064 92.1 1563 69.7 8.2 12.8 50.7 79.1
6 379.0 15.0 2150 85.0 1406 55.6 17.0 24.4 44.3 63.6
7 277.4 11.7 2084 88.3 1352 57.3 13.0 20.5 42.6 57.3
8 186.4 8.4 2035 91.6 1494 67.3 9.1 14.4 48.8 77.2
9 152.7 7.3 1949 92.7 1445 68.7 7.0 11.6 47.7 79.2
1 0 76.7 3.7 1992 96.3 1613 78.0 3.6 6.0 53.5 89.0
1 1 102.2 5.3 1839 94.7 1504 77.5 5.3 9.0 51.3 86.7
12 398.5 15.9 2112 84.1 1407 56.1 17.0 25.0 43.8 63.2
13 137.6 5.8 2238 94.2 1713 72.1 6.6 9.6 57.2 83.0
14 100.2 4.9 1929 95.1 1566 77.2 4.2 7.1 52.0 87.4
1 5 187.1 7.4 2339 92.6 1686 66.7 9.1 12.3 56.6 76.5
1 6 495.4 18.4 2191 81.6 1564 58.2 25.1 30.1 50.2 60.1
17
18 165.8 7.8 1959 92.2 1419 66.8 7.9 13.6 45.3 77.8
All* 193.8 8.4 2117 91.6 1570 67.9 9.1 13.9 51.3 78.1
N.R# <66.0 15.0 25.0 <70.0
a) of different socio-economic groups as stated respectively in tables 
A4 .3 - 7 above.
*) Urban communes of Northern Algeria.
•) Average all strata of socio-economic groups.
#) Nutritionelle Requirements.
Source: Compiled form Analyse Nutritionelle... op. cit. p. 106.
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Table A4.10: Composition of daily diet by socio-economic group in
peri-urban* 1967/68.
Code Animal calories Vegetable caloriesCereal calories Animal proteins Cereal proteins
(a) in K.cal in%of T in K.cal in%of T in K.cal in%ofT in Nr in% of T in Nr in % of 1
1 200.7 5.7 3220 94.3 2830 80.0 11.2 10.4 91.7 85.0
2 128.8 4.8 2560 95.2 2108 78.4 5.0 6.3 70.9 90.0
3 71.5 2.6 2663 97.4 2280 83.4 2.2 2.7 76.9 93.3
4 136.4 5.9 2164 94.1 1677 72.9 6.3 9.4 55.7 82.8
5 107.2 3.6 2906 96.4 2415 80.2 5.1 5.5 81.3 88.2
6
7 244.0 10.1 2181 89.9 1535 63.3 11.0 16.5 49.0 73.6
8 192.2 7.3 2438 92.7 1772 67.4 7.7 10.5 58.5 80.1
9 180.7 7.4 2276 92.6 1792 72.9 7.4 7.7 59.2 62.0
1 0 58.5 2.2 2664 97.8 2230 81.9 2.7 3.2 75.4 90.9
1 1
12
1 3 171.4 6.2 2638 95.6 2060 74.7 5.8 7.0 70.3 84.3
14
1 5
16
17
18 163.6 7.8 1935 92.2 1531 72.9 6.5 10.5 50.2 80.7
All* 146.0 5.2 2636 94.7 2106 75.7 6.9 8.1 - 72.2 85.6
N.R# <66.0 15.0 25.0 <70.0
a) of different socio-economic groups as stated respectively in tables 
A4 .3 - 7 above.
*) In peri-urban, peri-rural of Northern Algeria,.
•) Average of all strata, of socio-economic groups 
#) Nutritional Requirements.
Source: Compiled from Analyse Nutritionelle... op. cit. p. 109.
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Table A4.11: Composition of daily diet by socio-economic group in
rural communes* 1967/68.
Code Animal calories Vegetable caloriesCereal calories Animal proteins Cereal proteins
(a) in K.cal in%of T in K.cal in%of T in K.cal in%ofT in Nr in% of T in Nr in % of 1
1 161.1 4.9 3125 95.1 2670 81.2 7.6 7.2 91.5 87.1
2 138.9 4.8 2782 95.2 2197 75.2 6.6 7.7 73.7 86.9
3 ’ 101.7 3.1 3245 96.9 2747 84.6 4.8 4.7 93.1 92.0
4 159.7 6.0 2499 94.0 1993 74.9 7.4 9.3 68.0 85.3
5 128.3 4.4 2783 95.6 2373 81.5 6.1 6.7 81.2 89.1
6 380.7 13.0 2554 87.0 1989 67.8 17.8 19.8 67.3 74.7
7 157.2 6.4 2312 93.6 1685 68.2 7.0 10.4 55.9 82.9
8 142.4 5.1 2670 95.0 2158 76.7 6.1 7.3 73.8 87.8
9 131.8 4.0 3167 96.0 2624 79.5 6.1 6.1 90.2 89.5
1 0 74.7 2.9 2518 97.1 2161 83.3 3.3 4.2 73.3 92.6
1 1 91.1 2.9 3000 97.1 2595 84.0 3.8 4.1 87.2 92.8
1 2 172.6 5.8 2784 94.1 2034 68.8 7.5 8.8 69.2 81.6
13 339.8 10.0 3201 95.8 2485 74.4 6.0 6.1 85.6 87.6
14 51.7 2.3 2241 96.7 1962 85.6 2.5 3.5 66.6 93.5
15
1 6
1 7
18 130.0 4.6 2673 95.4 2191 78.2 6.4 7.4 75.4 90.0
All* 160.7 5.2 2943 94.8 2479 79.9 6.4 6.7 84.6 88.4
N.R# <66.0 15.0 25.0 <70.0
a) of different socio-economic groups as stated respectively in tables 
A4 .3 - 7 above.
*)In rural communes of Northern Algeria.
•) Average of all strata of socio-economic groups.
#) Nutritional Requirements.
Source: Compiled from Analyse Nutritionelle... op. cit. p. 112.
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Table A4.12: Composition of daily diet by socio-economic group in the
south of Algeria 1967/68.
Code Animal calories Vegetable caloriesCereal calories Animal proteins Cereal proteins
(a) in K.cal in%of T in K.cal in%of T in K.cal in%ofT in Nr in% of T in Nr in % of T
1 105.7 4.5 2224 94.5 1218 52.2 6.1 11.0 42.5 76.9
2
3 62.4 3.5 1678 96.5 1005 57.8 2.1 4.9 35.8 84.2
4 231.7 10.8 1916 89.2 1132 52.7 9.9 19.1 36.5 70.6
5 102.8 5.2 1873 94.8 1108 56.0 5.0 10.7 36.9 78.7
6
7 299.7 11.3 2343 88.7 1513 57.2 14.4 20.3 49.1 69.3
8 140.1 5.0 2651 95.0 1347 48.3 12.4 15.6 43.1 54.1
9 137.2 6.2 2093 93.8 1406 63.0 6.9 11.7 47.2 79.7
1 0 84.5 4.9 1643 95.1 1003 58.0 3.3 8.1 33.2 82.2
11
1 2
13 208.9 9.8 1927 90.2 1228 57.4 11.0 12.2 41.1 71.8
14
1 5
1 6
17
18 167.3 7.9 1946 92.1 1249 59.1 8.1 15.0 40.3 74.6
A i r 167.6 7.7 2022 92.3 1211 55.1 7.5 13.5 40.5 73.1
N.R# <66.0 15.0 25.0 <70.0
a) of different socio-economic groups as stated respectively in tables 
A4 .3 - 7 above.
*) Average of all strata, of socio-economic groups.
#) Nutritional Requirements.
Source: Compiled from Analyse Nutritionelle... op. cit. p. 115.
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APPENDIX 5.
Table A 5 .1: Monthly salaries in non-agricultural activities (all
public & private) in AD, 1970.
Occupation High techniciansTechnicians Qualified, Help Unskilled Average
Grade and Executives Specialised personnel
Extractive industries 2408 8 9 7 785 452 4 3 9 460
Petroleum and gas. 1798 1381 959 760 5 6 9 941
Food & drink industries 1880 1339 804 571 4 5 9 788
Textile industries. 1723 1154 772 551 4 5 7 828
Leather & shoe industry 1641 1353 754 516 4 8 8 818
Chemical industries. 2024 1690 1056 769 5 6 5 1099
Construction materials 1603 1 143 749 519 4 6 7 7 5 7
Steel industries. 2361 1325 986 523 5 8 5 1108
Metal transformation 1663 1339 931 549 541 970
Wood industries. 1653 1297 789 508 4 2 6 824
Paper industries. 1688 1 177 810 476 4 4 9 824
Building & public works 2490 1405 921 612 4 1 5 1033
Electricity, gas & water. 1371 936 603 479 41 1 651
Banks & insurance. 1640 1193 704 528 481 7 57
Transport & comm 1789 1144 756 607 6 16 809
Other industries. 1050 1218 755 620 3 7 8 783
Overall average. 1871 1171 831 526 5 1 2 825
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Table A5.2: Monthly salaries in non-agricultural activities (public
sector) in AD, in 1970.
Occupation High techniciansTechnicians Qualified, Help Unskilled Average
Grade and Executives Specialised personnel
Extractive industries 2516 681 759 303 - 448
Petroleum and gas. 1717 1269 872 700 550 865
Food drink industries 1861 1262 770 579 461 753
Textile industries. 1625 999 730 574 458 751
Leather industries 1641 1236 760 496 468 833
Chemical industries. 1930 1771 983 785 5 68 1029
Construction materials 1912 1259 781 522 4 90 784
Steel industries. 2445 1278 982 524 - 1095
Metal transformation. 1711 1342 916 526 5 37 951
Wood industries. 1635 1180 698 5 07 430 758
Paper industries. 1751 1154 803 455 455 8 17
Building & public works. 2 917 1429 921 633 41 1 1062
Electricit, gas & water 1370 910 5 9 5 474 418 644
Banks, insurance. 1678 1234 708 528 478 755
Transport & comm. 1782 1091 723 601 5 6 7 780
Other industries. 1425 1366 713 620 5 8 7 859
Overall average. 1871 1104 785 5 82 501 788
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Table A5.3: Monthly salaries in non-agricultural activities of the
private sector,in AD (1970).
Occupation High techniciansTechnicians Qualified, Help Unskilled Average
Grade and Executives Specialised personnel
Extractive industries. 1800 1129 894 4 5 2 4 3 7 1030
Petroleum and gas. 2 52 7 1746 1621 1537 783 1673
Food & drink industries 2113 1794 1004 581 • 4 62 1065
Textile industries. 1783 1621 939 4 98 515 1087
Leather & shoe industry 1740 1412 749 5 3 3 5 0 7 801
Chemical industries. 2385 1 64 2 1022 739 5 7 9 1232
Construction materials. 1590 760 513 4 16 2 63 . 538
Steel industries. 2196 1411 990 5 1 4 5 85 1126
Metal transformation 1774 1578 1054 7 0 7 548 1118
Wood industries. 1795 1 4 7 7 912 5 1 0 4 09 949
Paper industries. 1608 1235 1004 620 3 43 1004
Building & public works 1875 1334 9 29 599 4 50 1008
Electricity, gas & water 1500 1349 862 5 7 7 3 7 7 740
Banks & insurance. 1319 1058 626 5 3 2 5 18 779
Transport & comm. 1902 1830 1312 672 8 84 1577
Other industries. - 1284 880 - 2 65 651
Overall average. 2064 1462 1093 825 598 1131
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Table A5.4: M o n t h l y  s a l a r i e s  in n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l  activities 
(public & private) in AD, 1980.
Grade 1 II III IV V VI Average
Extractive industries 2863 2562 2051 1617 1443 1179 1643
Petroleum and gas. 2734 1798 1757 1397 1185 1 146 1622
Food & drink industries 3120 2245 1560 1451 1200 1137 1467
Textile industries. 2 95 7 2426 1799 1439 1290 1153 1533
Lather & shoe industries2958 2504 1804 1497 1137 1060 1567
Chemical industries 2986 2556 2061 1429 1274 1070 1639
Construction materials 3090 1894 1775 1674 1531 1361 1568
Steel industries. 3530 2440 2 03 9 1722 1377 1 105 1749
Metal transformation 3819 2549 1981 1452 1235 1 147 1643
Wood industries. 4015 2985 2 6 8 7 2081 1572 1458 1986
Paper industries. 3 61 7 2350 1807 1605 1460 1211 1652
Building & pub. works. 3570 2560 1883 1597 1369 1086 1745
Electricity, gas &water 2904 2377 1605 1580 1342 1221 1790
Banks & insurance. 2308 1902 1454 1280 1224 1004 1483
Transport & comm. 3471 2695 1644 1453 1368 1252 1521
Other industries. 4099 2351 1808 1542 1231 0 97 6 1397
Overall average. 3003 2312 1787 1545 1353 1 189 1602
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Table A5.5: Monthly salaries in non-agricultural activities of the
public sector in AD, 1980.
Grade 1 II III IV V VI Average
Extractive industries. 2653 236 4 2 02 9 1607 1443 1341 1740
Petroieum and gas. 273 4 1798 1757 1397 1185 1146 1622
Food drink industries 2 72 7 2144 1693 1498 1269 1 165 1575
Textile industries. 275 3 2 40 4 1644 1439 1334 1207 1626
Leather industries. 3 2 4 7 2351 1831 1609 1222 1209 1650
Chemical industries. 2323 1867 1674 1521 1342 1081 1528
Construction materials 2599 1925 1826 1740 1616 1608 1717
Steel industries. 3050 2 42 5 1856 1620 1379 1132 1667
Metal transformation. 2676 2 1 5 7 1706 1503 1217 1160 1528
Wood industries. 4015 2985 2 6 8 7 2081 1572 1458 1986
Paper industries. 3099 2 19 4 1726 1582 1334 1169 1658
Building & public works 2893 2 34 9 1733 1442 1286 1072 1660
Electricity, gas & water 2904 2 3 7 7 1605 1580 1342 1221 1790
Banks & insurance. 2308 1902 1454 1280 1224 1004 1483
Transport & comm. 2805 2 42 9 1793 1507 1441 1293 1653
Other industries. 3 31 2 2 33 7 1786 1335 1010 1028 1305
Overall average. 2770 2 214 1735 1552 1374 1206 1652
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Table A5.6: Monthly salaries in non-agricultural activities in the
private sector (1980).
Grade 1 ii III IV V VI Average
Extractive industries 3 07 3 2 76 0 2 073 1627 - 1016 1545
Petroleum and gas. - - - - - - -
Food drink industries 3 5 1 2 2 34 5 1406 1403 1131 1109 1359
Textile industries. 316 0 2 4 4 7 1954 1438 1245 1098 1439
Lather & shoe industries 2669 2 6 5 7 1777 1385 1052 0911 1484
Chemical industries. 3649 3 24 4 2 4 4 7 1337 1206 1058 1749
Construction materials 3580 1863 1724 1607 1446 1113 1418
Steel industries. 4010 2 4 5 5 2221 1824 1375 1077 1831
Metai transformation 4961 2940 2256 1400 1253 1 133 1757
Wood industries. 4 2 4 7 2 77 0 2033 1752 1451 1100 1830
Paper industries. 4135 2 50 5 1887 1628 1586 1253 1622
Building & public works. - - - - - - -
Electricity, gas & water - - - - - - -
Banks & insurance. - - - - - - -
Transport & comm. 4 1 3 7 2961 1494 1398 1295 1211 1388
Other industries. 4886 2364 1829 1749 1452 0924 1488
Overall average. 3935 2 70 2 1993 1515 1267 1117 1404
Source : For 1970, La Situation de l'Emploi et des Salaires 1970 
S.E.P. Direction des Statistiques. Decem. 1970.pp.32-35.
For 1980 Annuaire Statistiques de l'Alg6rie 1981. M.P.A.T. Mars 1983. 
p. 351.
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Table A5.7: Distribution of expenditure on bread, cerals and its by­
products by brackets of consumption expenditues in 1979/80.
Expenditure brackets population in % expenditure in %
less than 800 3.8 2.0
800 - 1,000 3.2 2.4
1,000 - 1,200 4.4 3.3
1,200 - 1,500 7.3 6.1
1,500 - 2,000 18.6 16.2
2,000 - 2,500 13.5 12.7
2,500 - 3,000 11.0 10.6
3,000 - 3,500 9.3 9.9
3,500 - 4,000 6.8 7.9
4,000 - 4,500 5.1 5.8
4,500 - 5,000 4.2 5.3
5,000 - 5,500 3.1 4.1
5,500 - 6,000 1.9 2.2
6,000 - 6,500 1.4 1.9
6,500 - 7,000 1.6 2.0
7,000 - 7,500 1.0 1.4
7,500 and over 3.8 6.2
Average/or total 100.0 100.0
Source: D6pense de consommation des Manages Alg6riens. op cit.
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